Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

190. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, December 14, 1966, 1550Z.

7104. Subj: Relaxation of tensions in Central Europe. For the personal attention of the Secretary, Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary Leddy. This message was initiated during my visit with Amb. Gronouski in Warsaw and has been the subject of subsequent exchanges between us. It represents my views and those of Amb. Gronouski, based on draft studies in both Embassies, on how relations between Poland and the FRG might be improved and the cause of European stability thus advanced. While certain revisions in this draft have been occasioned by the FRG policy declaration, which was given subsequent to my latest consultations with Amb. Grounouski, I believe that this message corresponds to the substance agreed. He may, however, wish to make additional comments.

1. A resolution of the Central European security problem is essential to a lasting peace in Europe. A key to this resolution is the development of an improved relationship between Germany and Poland. Poland, of all the Eastern European countries, retains the greatest fear and distrust of Germany. Between the two countries there exist the most specific, unresolved conflicts remaining from World War II:

(A) The division of Germany and German determination to achieve reunification;

(B) The failure to achieve final agreement on the Western boundary of Poland;

(C) Poland’s fear of German access to nuclear weapons;

(D) Poland’s fear of a possible Soviet-West German deal which would result in reunification without resolving the security of its Western territories;

(E) Germany’s fears of aggression by the USSR through and with the support of Poland; and

(F) The plight of the German minority in Poland.

2. The absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries is a factor resulting from and contributing to the prolongation of these conflicts. Only in the fields of trade, culture and in the exchange of persons has there been any concrete improvement in relations between Germany and Poland in recent years. However, even in these fields progress has been hobbled for political reasons.

3. The proposal: President Johnson’s October 7 speech, particularly his remarks on German reunification and European boundaries, opened the door to new ways of thinking and working towards a resolution of the Central European problem. Considering the conflicts listed above against the background of the President’s speech, the best possibilities for improvement appear to lie in the following steps to be taken on German initiative:

(A) Announcement by Germany of its intention to accept the Oder-Neisse Line, this action to be legalized however only when German reunification is achieved in the context of a final peace settlement. Such a step would greatly reduce Poland’s fear that Germany might attempt to seize the territory east of the Oder-Neisse by force. It would eliminate Polish dependence on the USSR as sole guarantor of the Polish territories east of the Oder-Neisse. By prior agreement, this action could also result in the establishment of Polish-German diplomatic relations.

(B) Concurrently with and supporting the action in (A), and as a consideration for a more liberal Polish policy permitting an increased rate of resettlement in Germany of Germans still living in Poland, Germany would renounce the claim of Heimatrecht (the right to return to one’s homeland) for German expellees from Poland, except insofar as this can be achieved by a free negotiation with Poland. This would also make the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary more acceptable to the Germans.

(C) At the next extension of the German-Polish trade agreement, increased levels of trade and credit terms more favorable for Poland would be negotiated.

4. German relations with Poland would, of course, also be greatly enhanced if Germany would adhere to a general non-proliferation agreement and would publicly renounce a hardware solution of the nuclear sharing problem, including a reiteration of its oft made denial of any intention to possess nuclear weapons. These issues arise, however, within a broader context and it must not be expected, therefore, that their resolution can be made to coincide with the other steps recommended herein.

5. Comment: (A) There is evidence that Poland may be willing to enter into diplomatic relations with Germany on the single condition that Germany recognize the Oder-Neisse Line. It is difficult politically for any German Government to do this until a peace treaty is achieved as stipulated in the Potsdam Agreement. Few Germans realistically expect to regain territory; nevertheless, many influential Germans feel that advance recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary would cost them one of the few bargaining counters they have for reunification. The formula proposed in 3 (A) above might be acceptable to Poland and Germany as a compromise.

(B) The often but ambiguously expressed claim to Heimatrecht made by some Germans, particularly when linked with a subsequent right to self-determination, is particularly offensive to Poland. Since the Germans have renounced the use of force, it is a claim which can be realized only through bilateral agreement. By renouncing the territory beyond the Oder-Neisse and Heimatrecht, the German Government would lose considerable support among expellees. This would, however, be offset somewhat by permitting greater freedom of movement of Germans to and from the Oder-Neisse territories (para 3 B).

(C) Since there is no real possibility for agreement at the present time on German reunification or—on the other side of the coin German recognition of the GDR—the Germans and Poles would ignore these points—agreeing to disagree. Although there is evidence that Poland will insist on FRG recognition of the GDR as a condition prior to eventual “normalization” of relations, it would not be required for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

(D) In his policy declaration before the Bundestag on December 13,² Chancellor Kiesinger had the following to say about relations with Poland: “Large sectors of the German people very much want reconciliation with Poland whose sorrowful history we have not forgotten and whose desire ultimately to live in a territory with secure boundaries we now, in view of the present lot of our own divided people, understand better than in former times. But the boundaries of a reunified Germany can only be determined in a settlement freely agreed with an all-German government, a settlement that should establish the basis for a lasting and peaceful good-neighborly relationship agreed to by both nations.” The new govt thus continues to adhere to the position that settlement of the boundaries will have to await a peace treaty.

At the same time Kiesinger emphasized the desire for reconciliation with Poland—and expressed greater understanding for Poland’s desire for secure borders. This could conceivably lead to a decision by the govt to grant—as proposed in (3)—what is essentially de facto recognition of the existing borders to be followed, upon a final settlement, by de jure acceptance.

(E) Tact and patience will be required in dealing with the Germans on this issue, however, I am inclined to believe that the present grand coalition may offer better prospects than the previous govt for tangible progress toward a German-Polish settlement. For one thing, it can make certain concessions without fear of exploitation by a major rival party. Moreover, the SPD has been a consistent proponent of a more flexible Eastern and nuclear policy. While not explicitly endorsing the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, a number of speakers at the June 1966 Party Congress—including FonMin Brandt—hinted that Germany must reconcile itself to the loss of the territory east of the Line. (Brandt said: “Many people act as though we have the territories east of the Oder-Neisse. They also act as though friendly states had committed themselves to mere legal reservations, when in fact some had not even done that … therefore our demand for working out the basic elements of a peace treaty settlement.”)

(F) The new German Govt has stated that it seeks “neither national ownership nor national control of nuclear weapons.” While vague, this language would not rule out the type of development foreseen in para 3.

6. Tactics: (A) The US is not believed to be in a position either openly or officially to propose the course of action described in paras 3 and 4. To do so might put the German Govt on the defensive, and would represent an assumption of responsibility for Germany’s future which we are in no position to take.

(B) I propose, however, that I be authorized to suggest such a course privately to Chancellor Kiesinger and FonMin Brandt. I would propose to do so in separate personal conversations with each—“unter vier Augen”—on an appropriate occasion. I would present the ideas expressed in this telegram both as a personal reaction from my trip to Poland, and as steps which I knew the US Government would approve and, when appropriate, support.

(C) In stating the case, I would congratulate them on the forward-looking approach they are taking toward all the East European countries. I would express the hope that the Federal Republic will be able to make progress in improving its relations with all the countries of East Europe, not just Poland. I would avoid any definition of what I understood the Oder-Neisse Line to cover. There would be no suggestion that Poland need be the first country tackled or that German initiatives should be limited to Poland. Indeed, once Germany has decided to breech the Hallstein Doctrine, Romania, which demands no conditions, may be the most logical country to begin with.

(D) Amb. Gronouski would seek to encourage and guide the Polish Government’s response to any German initiative along these lines—as appropriate.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Warsaw for Ambassador Gronouski and passed to the White House.
2. For extracts, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 935–941.