Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

136. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 15, 1965, 2315Z.

Secto 15. Following based on uncleared memcon FYI Noforn subject to revision on review:

Secretary met with Schroeder at 12:30 PM December 15 and reported he had just discussed communiqué problem with Couve, informing him that we could not agree to place specific time limitation on special committee. Secretary said he had suggested to Couve that communiqué omit any reference to timing. Schroeder agreed this would be satisfactory.²

Secretary said that while President and Erhard spoke alone together during forthcoming Washington meeting he hoped that he and Schroeder could pursue question of possible declaration on Germany following up on Schroeder’s comments at Quadripartite dinner. Secretary had impression that there were some things which could be said about political settlement in Europe which, while they might not have an effect in Moscow, could have impact in Eastern Europe. We could spell out some of prospects which would open up if Germany were reunified in freedom, i.e. boundary settlement, arms control, trade and economic assistance. What might be considered is unilateral Western declaration outlining these prospects.

Schroeder seemed relatively cool to this idea noting FRG had already given direct indications of these possibilities on various occasions. He agreed however on need for more emphasis on advantages reunification would bring to the East. In absence prospect serious negotiations, however, it was difficult and dangerous to get into details. Secretary recalled that Schroeder had talked of formalizing “arms status” of FRG and wondered if this referred to control over arms levels or covered such matters as German membership in NATO. Schroeder replied this formula went back many years and was intentionally vague. No real discussion on European security system possible in abstract. Secretary suggested this matter be pursued further in Washington.

Secretary asked whether there were any special developments in FRG-Polish relations. Schroeder said there were no developments of positive nature. Poles have held FRG trade mission to exclusively trade problems. There has been no trace of Polish desire to use FRG mission as point of departure for political discussions. Polish Bishops’ overture to German Bishops has been squelched by political authorities although it was still not clear whether Poles would actually attempt to prevent their entry.

Secretary said President would wish to discuss Vietnam with Chancellor. In early January he would have to go to Congress with more specific recommendations re future US commitments in SEA. These would include substantially larger number of men and large increase in US defense budget, and would inevitably stimulate discussion of US commitments in Europe. Secretary McNamara had tried to fend off consequences this questioning by stating our intention not to make major changes in US combat forces in Europe. However questions would arise as to what our Allies are doing to help in SEA. It would be helpful if FRG could consider this issue and specifically whether it could send engineers, medical, or other specialized personnel. He recognized problems this would raise but wished to flag it as subject for discussion with Chancellor.

Schroeder noted in reply that FRG economic aid was second only to US and that personnel represented major difficulty. This could only be done on voluntary basis and matter had been raised with many private organizations. Response so far was not encouraging. Secretary asked whether “official units” such as police, hospital or engineering units could be sent. Schroeder said that he would have this matter looked into in detail.³

Discussion concluded with review of status negotiations on communiqué with US promise to support sentence rebutting Soviet anti-FRG defamation campaign and promise by Secretary to speak to Danes,⁴ who constituted major resistance to inclusion of this thought. Secretary made clear his personal disenchantment with entire process of communiqué drafting and disinclination to devote many minutes of Ministerial time to it. Schroeder noted that communiqués have some importance for European public opinion and for historical record.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Exdis.
2. For a summary of discussions at this December 15 meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 118. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, January 3, 1966, pp. 7–9.
3. Regarding this discussion of Vietnam, see also Document 135.
4. A handwritten notation reads: “Not French?”