Office of the Historian

133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

Moscow, December 11, 1965, 1205Z.

1907. For Secretary, Under Secretary, Amb Thompson, Leddy, Rostow.

1.
In response Amb McGhee’s request, I would offer following comments on his thoughtful memorandum on German reunification.2
2.
I agree we must continue seek allay German suspicions that Allies not really interested in reunification. We should therefore keep issue alive and raise it with Soviets on every suitable occasion, as has been done, of course, by Secretary in his conversations with Gromyko over past five years and most recently in New York, as well as by Stewart during his visit here last week. We will thus continue to keep record clear that responsibility for continued division of Germany rests with Soviets.
3.
I also agree that in pursuing above objective we must, of course, not jeopardize other U.S. foreign policy objectives. Soviets are now (and, I suspect, will be for some time to come) disinterested in reunification and desirous maintain status quo in Central Europe. I therefore see no reason for us to take any initiative which, given this Soviet position, bound to fail and would only force differences existing among allies and with Germans on various aspects of issue. Moreover, I see no reason why we should arouse Soviets on thorny problem which they themselves seem prefer leave dormant at this time. Despite vehemence their anti-FRG propaganda, Soviets clearly not seeking open “second front,” as it were, in Germany in connection their disagreement with us over Vietnam, and such front is certainly not in our interest either.
4.
I see no percentage for anyone at this time in any formal procedural initiative. Chances of Soviet acceptance such initiative are nil, as shown by Gromyko’s reaction to Secretary’s and Stewart’s probing re possibility Four-Power talks as recently as last October and last week, respectively (Embtel 1890, Dec 10),3 and it is hard to see what Bonn could derive domestically from such unpromising initiative except increased demands for further and more far-reaching moves requiring painful decision.
5.
As Amb McGhee’s memo points out, Soviets seem to take broader view of quadripartism than East Germans, and they have repeatedly stated that while Four Powers could not solve reunification, they could facilitate it. In view of this, Bonn’s interest in having Quadripartite umbrella for bilateral West German-East German negotiation could perhaps be met by simply assuming any such negotiations were in fact being conducted under Four-Power aegis. As recently as yesterday Gromyko explicitly reaffirmed continuing validity Potsdam Agreement, and such implicit arrangement covering FRG-GDR contacts would be difficult for Soviets to denounce.
6.
Meanwhile, I believe we should continue quietly to encourage Germans to sort out their own thoughts on various short and long range issues relating to reunification problem. This connection, I note from Bonn’s 1683 to Dept4 that exchange of messages between German and Polish Bishops may have set a hopeful trend in this direction, and I fully agree that we should make every effort to ensure that these possible opportunities be fully utilized.
Kohler
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn for Ambassador McGhee.↩
  2. Document 131.↩
  3. Dated December 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-USSR)↩
  4. Dated December 8. (Ibid., POL 7 GER W)↩