Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

131. Memorandum Prepared in the White House¹

Washington, undated.

TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR MEETING²

November 11, 1965

The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Ball, Mr. M. Bundy

1. Preparations for Erhard Visit

There are a number of important issues for discussion with Erhard—France and NATO, offset agreements and troop levels, funds for under-developed countries, policy toward Russia, reunification, trade and finance. But the one which needs urgent discussion today is Atlantic nuclear defense policy and the German place within it.

Three views have developed in recent weeks in Washington. One is that it is important to have US leadership in pressing for a “hardware” solution—a collective nuclear force in which the Germans would buy a share and in which they could look forward to mixed-manning and increasing responsibility. This solution is strongly preferred by Under Secretary Ball, who would couple it with resolute pressure upon Great Britain to give up a finger on the trigger of an independent nuclear force.

The second school of thought which includes Bundy would argue strongly against pressing for a hardware solution now and would prefer a candid statement to the Germans that no such solution seems immediately possible since there is no consensus whatever on its shape or form in Europe. This school believes that the Germans mislead themselves about the real meaning and value of such a hardware solution and that it would be wrong to proceed now even if we could easily get the agreement of other Europeans. This school would prefer to seek maximum value from increased consultation on matters of intelligence, targetting, planning, budgeting, and weapons system design. This school would not foreclose an eventual shared weapons system and would not give up existing US language in the non-dissemination treaty at German expense.³

Secretary McNamara would support a hardware solution if it is the President’s judgment that such a solution deserves intense and continuous US pressure for its achievement. If not, he would prefer a decision now that we do not expect a hardware solution.

Secretary Rusk recognizes also that we cannot afford a feeling of betrayal among the Germans. Unlike Ball, McNamara, and Bundy, who believe that this issue requires prompt decision, the Secretary has kept open the possibility that the matter might be discussed right through the coming winter. McNamara and Ball will be in Europe in the last week in November,⁴ and it is essential that they have a clear sense of the President’s own desires before they go.

[Here follows discussion of issues unrelated to Germany.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, vol. 16. Secret.
2. The President’s Daily Diary for November 11 indicates that he did hold morning and afternoon meetings with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and Bundy at the LBJ Ranch. Moyers sat in on the afternoon meeting. (Ibid.) No record of their conversations was found.
3. Marginal notes by McGeorge Bundy that begin in the left margin next to the third paragraph read: “A basic reason for discussion now.” “What do we say after Erhard visit. Surface words are easy, but general words are hard—even impossible unless they are agreed.”
4. McNamara was scheduled to attend the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Paris November 27–29.