96. Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Council1

SUBJECT

  • Soviet Policy in the Light of the Vietnam Crisis

In the four months since the fall of Khrushchev the effects which this event might have on the general course of Soviet foreign policy, and in particular on relations with the US, have been far from clear. There have been some signs of a willingness to continue the phase of reduced tensions which began in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis and which brought some constructive developments in Soviet-American relations. But there have been other signs-in Soviet handling of the Congo and UN crises, in the virtual standstill on bilateral issues, and in the generally more militant and at times even hostile tone of propaganda-of an inclination to terminate the post-Cuba phase and to return to a harder stance in relations with the West.

The intensification of the Vietnam crisis over the last week, preceded as it was by Soviet moves to resume an active role in that area, has brought what is apparently the first major test of the succession leadership’s conduct of external policy. This paper examines some of the questions posed by the USSR’s involvement in the Vietnam crisis, primarily with a view to inferences which may be drawn about the general direction of Soviet policy in the current phase.

Why Soviet Policy Resumed an Active Role in Southeast Asia

Khrushchev had virtually disengaged Soviet policy from the Indochina problem, presumably because since mid-1963 Hanoi’s alignment with Peking had been complete and the USSR no longer had any real influence on the conduct of the warfare in South Vietnam and Laos. Deeply preoccupied with internal economic problems, he was probably not willing to see a new increase of tensions in relations with the US develop from the sharpening confrontation in Vietnam which Hanoi and Peking insisted upon. He was moving in any case toward a rupture with the Peking-led parties in the Communist movement. His [Page 245] course manifested itself in tacit abandonment of Moscow’s co-chairmanship responsibility under the Geneva agreements and in his tepid reaction to the US retaliatory attacks in the Tonkin Gulf incident last August.

It now appears that the Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership rejected this virtual ceding of Chinese hegemony over the Communist movement in Asia. Contacts with Hanoi were resumed in November, and new declarations of Soviet support “in the struggle against US imperialism” were then issued in the following weeks. Evidently the Soviet leadership was encouraged by these soundings and by a change of tone in Hanoi’s utterances on the Sino-Soviet quarrel to believe that there was a chance of bringing North Vietnam back to something like the middle position it had held earlier in the struggle between Moscow and Peking. This possibility would be increased if Moscow could be helpful to Hanoi in what must have looked like the approach of the terminal phase of the war in South Vietnam. To play such a role would also deprive Peking of exclusive credit for having backed this crucial “national liberation struggle.” This would offset the Chinese charges of Soviet lukewarmness toward such efforts, long one of the key issues in the dispute.

It was almost certainly this chance to win back the support or at least the neutrality of one of Peking’s client parties, all the more important because of the reluctance of East European and other parties to proceed toward a showdown with Peking and its supporters, which drew Moscow into its courting of Hanoi. At the time the Kosygin visit was laid on with a view to capping this effort, it was probably believed in Moscow that there was little chance that a “wider war” would develop over South Vietnam and so involve the USSR in a risky commitment. Or it may have been thought that Moscow’s renewed support to Hanoi would help to deter the US and so minimize this risk.

It cannot be excluded, of course, that Moscow did estimate that there was still considerable danger of escalation of the Vietnam war but chose deliberately to run the risk of injecting itself into the situation. In case of success, the prospective gains in the intra-Communist quarrel and in terms of prestige throughout the Afro-Asian world would be tempting. It is mainly Moscow’s consistent record of caution in direct confrontations with the US which discredits this hypothesis.

Even if the US accepted defeat in South Vietnam without moving to enlarge the war, however, it must have been recognized in Moscow that the Soviet move to associate itself with Hanoi at the last stage could bring a sharp deterioration in US-Soviet relations. It may have been hoped that this could be overcome by a campaign of new gestures for relaxation of tensions culminating in an exchange of high-level visits. Khrushchev had similarly attempted to combine a Western reverse over Berlin with the healing effects of summitry.

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If the foregoing reconstruction is reasonably accurate, it is clear that the Soviet leadership was willing, for the sake of possible gain in its struggle with Peking for leadership in the Communist movement and the Afro-Asian world, to put its relations with the US in serious jeopardy. This shift in priorities conforms with the impression that many observers have had of Moscow’s behavior in recent months: that the primary preoccupation of the new leaders, apart from internal problems, was in coping with the challenge of China rather than in continuing the improvement of relations with the West.

Possible Consequences of Soviet Support for North Vietnam

The problem posed for the Soviet leaders by the sudden threat of escalation in Vietnam is probably felt as an agonizing one: If the “wider war” develops after all, what risks of serious confrontation with the US should they assume to fulfill their new commitment to Hanoi? To appear to renege would be extremely costly in the struggle with Peking. On the other hand, the Soviets must see one particularly dangerous feature in this crisis; they will not be in full charge, but can have their hand forced by Hanoi and perhaps also by Peking. It is probably this that explains the still somewhat hazy formulation of the pledge to Hanoi, unchanged even after Kosygin’s visit and the US attacks.

Whenever Soviet freedom of maneuver is narrowed in a major crisis, the hypothesis is advanced-and deserves examination-that Moscow might try to force the US to back off by bringing pressure to bear in another theater. In the present case, a new threat to Berlin access, a push against South Korea, or in Laos are all conceivable.

The device of instigating a diversionary crisis to maximize pressures has never been employed by the Soviets in the past, although they had this option in both the Berlin and Cuban cases. The compelling reason against it has probably been that to present the US with what would then appear as a generalized threat rather than a limited local demand might raise tensions beyond control. At a minimum, it would greatly complicate the tasks of crisis management. It could also overextend US conventional capabilities and so increase the incentive to resort to nuclear weapons. In the present case, with some degree of escalation already taking place, and with the Soviets not in complete control of their partners, resort to a diversionary crisis seems even less likely than in previous cases.

Almost certainly the course which the Soviets prefer would be to combine a strong display of support for Hanoi with diplomatic action to contain the crisis. The critical unknowns affecting this possibility are the intensity of Hanoi’s desire for early victory even in the face of major dangers and the degree of Moscow’s leverage on the North Vietnamese leadership.

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It is possible that Kosygin argued successfully that if Hanoi was patient some while longer and refrained from raising the level of action in the South to a point which would provoke further American attacks, the process of decay in Saigon would eventually bring victory through negotiations. He might have pledged that Moscow would take a line in such negotiations that would ensure that control of South Vietnam would not in the end still elude Hanoi. Promises of substantial military and economic aid might have made such an offer more persuasive.

The declaration terminating the Kosygin visit is not clear as to what further line of tactics might have been agreed, or even whether there was actually agreement on this at all. It would not be surprising, however, if the Soviets now pressed hard for negotiations, perhaps privately to avoid any inference that Hanoi was cowed by the threat of further US attacks.

At this juncture, it appears that the Soviet move into the Vietnam problem can hardly fail to worsen US-Soviet relations. To avert this, either the US would have to accept a defeat gracefully and without rancor, or the Soviets would have to curb their support for Hanoi once again.

Implications for Sino-Soviet Relations

It has been suggested that one consequence of intensified crisis over Vietnam could be a healing of the Sino-Soviet rift, and that Moscow might be willing to take greater risks of confrontation with the US because of this possibility. Already declarations of Bloc solidarity in the face of US aggression have issued from both sides and the anniversary observances of the Sino-Soviet defense treaty have solemnly reaffirmed its continued validity.

Against the background of the whole prolonged quarrel with Peking and the issues that have been at stake in it, it must be seriously doubted that any hope of reconciliation figures in Moscow’s calculations at this time. The courtship of Hanoi was undertaken precisely in order to undercut Chinese influence there, and Kosygin’s appeals during his travels for unity in the international movement have found no resounding echo in Peking. One purpose of his stops there may have been to persuade those parties which were reluctant to come to the March 1 meeting in Moscow that new bilateral approaches by the Soviets would be futile.

Both sides, of course, have an interest in playing down polemics when situations of crisis arise, and in this case both wish to show solidarity with Hanoi. To do otherwise would appear unseemly in the eyes of brother parties for whose loyalties the Chinese and Soviets are contending. But the central issue between them remains. That issue is [Page 248] authority-who has power to promulgate the general line and to command on tactical decisions. The conflicts arising from this issue have in effect become non-negotiable between the two Communist great powers. In a situation of crisis with the US this issue is more likely to be sharpened than it is to be attenuated.

Prospects for Soviet-American Détente

The USSR’s moves over the last several months to involve itself once again in the Vietnam problem with support for Hanoi obviously endangers the détente which has been assumed to exist in Soviet-American relations. It had been frayed already by the Congo problem, the UN crisis, Soviet reaction to MLF, and the sometimes quite violent propaganda accompanying these developments.

There is always a tendency to hope that a period of reduced tension accompanied by some constructive agreements, even if these are only marginal and symbolic, will build on itself and lead on to more substantial accords. This tendency arises from the nature of the West’s aims in the cold war and expresses its view of the value of continuing détente.

Until now, the Soviet view has been different. Historically, the function of détente for the Soviets has been to provide a period of pause in offensive action whenever the relation of forces turned unfavorable. The aim is a temporary truce and there is no Soviet assumption that this can or should be built into a solid peace.

After the offensive over Berlin miscarried and ended in the humiliating setback of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets clearly felt the need for a period of diminished risk in which they could deal with internal economic troubles, correct the imbalance in military power, and repair the damage to their prestige and political influence. It would obviously be incorrect to say that they have accomplished all this, and it would be an oversimplification to conclude that they have now deliberately entered on a new “hard line” phase which terminates the détente begun in 1963.

In some respects, however, the Soviet leaders probably do feel that their relative power position has improved since 1963. They have increased their influence in the underdeveloped world, and can now command wider support there on at least a certain range of issues. The troubles in the Western alliance have deepened and there is particular doubt about European support for US policy in Asia. Khrushchev’s successors may feel that they have begun to get a grip on their economic problems, and that their military programs are moving forward with diminished strain on the economy. It is true that the deep divisions within the Communist movement continue, but these are in part the result of détente and might be ameliorated by withdrawal from it.

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Altogether it appears likely that the combination of such factors has led the Soviet leadership, if not to terminate détente abruptly and deliberately, at least to place a lesser priority on its continuance. In recent months they have been willing to make a number of tactical choices at the expense of the détente: Their effort to compete with China has brought a new note of militancy to their propaganda. They have refused any compromise on the Article 19 issue. They intervened by proxy on the side of the Congo rebellion in order to stimulate and profit from radical nationalism in Africa. And they have now undertaken to renew support for Hanoi’s “liberation struggle” in South Vietnam.

“Peaceful coexistence is the form of struggle appropriate to the present epoch,” a policy to expand Communist power without major war. It always combines elements of hostility and reassurance, advance and withdrawal, as tactical advantage indicates. Currently the Soviet leaders may be changing the mix. The outcome of the Vietnam crisis will obviously now have a major influence on whether the détente phase begun in 1963 proves to have run its course.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII. Secret. Drafted by John Huizenga. Attached to a February 15 memorandum from Walt Rostow to Bundy that stated it considered some of the basic factors that affected Soviet decision-making in the Vietnam crisis and might well be scanned in connection with telegram 2377 from Moscow (Document 94). Another copy, initialed by Rusk, was sent to him on February 17 with the same covering memorandum. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, USSR) Copies were also sent to Ball, Harriman, Tyler, and Thompson.