Office of the Historian

95. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, February 15, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Demonstration against our Embassy in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
  • Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I took the occasion of the Soviet Ambassador’s visit to tell him I thought he ought to know how strongly the President felt about the demonstration against our Embassy in Moscow, and particularly the failure of the police to furnish adequate protection. I said we were also concerned here about the involvement of an American correspondent. I said I certainly hoped they did not intend to pursue the bringing of charges against him.

Dobrynin said he understood that the correspondent had hit a policeman. He said possibly the correspondent had become angry, but this was a serious matter. I said that I understood there was a scuffle, but our information was not that he had deliberately hit the policeman and, in any event, I thought that the best thing would be for this to not go any further.2

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 15.↩
  2. During this conversation Thompson also explained further U.S. policy on Vietnam stating in particular that the bombing of North Vietnam had not been an attempt to embarrass Kosygin.

    “In discussing Soviet/American relations, Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government had made several gestures toward the improvement of relations, not that they felt President Johnson needed them, but they were genuine. He emphasized that contrary to press statements, the Soviet Government was not in a position of having any need to improve relations, although they thought that this was in the mutual interest of both countries. He said it was not a question of desiring to worsen them, but was simply one of fact that if our present policy continued, our relations would be adversely affected. I said I could recognize this fact but it seemed to me they were attempting to use the threat of worsening relations as a deliberate move to affect the Vietnamese situation. I pointed out that after the Cuban affair we had been able quickly to resume our progress in bettering our relations.”

    For full text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Document 120.

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