330. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Mr. President:
I gather from Sec. Rusk that both you and he are now cool to the possibility of a Summit on missiles; and I would guess that Moscow is also cool.2
The reasons are ample:
- —time is short;
- —we could not go far beyond the exchange of positions and papers;
- —we would have to brief in Rogers and Laird;3
- —we would have NATO consultation problems.
Every normal argument is for leaving it to Nixon. And that may be the correct course.
But it may also be a decision we shall regret more than any other in the years ahead.
[Page 781]Nuclear agreements are always marginal and tough. If we do not hold the meeting, the new administration may let the NPT and missiles slip in priority. Time will pass. Men and situations will change. And mankind may move down the wrong fork in the road for what will, with hindsight, look like relatively trivial reasons.
Therefore, I suggest that the President and Secretary of State make one more assessment of NPT and missile talk prospects in the Nixon administration, before abandoning the concept finally.4
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.↩
- In a memorandum to the President written at 9:55 a.m. on December 11, Rostow reported that, according to a telegram from Thompson, Dobrynin “said that if the President decided not to go ahead with the meeting, that would be understood in Moscow and there would be no hard feelings.” The President wrote in hand on Rostow ’s memorandum, “I’m ready. Are they?” (Ibid.)↩
- Secretary of State-designate William Rogers and Secretary of Defense-designate Melvin Laird.↩
- At the bottom of the memorandum, Johnson wrote in hand, “I agree,” and drew lines connecting his remark to the third paragraph (circling the wording “we shall regret more”) and to the final paragraph (circling “Therefore, I suggest” and “one more assessment”).↩