329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
284495. Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary.
We would hope that at your luncheon with Dobrynin you could get, even if only informally and unofficially, some insights into what Soviet leaders really have in mind about a possible meeting. The fact that they have not responded to your specific suggestion of the 16th and 17th in Geneva indicates that they may have some questions in a period of transition between two administrations in the United States. I wish to emphasize that there is no interest here in a meeting merely for its own sake or for cosmetic purposes at the end of an administration, although we have good information that their Embassy frequently passed to the press here that the President wanted a summit meeting. On the subject of missiles, we have done an enormous amount of work and have State, Defense, JCS and ACDA all together on what we think is a reasonable and constructive position. A new administration could lose a great deal of time, momentum and even unity in starting all over again. Meanwhile, the missile race may not wait for another protracted period because actions will be taken on both sides which would make eventual agreement both more difficult and achievable only at higher levels of expenditure and danger. Further, the Middle East and Southeast Asia situations are urgent. We have had little encouragement from what has been said by the Russians so far that they anticipate any serious advances on these two areas. On the other hand, we have now stopped the bombing of their fellow socialist country, North Viet-Nam, and believe we are entitled to see them “put their stack in” to help bring peace to Southeast Asia. On the Middle East, I personally went over with the Egyptian Foreign Minister the various points arising under the November resolution of the Security Council and did so in a spirit which was forthcoming from Egypt’s point of view and in a way that was not at all pleasing to Israel. The Egyptian response was negative and disappointing and reflected no signs of any constructive Soviet influence in Cairo.
It would be very helpful if you could make a judgment in your talk with Dobrynin as to whether they prefer to wait for a new administration or whether they are reluctant about being pressed hard on such problems as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. They may be [Page 780] interested in a meeting but may prefer a somewhat later date because of the recent involvement of their leadership with Czechoslovakian Central Committee and Party Plenum. We ourselves may have a problem with those particular dates because of allied consultations but we could manage it. They may be expecting something more from us but I am not sure what it would be. The President believes that they have lost some of their interest in a meeting because of impressions from Nixon associates. In any event, the present situation is that we have suggested a specific time and place and they have not responded. Do your best scouting job with Dobrynin. Regards.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.↩