Office of the Historian

297. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, September 13, 1968, 3 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith very tentative first thoughts on the Soviet message of today.

[Page 705]
1.
The Soviet message is basically responsive in that it suggests what a communiqué might look like out of a meeting between the President and Kosygin.
  • —The formula on missile talks is probably as far as one could go unless one were immediately to exchange position papers and try to get a bit more substance into the communiqué.
  • —A good deal of work would have to be done on the Middle Eastern section because they have in it both the language of the November resolution and some of their old ritual about first withdrawal and then peace. But, presumably some hard work between Sec. Rusk and Dobrynin might get something mutually acceptable.
  • —On Vietnam, the language sounds okay but they are obviously suggesting a bombing cessation on the basis of their word. In his conversation with me, however, Dobrynin said “he had hoped that if we could not act immediately” upon the Soviet proposal “we would come back with a proposition which ‘Kosygin and his colleagues’ might press on Hanoi.” Obviously the best setting for a meeting in Geneva would be a bombing halt achieved on the basis of the principles you have laid down.
  • —On Czechoslovakia, I do not see how the President could go forward unless the Soviets had publicly agreed to a date for the withdrawal of their troops from Czechoslovakia.
2.

I, therefore, suggest—tentatively—that you talk over this message quietly with Sec. Rusk; you consider with him whether he should not call in Dobrynin on Sunday and say:

  • —that we found the Moscow message responsive and constructive;
  • —that it would be enormously helpful for such a meeting if there were a bombing cessation at the time it took place;
  • —that they should urge their Hanoi friends to try intensively in Paris to discover, with Harriman and Vance, a version of the Zorin formula or some other formula that would permit the President to call a bombing cessation in terms of the principles he has publicly laid down;
  • —that it is equally important for the total environment of the conference that the Czech crisis be greatly eased; and a stated
  • —schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces from Czechoslovakia, which Dobrynin promised the President on August 20, would be immensely helpful.

In short, if we had a bombing cessation formula and a Soviet troop withdrawal announcement, we would have the proper environment for the meeting.

Sec. Rusk could then state that until these questions were answered, the President could not make a firm and definite commitment. In the meanwhile, he, Sec. Rusk, was willing to work with Dobrynin on the appropriate formulae for a conference communiquéto see if there was, in fact, the basis for significant joint statements on the three issues. The formula on the missile talks looked promising; there were [Page 706] difficulties that would have to be ironed out with respect to the Middle East formula; the formula on Vietnam required that we find the “appropriate conditions” for a bombing cessation and that the Hanoi delegation in Paris go to work in the greatest seriousness and urgency on substantive issues immediately upon a bombing cessation, recognizing that the GVN must have a critical role in this settlement while, of course, the NLF could also participate.

3.
If, in fact, we can find livable conditions for a Summit meeting in, say, Geneva, the President could meet thereafter with the NATO Chiefs of Government, both to report the results and to consolidate whatever measures might be agreed to strengthen NATO; and he could then proceed to the Far East to meet with the Chiefs of Government of the troop contributing nations.
4.
As I say, these are first, tentative thoughts.
Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.↩