296. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson
1
Washington, September 13, 1968, 1:45
p.m.
Mr. President:
Just before 1:00 p.m. this afternoon, Ambassador Dobrynin called on me to deliver orally
the attached note. He left behind, however, his handwritten translation
from which we typed up his communication, literally.2
When he had concluded, I raised the following points, after explaining
that I had no other instruction except to receive his message and that
what I was about to say was personal and informal.
- 1.
- Had he, in informing Moscow, made absolutely clear the distinction
between my formal message to him and our informal discussion?3 He said: “Absolutely.” But he evidently
understood my major anxiety with this message, which was the phrase
“questions named by the American side.” He knew that the Middle East
and Vietnam had been raised in our conversation not by me but by
him. He added, therefore, that the “two subjects of interest to the
American side” had been “often discussed between him and Secretary
Rusk.” I draw the
conclusion, therefore, that in reporting he did not make it quite
clear to Moscow that the notion of a Summit embracing the Middle
East and Vietnam was, so far as our conversation was concerned, his
idea and not mine, although I joined readily into the exchange of
informal views.
- 2.
- I recalled that I had given him copies of the Dirksen and Hruska speeches and
noted that there was, perhaps understandably, no reference to
Czechoslovakia in this message. I asked, then, was he sure that the
men in Moscow understood the relationship of Czechoslovakia to any
possible meeting? He said: “Certainly, absolutely.” I then asked
what his personal view was about Czechoslovakia in the days ahead:
would things get better, or worse? He said: “I believe,
better.”
- 3.
- He then asked me if I thought we would have an immediate response
so that he should stay in town and not go to New York later this
afternoon, remaining there Saturday.4 I said that if I were he, I [Page 702] would proceed to New York.
He said he would certainly be back in town on Sunday and could
return to Washington if there was urgency.
- 4.
- In leaving, he asked if we could furnish him with a copy of the
picture taken of him at the Cabinet table delivering the message on
Czechoslovakia on August 20. I said that I would look into this
somewhat ghoulish request.
Attachment5
Moscow, September 13,
1968.
Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to
the Government of the United States
(copy of Ambassador Dobrynin’s handwritten paper)
- 1.
-
As before the attitude in Moscow is positive to the idea of
meeting with the President of the United States for an
exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest. The
wish of President Johnson to have some degree of certitude in
the positive outcome of his possible visit to the Soviet
Union is understandable to us. It is also far from being
indifferent to us what will be the result of such an
exchange of opinions, though it is obvious that efforts from
both sides will be needed to gain a success.
There is no objection in Moscow as to a discussion during
such a meeting of questions named by the American side:
curbing to strategic armaments race, question of Viet–Nam
and the situation in the Middle East; this, of course, does
not exclude the possibility of an exchange of opinions on
other questions too.
- 2.
- So far as the question of strategic armaments is concerned,
our point of view is that an exchange of opinions on this
question during the meeting could result in an agreement that
fulfilment of certain restraining measures in this field would
answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the
task of strengthening international security. It would be
possible to agree further on certain basic principles of
limitation and then reduction in complex of both the offensive
strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of
defense against ballistic missiles, having in mind that this
would constitute a [Page 703]
directive of the two Governments to their delegations to engage
then in working out of an agreement on the concrete aspects of
this problem.
- 3.
-
We are ready to exchange opinions on Vietnam with the
understanding also of the fact that the Soviet Union cannot
be a substitution in this question for the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and for the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam. We think that such an
exchange of opinions can be useful if to proceed from the
fact that continuation of the war in Vietnam benefits nobody
but those who would like to bring the United States and the
Soviet Union into collision, and that the solution of the
Vietnam problem can be found not on the battlefield.
We did already express to President Johnson our conviction that
the current meetings in Paris between representatives of the
DRV and the United
States give an opportunity to find a way out from the
present situation. We continue to believe—and it is not
without grounds—that if the United States completely stop
bombings and other military actions against the DRV it could create a turning
point at the meetings in Paris and would open perspectives
for serious negotiations on political questions of a
settlement.
- 4.
-
On the ways of settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict the
Soviet Government has not long ago expressed to the
Government of the United States a number of concrete
considerations. For progress in this question it is
necessary, of course, that both sides should proceed from
undesirability of a new aggravation in this region. This, in
its turn, provides for the necessity to liquidate the
consequences of last year’s aggression of Israel against the
Arab states and first of all—for the withdrawal of Israeli
troops from the territories occupied by them, together with
the end of state of belligerency between Israel and the
Arabs, recognition of the right of each State of this region
to existence and respect of its sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence.
The striving for the political settlement of the problems of
the Middle East is now, as it is known to us, a determining
factor among the Arab leaders and we have made and are
making all that depends on us to have this understanding
strengthened in those countries of this region whose
Governments listen to our opinion.
If the Government of the United States takes on its part the
similar course in its relations with Israel this will
greatly facilitate the stabilizing of the situation in the
Middle East. Israel must withdraw its forces from the
occupied Arab territories, then the threat to its existence
will vanish just by itself. Then a perspective will be open
of a real normalization of situation in all this region. If
the forces of Israel were withdrawn from the occupied Arab
territories then it would be possible to consider in the
practical aspect also the question of curbing unnecessary
[Page 704] and wasteful
arms race in the Middle East; we do remember President
Johnson’s
interest in this question. We are in principle in favour of
this and we believe that corresponding steps in such
direction would not contradict the interests of the
countries of this region. If we had such understanding
between our Governments it would be then possible to find a
form of informing the public opinion (bringing it to the
public).
- 5.
- Provided there is will of both sides, steps of no small
importance can be made in the forthcoming months in the field of
Soviet–American relations and thus not a bad foundation can be
laid for further development of these relations in
future.
Concerning the idea which is being planted by some people that the
agreement of the Soviet leaders to meet with President Johnson was allegedly guided by
motivations of conjuncture [in his conversation with me, Dobrynin went to some lengths to
explain the meaning in English of this Russian phrase in its
political context. It means a short–run, expedient, perhaps
insincere political motivation. Technically, the word, derived from
the German, means fluctuating.]6 the meaning of such allegations must
be clear to the President. Of course they do not reflect our
approach to the relations with the United States. Basic long–range
interests of our countries and interests of peace in general are the
determining factors in these relations. Our point of view lies in
the very belief that current events, no matter how differently they
can be perceived and interpreted, should not overshadow these
long–ranged interests.
