Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 28, 1967, 0137Z.

90262. Ref: Moscow 279.²

1. We have reviewed confrontation policy regarding Soviet defectors as recommended reftel, taking into account legitimate intelligence objectives, influence which our policy may have on future Soviet conduct toward American defectors, humanitarian considerations, and continuing need avoid unnecessary complications in US-Soviet relations. As a result we intend to notify all agencies concerned with handling Soviet defectors that:

A. In general it is Dept policy that Soviet Government shall be notified of Soviet defectors to the US and that arrangements will be made for confrontation of such defectors with Soviet representatives if Soviet Govt. requests.

B. Accordingly, all defectors should be told immediately after they come under our control (in US or abroad) that the Soviet Government will in due course be informed of their defection and that they must agree to a confrontation if this should prove necessary.

C. If intelligence community considers that facts of a particular defection case are such that notification and/or confrontation may jeopardize intelligence objectives, burden of proof is on community to demonstrate to Dept the existence of this potential danger. Dept will then decide appropriate course of action.³

2. We believe that under this policy US Government will retain that measure of flexibility we may consider desirable in sensitive cases (e.g. Svetlana) and that may be requested and needed by intelligence community in critical cases (e.g. defector case). In particular we recognize that defection cases occurring abroad sometimes present delicate problems of relations with third countries so that decisions regarding notice and confrontation in these situations must be based on facts of the particular case.

3. We intend that above procedure shall go into effect immediately and that it will be applied to Eastern European as well as Soviet defectors.

4. Should be noted that this procedure is applicable only to defectors cases, not refugee-type cases with which intelligence community has no direct concern. It would not be applicable to cases where Soviet (or other East European) citizens with non-diplomatic visas in this country might apply to INS for adjustment of status under Section 245 of Immigration Act. We doubt that it would be feasible or desirable for INS to require that applicants agree to confrontation with Soviet representatives as precondition for INS approval of adjustment application.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30 USSR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Pratt; cleared by Toon, Robert McKisson (EUR/EE), Leddy, Kohler, Meeker, and William Trueheart (INR); and approved by Katzenbach.
2. Telegram 279 from Moscow, July 20, suggested reconsideration of U.S. policy of “not insisting upon Soviet defectors agreeing to confrontation with Soviet Embassy representative. Continuation of this policy would enable Soviets to refuse US access to an American citizen despite provisions of Consular Convention by alleging he had sought asylum and did not agree to interview by US authorities. Failure to arrange confrontation will always arouse suspicion of Soviets that defection not voluntary and confrontation protection to US in event of re-defection.” (Ibid.)
3. On January 19, 1968, Katzenbach sent identical letters to Helms, Hoover, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze notifying them of the new policy.