Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

258. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, December 18, 1967.

CHANGING US-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS

1. A General Observation

An assessment of relative military capabilities is exceedingly complex, uncertain, and controversial. It is complex because so many variables enter into the assessment of military capabilities and because military technology is advancing so rapidly and on so many fronts. Even for the present, many of these variables are subject to wide ranges of estimates (e.g., How hard are missile silos? How accurate are missiles? What is the actual operational reliability of weapons systems?). Intelligence estimates have not proven fully reliable in the past. In the future, the variations of these estimates may be even greater because it is inherently more difficult to obtain reliable information on qualitative changes of the type expected.

The present study confirms the fact that there are great and honest differences of opinion among knowledgeable experts, particularly as to the future relationship of strategic forces. “The truth” is elusive partly because our information cannot be complete, and partly because the relevant indicators of military capability depend on what you are trying to measure. Unquestionably the same uncertainties exist for the Soviet Union. Thus, categorical statements (including our own) about strategic relations, particularly projections more than five years into the future, should be treated with considerable skepticism.

2. Findings on the Strategic Balance (Details at Tab A)²

a. During the past three years, the Soviets have substantially increased their ability to damage the US in a nuclear exchange. Our ability to limit damage to the US has been correspondingly reduced. Their rapid buildup of hardened, dispersed ICBMs has given them a deterrent in which they should have high confidence. In a second strike, we estimate they could inflict two to four times more damage on the US today than they could in early 1965 (80–100 million fatalities as compared to 25–35 million). The Soviet leaders certainly are aware that their situation has improved, even though their detailed calculations may differ from ours.

b. Perceptions of the strategic balance are probably more significant in international relations than the actual balance. Our own perceptions of the balance may not have changed as markedly as the above facts suggest. This is best assessed by our own leadership. However, it should be noted that, in the early 1960’s, we already had credited the Soviets with the ability to do substantial damage to the US, and we foresaw the emergence of mutual deterrence by mid-decade. On the other hand, the Soviets undoubtedly had a feeling of strategic inferiority in the early 1960’s which must have declined today.

c. Over the next decade, we expect the Soviets to continue expansion of their strategic forces and even to surpass us in some categories of strategic strength. They will equal the US in the number of ICBM launchers deployed during the coming year and will probably continue to expand their force beyond 1000 missiles. Several Soviet ICBMs with advanced performance characteristics now are in development. The USSR also will pass us in total intercontinental megatonnage in 1968 or 1969. They could equal or surpass us in numbers of Polaris-type submarines in the mid-1970’s. They already have an ABM system in the Moscow area, and it seems likely they will deploy ABMs more widely in the 1970’s.

d. These trends do not now jeopardize the US deterrent, nor do they seem likely to do so in the next five years or so. We believe that the Secretary of Defense makes a persuasive case that our deterrent will remain more than adequate even against quite unlikely increases in the threat. However, we should point out that some qualified military experts question this conclusion. At present, our principal means of assuring deterrence into the 1970’s is the MIRV³ program. MIRVs will increase our total number of warheads from about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] today to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in 1976, with the increase beginning in 1970. However, between now and 1970 the Soviets could come close to parity in total intercontinental warheads.

e. The Soviets also have been gradually increasing the reach of their conventional military forces. In recent years they have developed forces which, while probably originally intended for the general war mission, now provide them with capabilities for distant, limited operations. Specific evidence of growing Soviet military reach includes: greater worldwide naval activity, particularly in the Mediterranean; the expansion and modernization of airlift and sealift capabilities; and a modest expansion of naval infantry (marines). The Yemen provides evidence of Soviet willingness already to exercise their growing reach. We foresee a doubling of port-to-port sealift capabilities over the next decade and a substantial increase in their airlift. However, the Soviets will remain far behind the US in their over-all capability to move large forces rapidly to distant points and will have less capacity for opposed operations beyond the range of their tactical aircraft.

f. The Soviets have maintained superiority in Central Europe and have modernized their forces, including the provision of a formidable tactical nuclear capability. However, since the early 1960’s, our own assessments have recognized that the margin of their conventional superiority is much less than we previously assumed, particularly in a surprise attack. Furthermore, the consensus in NATO is that a Soviet attack on Western Europe is highly unlikely.

3. Political Implications (Details at Tabs B and C)

a. The current rapid growth in Soviet strategic nuclear forces is unlikely to increase their willingness to take actions which they believe would have a high risk of leading to nuclear war with the US either directly or by escalation. For in contemplating the possible consequences of any such course, their own casualties would still be likely to weigh more heavily upon Soviet calculations than their growing ability to hurt us. Such restraint, however, does not rule out Soviet initiatives that could adversely affect the US or its allies’ interests. Where a direct conflict of interests develops, Soviet leaders may prove tougher in maintaining their positions in a situation of mutual deterrence.

b. We should be concerned that, as the Soviets view their higher strategic force levels as reinforcing deterrence, they may be more inclined to think they can intervene in third areas with reduced risk of American opposition. Potential Soviet options for such moves are created by the greater reach of their conventional forces. As a result, they may be more tempted to respond to requests for military support from governments or factions they support politically. Thus, we could be faced with situations in which the Soviets intervene before we do, leaving us with the choice of initiating confrontation or accepting a fait accompli.

c. While the basic condition of deterrence is not likely to be upset in the next five years, any close reckoning of the state of the strategic balance will be increasingly complex and difficult. In particular, net evaluations are becoming more and more sensitive to assumptions about weapons characteristics, such as accuracy, which are extremely difficult to verify. Traditional “box score” comparisons of US-Soviet strength relations are becoming increasingly subject to varied interpretations and possible manipulation for polemical purposes both by domestic critics of our defense programs and by the Soviets.

d. Domestic American controversy over defense policy is likely to increase, inevitably attracting foreign attention. So far, foreign reaction to changing Soviet capabilities has been limited, but American discussion will expose foreign opinion to criticism of American policy on two lines—one that US programs are pushing the Soviets into a new round in the arms race and the other that American vulnerability is increasing and that American ability to meet its Alliance commitments is declining. Either line of criticism could, if it makes an impact abroad, complicate our foreign relations.

e. Uncertainties will tend to generate mutually reinforcing pressures on both sides to use “worst case” assumptions. For the Soviets, this will mean having to adopt military budgets which entail a cost in over-all economic growth rates. Moscow may seek ways of regulating the pace of the arms race, perhaps using arms talks and even limited arms control agreements for this purpose. There appears, however, to be very little likelihood that the two sides will be able to attune their views on all the complex issues sufficiently to conclude a comprehensive agreement to end the race in strategic weaponry.

4. Conclusions

a. Mutual deterrence is here and likely to persist for at least the next decade. In these circumstances the US will have increasing difficulty in defining vital interests for which the use of nuclear weapons would be warranted. Moreover, even to maintain deterrence we will have to continue spending large sums because of the uncertainties inherent in the strategic equation and the steady development of new weapons systems.

b. Effect on the Soviet Union—The Soviets probably believe that their growing strategic capabilities will deter the US, enhance their prestige, and improve their ability to influence events in other countries. The Soviets may be more prone to take advantage of opportunities to intervene in local conflicts or may be more readily drawn into such conflicts and, once involved, may be less willing to withdraw. Thus, we may face situations where the Soviets are there first or where it will be desirable for the US to intervene rapidly to assure they are not. At present, this seems most likely to occur in the Middle East or Africa.

c. Effect on NATO Allies—Soviet military capabilities in Europe will remain at least as great as heretofore. From a military viewpoint, Soviet leaders will certainly feel as able as they have been in the past to engage in a policy of threats or renewal of pressures on Berlin. Their increased over-all power may cause our European allies to be more deferential to Soviet political pressures and lead to questioning of the reliability of American commitments. The confidence of the European members of NATO in US nuclear intervention in the event of an attack on Europe already has declined and probably will be further eroded. While the Europeans already understand in general terms that mutual deterrence exists, they have been slow to acknowledge the full meaning for them. Where they have recognized the implications, with the exception of France, they have chosen to play them down. To be sure, a significant deterrent to an attack on Europe will remain so long as the US retains a nuclear arsenal. However, continued concern about the US nuclear guarantee and demands for reassurance are likely to be prominent in our future relations with the NATO countries. If our allies feel these concerns are not being met, it could lead either to neutralism or to greater pressures for independent nuclear capabilities.

d. Non-Proliferation—Questions about the validity of the US deterrent in protecting other countries could feed pressures for additional independent nuclear capabilities—and not only in Europe. We are likely to encounter increasing pressures for more specific assurances as to our nuclear commitments at a time when the strategic situation and the mood of the American public make it less likely that we will be able to accede to these pressures.

Given our own obvious vulnerability to nuclear attack, it will be more difficult for the US to extend nuclear assurances, and it may also become increasingly difficult for us to satisfy other countries that their security requirements can be met through nuclear guarantees. (The light ABM defense should help, at least for some years, to reinforce our assurances to Asian countries that feel threatened by Communist China.) Under these conditions, there may be greater pressures for independent nuclear capabilities. Our efforts to resist such pressures are likely to increase strains in our relationships with friendly countries.

e. Limiting Strategic Forces—In current circumstances the reasonable approach would be for both sides to seek to limit their expenditures on strategic forces. However, the prospects for limiting strategic forces by agreement with the Soviets are not promising. The difficulties have been noted above, particularly the difficulty of controlling technology. However, the effort to achieve such an understanding should not be abandoned. If, as seems likely, a situation of mutual deterrence is destined to persist for some years, both sides may become convinced that they should try to maintain deterrence at lower levels of effort. Two possible approaches with respect to the Soviets have been advocated in recent years: (a) one stresses our ability to maintain superiority and the futility of their competing with us; (b) an alternative approach accepts approximate parity as inevitable and seeks specific means of implementing it through discussion, and, hopefully, agreement. Past US public statements of defense policy have stressed elements of both approaches. In our view, it is preferable to avoid the rhetoric of both “superiority” and of “parity.” Rather, our statements should stress the adequacy or sufficiency of our deterrent and make the point that we are doing just as much as is necessary to assure our deterrent. We are not attempting to accelerate the arms race by doing more nor jeopardizing security by doing less.

f. Offense-Defense Balance—A major asymmetry exists between the US and Soviet strategies and strategic postures. This is the difference in relative emphasis which we and they place on strategic defense. In recent years, US policy statements have given increasing weight to “assured destruction” and lesser weight to “damage limitation.” This trend has certain foreign policy implications.

• First, the Soviets see us as “offense-oriented.” Almost certainly they will perceive the sharp increases in US offensive warheads which will result from our MIRV program as a serious threat to them. This Soviet view contributes both to the maintenance of political tensions and constitutes an obstacle to disarmament agreements. It is possible that we could meet this situation, without necessarily increasing our total strategic effort, by a greater relative emphasis on defense in US strategic doctrine. Such emphasis might contribute to arms control in two ways: (a) greater US defensive effort would complicate Soviet strategic planning and make their strategic effort more costly, thereby imposing further economic pressure for limiting arms; (b) if Soviet leaders want to reach agreement, a more balanced, mixed system might make agreement more feasible because of somewhat greater similarity in defense posture.
• Second, the erosion of our ability to limit damage to the US is creating doubts about the firmness of US nuclear commitments. Even if defenses are far from perfect, doing something about defense could create a psychological climate which could be somewhat reassuring (without necessarily being falsely reassuring) both for our public and our allies.

Finally, quite aside from its merits, we should also recognize that the prospect of defense against missiles continues to have domestic political appeal. If the Soviets continue to deploy an ABM and we deploy only for protection against China, this will remain a political issue in this country.

On the other hand, a greater emphasis on defense also presents us with many problems. As has often been pointed out, no combination of defense and counterforce can begin to provide complete protection against the Soviets. A larger ABM program could further stimulate arms competition, and would be even more likely to do so if undertaken in conjunction with further improvements to our offensive forces. Furthermore, deployment of ABMs and greater emphasis on civil defense will create opposition from many allies who are concerned that this will intensify the arms race.

Clearly, we should make a more intensive effort to analyze the pros and cons of the damage-limiting issue as it affects our foreign relations. In the meantime, we should not take positions which will make it more difficult for us to expand our defensive programs should we wish to do so in the future.

5. Recommendations:

a. That the Secretary of State, through the Under Secretary, request the SIG to arrange for appropriate political-military contingency planning in light of the above analysis. Such planning should focus in particular on the Middle East and Africa and should consider where and how the Soviets would be most likely to intervene in local conflicts if they should be requested to do so by a local government or revolutionary movement.

b. That the Secretary of State suggest to the Secretary of Defense the need for State and Defense jointly to develop a rationale for our strategic forces, to be used in the forthcoming DOD posture statement, which takes into account the impact of that statement on the Soviets and our allies. Particular attention should be paid to the way in which our assured destruction and damage-limiting objectives and capabilities are described.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, Box 270, US-Soviet Military Relationship. Top Secret. Transmitted to Secretary Rusk by State Department Counselor Robert R. Bowie and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley under cover of a December 18 memorandum that listed the purposes of the study as: “a. Assess the significance of projected changes in US and Soviet forces over the next five years or so. b. Analyze how various key countries are likely to perceive the changing military situation. c. Propose what the US should say or do to deal with the consequences to our foreign policy of these changes.” The memorandum also noted that Rusk authorized the study on September 20 and Kohler received a copy of the paper and agreed with its major findings and conclusions.
2. The tabs were not attached.
3. Multiple, independently-targeted re-entry vehicles. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Rusk transmitted copies of the paper to McNamara and Helms on December 18. His covering memorandum to McNamara is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X. Helms responded in a January 11, 1968, letter that “its major findings generally accord with our view of Soviet strategic developments.” He attached comments that noted “such differences as we have.” (Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, Box 270, US-Soviet Military Relationship) Defense Department comments, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, International Security Affairs, and Systems Analysis, were transmitted to Rusk by Nitze on May 24. In a June 3 memorandum to Farley, Leon Sloss of G/PM indicated that the JCS generally agreed with the study but that the comments by ISA and Systems Analysis were generally critical, particularly of the emphasis given to defense. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139)