Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

197. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 27, 1967, 4:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• W.W. Rostow

PLACE

• Lunch at the Embassy Residence

Today I had one of my periodic lunches with Ambassador Dobrynin.

1. I first put strongly to him the case for their going forward with the Kiev exhibition at a time when the Consular Convention was delicately balanced and we were trying to push forward with other enterprises involving U.S.-Soviet Union relations. He said that he agreed with me that Moscow should not risk tipping the balance in the wrong direction on this minor issue; and he had so recommended to Moscow.²

2. He then asked me what my assessment was of the prospects for the Consular Convention. I said it was a close thing, as he knew; but the Administration was working hard at it.

3. He asked why the Administration was obviously working so hard on the Consular Convention this year when it did not work so hard last year. I said that I could not give a responsible government answer to that question; but it was my personal view that the shift in the seriousness of the Soviet Union on the non-proliferation agreement had made a deep impression; and there was a growing sense in the government-with the non-proliferation agreement and other matters, including the problem posed by the ABM-that this was a good time to do the maximum we could on both sides to create a good atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations. He said that this was a clear and understandable answer to a question which had puzzled him. I said, again, this was a personal judgment.

4. We then moved to the ABM issue. I explained in some detail why it might be possible for the Soviet Union to move slowly and in small increments on the ABM’s, but that in a democratic society with two Senators from each state, it would be extremely difficult to have an ABM system limited to one city or one region. If we installed such a general system, I was sure the Soviet marshals would be pressing the government in Moscow for many more offensive missiles to which, inevitably, there would be still another U.S. response. Therefore, this was a moment for us to try hard to stabilize the strategic nuclear arms race. He said that he understood this argument, but would not commit himself further.

5. I then pointed out to him that it would be harder to get nations to sign a non-proliferation agreement if they saw the United States and the Soviet Union entering another major round in the arms race. He questioned me as to whether I was proposing a specific link between the non-proliferation agreement and the ABM agreement. I said that I was not, but merely underlining the difficulties we might both face if we were urging others to enter a world of non-proliferation while each of us was spending many billions of dollars in bilateral strategic arms race. He said that he understood and agreed with this view.

6. He asked, in this context, if the Germans were going to propose changes in the language of the non-proliferation treaty. I said that I did not know. We had no final response from Bonn. He expressed the hope that they would find it possible to accept the present draft. Once changes, even minor changes, were suggested, there would be difficulties in re-clearing the treaty with all parties.

WR

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Confidential.
2. In telegram 129728 to Moscow, February 2, the Department reported that Rusk had telephoned Dobrynin to reinforce the démarche made by Rostow on January 27. (Department of State, S/S-I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm Files, Reel 145) In telegram 132463 to Moscow, February 6, the Department reported that Dobrynin called Rusk on February 4 “to advise him that because of President’s expressed concern Soviet authorities had reacted favorably to our request that Industrial Design Exhibit go forward first half of 1967.” The telegram noted that the President discussed the problem with Dobrynin on January 27 following the signing of the Outer Space Treaty. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, CUL 8 USSR)