Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

141. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, November 24, 1965, 1–3 p.m.

Ambassador Dobrynin and I had the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance today. In approximate order of importance, the topics we discussed are as follows:

[Here follows Item 1, which deals with NATO and the Multilateral Force; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIII, Document 111.]

2. Vietnam. Ambassador Dobrynin raised this question only briefly. He expressed again the well-known Soviet view that a renewed and longer pause would be helpful. He said that the brevity of the pause of last spring had caused many members of his government to regard it as cynical. He said that if there could be a pause of “12 to 20 days” we could be assured of intense diplomatic effort. But he acknowledged under questioning that his government could give no advance assurances about the results of such diplomatic effort. He repeated the well-known Soviet view that it is psychologically impossible for a country under bombardment to agree to negotiations.

3. Private communication. Not only in the context of the European problem, but more generally, the Ambassador emphasized his view that private and informal communications between our two governments are important. He referred nostalgically to the period in which there was intimate communication with President Kennedy both through his brother, and through informal written notes. I reminded him that in that period, everything that was said had been known to the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson. He agreed, but he seemed to believe that there was something valuable in direct access to the White House, and he asked me where he could establish such contact if necessary. I told him that the President preferred generally to conduct this important business, as he now does, through the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson, but I said that of course he could always reach me if he thought it necessary, and I also told him that I thought it would be helpful for him to be better acquainted with Mr. Moyers. (We also agreed that informal communication between his counselors and my deputies would be helpful, and I expect that Messrs. Komer and Bator will be getting luncheon invitations from their opposite numbers.)

4. The Ford Foundation. The Ambassador said that he knew I was the subject of a current guessing game in Washington, and that he was interested to see how it would come out. I asked for advice, and he said that he thought it all depended on the sort of future I wanted. Similar problems arose in Moscow from time to time. A number of his friends had been successful in withdrawing from important official jobs into quieter and more academic pursuits-although usually at the expense of some temporary unpopularity with the ministers whom they had abandoned.

5. Habits of the Soviet bureaucracy. In my opening remark to the Ambassador, I commented on his obviously healthy appearance, and he told me of his month on the Black Sea and his month of intense consultations with all the members of his government who are curious about the US. It became clear from these accounts that Dobrynin is a person of growing consequence in Moscow, and I think he rather expects to be offered a more important appointment at home soon. He agreed with me that men in our two foreign offices work too hard-he said he had had only three Sundays off in his two and one-half years as the head of the American desk. He thinks it is easier to be an Ambassador, and he clearly likes his present job. I told him at the end of lunch that we liked having him here-and I meant it.

McG.B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. I. Secret. Bundy forwarded the memorandum to the President on November 25. (Ibid.)