140. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)1
Washington, November 24, 1965.
SUBJECT
- Summary of Codel Mansfield
Talks With Soviet Leaders
Attached is a summary of the main topics discussed by Senator Mansfield and his four colleagues with
Soviet Premier Kosygin (November
19) and Foreign Minister Gromyko
(November 18). The summary is based on telegrams from our Chargé, who
was present at both meetings.2 You may wish to refer to this
paper in briefing Foreign Secretary Stewart.3
Neither of the Soviet leaders covered new ground or deviated markedly
from previous Soviet positions on the topics discussed. On the other
hand, in some important instances the statements of Senator Mansfield and others of his colleagues
do not conform with generally understood Administration policy. While
the Senators said that they were giving their opinions and those of
their Congressional colleagues, Senator Mansfield stated that “he had discussed the trip with
the President and that he could speak with some assurance that his
remarks would reflect the President’s thoughts.” You may wish to stress
in your discussions with Mr. Stewart that Senator
Mansfield’s views are a
matter of public record and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Administration. Senator Mansfield’s statement that we had guaranteed the Oder-Neisse
line is, of course, inaccurate. Additionally, you may wish to suggest to
Mr. Stewart that it would be desirable for him to
disabuse the Soviets, should they refer to Senator Mansfield’s remarks, of any notion that
they can use his comments to play on possible differences within the
alliance regarding such matters as nuclear sharing and
non-proliferation.
A cable from Senator Mansfield
requests that the content of his talks in Moscow not be made public
prior to his return and report to
[Page 353]
the President. We have not informed our allies of
the substance of these discussions.
Enclosure
Paper Prepared in the Office of Soviet Union
Affairs4
MAIN TOPICS OF DISCUSISON BETWEEN SENATOR MANSFIELD’S GROUP AND SOVIET
LEADERS
1. MLF and
Non-Proliferation
Gromyko made the following
points in response to Mansfield’s request for his views:
- a.
-
USSR attaches great
importance to non-proliferation and to need to prevent
German access to nuclear weapons;
- b.
-
USSR categorically opposed
to any plans for giving the FRG such access in any form;
- c.
- implementation of such plans would have a negative effect
on the interests not only of the USSR, but also of the US, UK and
others;
- d.
- efforts to convince the USSR that any nuclear sharing arrangements
would be subject to adequate safeguards are futile;
- e.
- if the US does not want an
improvement in US–USSR relations, the
implementation of any MLF
plan will achieve this purpose;
- f.
- a non-proliferation agreement would greatly improve
US-Soviet relations, and USSR is prepared to discuss their draft treaty
with all powers concerned.
Kosygin made the following
comments:
- a.
-
US is inconsistent in seeking
MLF on the one hand and
non-proliferation on the other;
- b.
-
MLF is aimed at the USSR;
- c.
-
FRG has nuclear delivery
vehicles and access to nuclear warheads will make it ready
for nuclear war;
- d.
- creation of MLF would
result in great military tension and an immediate increase
in military budgets in the USSR and Eastern Europe;
- f.
- if an MLF is created, the
USSR will take
appropriate steps and respond in due manner.
Mansfield made the following
remarks, expressing the belief that he could speak on behalf of the
entire group:
- a.
- he appreciated Gromyko’s argument on the inability to
convince Soviet leaders on adequate safeguards for nuclear
sharing arrangements;
- b.
- there is a great division of opinion in the US on the MLF; he personally is opposed
to the idea;
- c.
- the emphasis on MLF had
declined in the US in recent
months;
- d.
- the JAEC had voted unanimously against the project;
- e.
- the JAEC, as well as his group, was bipartisan and
reflected the feeling in Congress generally;
- f.
- the subject would be given a very close look by Congress,
with due account given to views expressed by the USSR, France and
others;
- g.
- while foreign policy is the prerogative of the Executive
Branch, it is very difficult to implement without
Congressional approval.
2. Germany, Reunification, and the Oder-Neisse
Line
Kosygin made the following
points:
- a.
- the German problem was complicated and made even more so
by US European
policies;
- b.
- sharply attacked the FRG
and the US for aligning its
policies with those of the FRG, which were revanchist;
- c.
- the US had not taken issue
with Erhard’s remarks
on the 1937 borders;
- d.
- the present borders could be changed only by war;
- e.
- the German problem can be solved only on the basis of the
present boundaries, and on the basis of agreement between
the two German states, which needed no special outside
help;
- f.
- West Germany had been the primary recipient of the
Marshall Plan.
Mansfield said:
- a.
- the USSR, US and UK had guaranteed the Oder-Neisse line, and
that de Gaulle had later supported this;
- b.
- this border supposedly was subject to confirmation in a
peace treaty, but that the line seems to have been
drawn;
- c.
- he rejected the assertion that the US was helping revanchism or fascism in
Germany;
- d.
- we did not say Erhard was right about the 1937
borders;
- e.
- reunification will not be imposed by force, and it is
obvious that the two German nations will have a say, as will
the four powers;
- f.
- the UK and France had
received larger shares of Marshall Plan assistance than the
FRG, and the USSR and Eastern Europe had
been offered but had refused aid under the Plan.
3. Vietnam
Mansfield, noting that we
understood the Soviet position, observed that:
- a.
- Vietnam was of paramount concern to the President, who,
while having inherited the situation, was looking for ways
to bring it to the conference table and an honorable
resolution, and had expressed willingness to go anywhere any
time toward this end;
- b.
- his (Mansfield’s)
September 1 speech in the Senate, which had been discussed
with and approved by the President, should be compared with
Pham Van Dong’s four points;
- c.
- there had been no response to his speech, and the war was
now more likely to get worse rather than better;
- d.
- in connection with suggestions to reconvene the Geneva
Conference with consideration of Pham Van Dong’s four points
and a cessation of US
bombing, he was certain this possibility would be given the
most serious consideration by the US if Hanoi signalled that the conference could
be resumed if we stopped bombing;
- e.
- the President had also approved Sihanouk’s idea for a
conference on Cambodia, which might also discuss matters
relating to other countries, but nothing had come of
it.
Kosygin and Gromyko reiterated standard Soviet
positions on Vietnam, pointing out that:
- a.
- the USSR had not been
authorized or asked to negotiate on this matter;
- b.
- the US should talk directly
with North and South Vietnam, in the latter instance with
the Viet Cong;
- c.
- the US should cease
bombing;
- d.
- the Geneva Conference is not workable.
4. US–USSR Relations
Kosygin and Gromyko asserted that:
- a.
- an improvement in bilateral relations, which they said
they wanted, was hindered by US policies on MLF and Vietnam;
- b.
- under the circumstances, the USSR questioned whether the US desired better
relations;
- c.
- various US actions, such as
certain Congressional resolutions, the Penkovsky Papers, and
US shipping policies also
increased US-Soviet
tensions.
[Page 356]
Mansfield pointed out that he
had no magic formula for improvement of relations, but that the
frank talks they had had been useful.
