Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

117. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 3, 1965, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Miscellaneous Matters

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• The Secretary
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

In reply to a question from the Secretary, the Ambassador said that he was sailing from New York early Thursday morning, July eighth and planned to leave Washington Tuesday evening. If necessary, he could stay over until Wednesday.

The Secretary said that the President might wish to see the Ambassador before he departed, but this would only be known after the President returned to Washington. The Secretary said he would let Dobrynin know as soon as he found out anything.

The Secretary inquired what questions about the United States the Ambassador thought he would get when he returned home.

Dobrynin said that he was sure he would be asked what the plans of the American Administration were, particularly with respect to Viet-Nam. The United States talked of its readiness to settle the conflict but its actions took the ground out from under such declarations. Until the bombing of North Viet-Nam stopped, it was difficult to imagine how one could even approach negotiations for a settlement.

The Secretary said that as a matter of broad Government policy, the United States would like to see improved relations with the Soviet Union. There had been no change in this policy. He said this was why in their last talk he had mentioned the personal attacks on President Johnson.² The President has tried to keep from arousing feeling in the United States against the Soviet Union. These attacks on him, however, aroused feelings among the American people against the Soviet Union. If we were not careful, opportunities to improve relations would be closed because of the aroused feelings of our people. The Secretary pointed out that his own language was always moderate on such issues.

The Secretary continued that in the broadest sense, the key problem between us at the present time was that of Southeast Asia. We have conflicting impressions with regard to the Soviet attitude toward discussing these issues. Mr. Gromyko in Vienna³ had indicated he had no desire to discuss these in any formal way and the Secretary had the same impression with respect to Ambassador Dobrynin. On the other hand, the Secretary was aware that the Ambassador had discussed these issues with many others.

[Here follow 7 paragraphs of discussion on Vietnam.]

Mr. Thompson said that with reference to bilateral relations which the Ambassador had mentioned, he thought he might like to know that Senator Fulbright was initiating closed hearings on the Consular Convention in order to ascertain whether we could move on this matter. He said, also, that the President and Senator Fulbright were actively considering the possibilities of trade with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had reported his last talk with the Secretary in which the Secretary had said he had the impression that Moscow thought our policy had changed. He said frankly that Moscow did think there had been a change of policy from that of President Kennedy and from the position taken in the election period as well as from the talks that he had had with the Secretary. By way of example, he cited the ever increasing United States involvement in Viet-Nam, the bombing of a socialist state, the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, and in the Congo. He also referred to the financial question in the United Nations and the different plans that had been developed for an MLF or similar arrangement. He also cited the President’s statement of May seventh,⁴ which Moscow had considered was hostile to the Soviet Union. He pointed out that all of this had affected our relations. He said that Moscow still supported the policy of peaceful coexistence and thought that the deterioration in relations was not the fault of the Soviet Union. He pointed out, however, that one could not look at bilateral relations in a vacuum. The United States Government must have known that its decision to bomb North Viet-Nam would result in a worsening of relations with the Soviet Union. The United States action against North Viet-Nam had no perspective and was very dangerous. The Viet-Namese people were determined to fight for their freedom and the socialist countries were determined to help and to oppose aggression.

The Secretary interrupted to ask if the first step was not to pull North and South Viet-Nam apart militarily.

Dobrynin repeated that the United States bombing and the increase in our troops in South Viet-Nam pulled the ground out from under our peaceful statements. The Soviet Union thought that the four-point proposal of North Viet-Nam was a good basis for solution. He added, however, that the Soviet Union does not represent North Viet-Nam nor the National Liberation Front. They had not asked the Soviet Union to represent them.

The Secretary said it would be a mistake for the Soviet Union to conclude that there had been a change in the United States policy since the Kennedy days. In those days we had had serious crises and he mentioned tension over Berlin initiated at the Vienna discussions. He said that our attitude in the United Nations was based upon our interpretation of the Charter. We hoped the matter could be settled. We had led no crusade during the two years that the Soviet Union was behind in paying its assessments but when Article 19 came into operation, we had serious problems. Even if the Soviet Union had paid, we would have had a serious problem with France. It was not only a question of Charter interpretation, but a question of our relations with the Congress because of the legal differences between voluntary and compulsory payments. We had encountered difficulty this year with regard to the appropriation for the regular United Nations budget because of this matter. The Secretary also pointed out that this question of United Nations dues was not a recent development but was due to the fact that the Soviets had let their arrears go beyond the two year rule. The Secretary also pointed out that the MLF had been initiated under President Kennedy. It would not be correct for Moscow to conclude that because we do not abandon the MLF that we are following a policy hostile to the Soviet Union. We know that the MLF does not represent a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government takes a different view. It would be a great tragedy if we can’t find some way to move ahead on the question of proliferation.

Dobrynin inquired how this could be done and asked if the United States position was basically the same.

The Secretary replied that the question would be reviewed after the German elections, but without an international understanding, many nations could move in this direction. Nuclear weapons were becoming easier and cheaper to make. Perhaps nothing could be done for the time being, but it would be tragic if we could not halt the spread of nuclear weapons, and, in any event, there was no basis for concluding that there was a change in United States policy.

With respect to the Dominican Republic, the Secretary said we were fully informed on the activities of the two Communist parties in that country. Both were in touch with Castro, and this constituted a problem. We would not permit them to arm civilian bands to take over the country by force. There would be elections there and a constitutional government would be formed.

With respect to the Congo, the Secretary said that the upper circles in the Soviet Union know that we are aware that Soviet arms were sent to the Congo rebels through Egypt, Algeria, and other countries. We concluded that this was a change in the policy of the Soviet Government. The Soviet leaders should know that we are not naive in this matter.

The Secretary said, as he had indicated in the previous conversation with respect to the President’s speech on May seventh, that we were well aware of the plans of the Soviet Union to use this occasion for sharp attacks on the German Federal Republic. This got in the way of any joint commemoration of the day we should have celebrated together.

Dobrynin pointed out that the Soviet Union had particularly resented the references in the speech to liberation, presumably of Eastern Europe. He pointed out that this harkened back to a policy of one of the Secretary’s predecessors. The Soviet Union had given us no grounds to reopen this question.

The Secretary observed that when we talked of building bridges, we had in mind improved relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. He reminded the Ambassador that there was a flood and torrent of talk constantly coming out of the socialist countries with respect to Wars of Liberation. These ideological differences between us exist, but the Soviet Union devoted much more propaganda and activity to these differences than we do.

In reply to a question, the Secretary said that our recent talk with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw had taken the usual course. He said, however, that some messages we had received from the Chinese seemed to mean that they wanted to get the Soviet Union and the United States into major conflict with each other. This should not be allowed to happen. When Dobrynin asked what these messages were, the Secretary said he was not at liberty to go into details.

Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary believed that our bombing of North Viet-Nam would lead somewhere. He referred to the wartime experiences with bombing and said that the Soviets did not think that this activity could lead to a settlement.

The Secretary said the Ambassador must realize that the 325th Division in South Viet-Nam was killing South Viet-Namese and Americans. We were not going to allow them to do this and to bomb our Embassy and people in restaurants, and then sit in a safe haven and be secure in carrying out such operations.

Dobrynin pointed out that the Secretary seemed to consider that everything was the fault of the North. He did not appear to recognize that there were forces in the South opposed to the Government. He cited an article by Gordon Walker to the effect that the Viet Cong enjoyed considerable support of the people of South Viet-Nam.

The Secretary said that the United States forces were in South Viet-Nam only because of what the North was doing against the South. He said that when the sects in the South were opposing the Government as well as some other elements there, we did not put in United States forces-nor, for that matter, did we do so as a result of the activities of the indigenous Viet Cong.

Dobrynin said that we were fighting the Viet Cong now.

The Secretary said that we were also fighting the North Viet-Namese and fighting Viet Cong, supplied with arms and direction from the North. Why should we talk to the NLF in regard to the North Viet-Namese Division in the South? We did not go into Viet-Nam until the North intervened.

The Secretary said that we had many prisoners that came from the North. He asked whether the 325th Division would go home if we stopped bombing.

Dobrynin noted that the Secretary said “if.”

The Secretary asked if we should leave those who are supplying the arms and matériel and directing the operations in the South to sit safely in the North. That was why he had asked the Ambassador some time ago what else would happen if the bombing stopped. Referring to Dobrynin’s remark that we should stop and see, the Secretary inquired how long does one have to stop. He repeated that both countries must be interested in better relations. This was an imperative of history. He observed, however, that some Soviets seemed to follow the line that “what is mine is mine, and what is yours must be discussed and divided up again.” Gromyko had told him that North Viet-Nam was socialist and would remain so, and that he would talk only about South Viet-Nam. The agreement we had reached about Laos had not proved to be worth anything. When Dobrynin said that we had violated the agreement, the Secretary replied we had not done so until we had found out that it was being violated by North Viet-Nam. He said we could accept full compliance with the agreement on both sides and would be very glad to know how to get to that position.

On the question of safe haven, Mr. Thompson pointed out that we had thought it important that Peking take note of the fact that this kind of activity could not be carried on without any reaction.

In concluding the interview, the Secretary wished the Ambassador a good journey and said that he would be in touch with him about the possibility of his seeing the President.⁵

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret. Drafted by Thompson, initialed by Rusk, and approved in S/AL on July 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
2. See Document 114.
3. See footnote 4, Document 115.
4. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506–509.
5. No record of any meeting with the President has been found, although Bundy sent Johnson on July 4 a 1-page memorandum recommending it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12, Pt. 2)