Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

114. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 15, 1965, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Discussion on Broad Policy Aspects

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large
• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Secretary said he thought that it would be useful to have a good discussion before the Ambassador returned to Moscow on consultation. He would suggest that such discussion deal with the broad aspects of policy, rather than details. We had a feeling that there had been a change in attitude in Moscow and we had received some indications that Moscow thought there had been a change in attitude in Washington. We ought to discuss the issues between us in some depth. As illustrative of the change of attitude, the Secretary pointed out that Soviet leaders had recently attacked the President personally, by name. We had been rather careful on this score and thought this was a rather important point. It had been a surprise to us when the President suggested that we go down the road to peace together, the Soviets responded by accusing him of double talk.²

The Secretary referred to the fact that in an earlier conversation on Southeast Asia, he had mentioned the possibility of our repeated statements that we did not want a large war might have been misunderstood. He suggested that perhaps Hanoi thought they could have a larger war without any reaction from us. He suggested that the Ambassador check when the 325th DRV Division moved and where. He thought this would help the Ambassador understand our feeling that Hanoi may have misunderstood. He went on to say that we wanted better relations but that there were some things we could not accept. He did not know whether there were other issues than Viet-Nam which may have affected the atmosphere. He knew that the Soviets did not now want to discuss Viet-Nam in detail, but as the two largest and most powerful nations in the world, we had great responsibilities and must do everything possible to avoid misunderstandings.

Dobrynin said he wished to ask a personal question; namely, whether the State Department participated in the drafting of the President’s Victory Day speech.³ When the Secretary replied in the affirmative, Dobrynin said he was disappointed. He said this was a day of memorial in which the Soviet people had lost twenty million killed. He said the speech had been particularly badly received because it had been made on that day. It was difficult from the speech to know who had been fighting whom and it almost looked as if it had been commemorating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Secretary said it had seemed to us that the Soviets were planning not a day of recollection of the agony of man that the late war represented, but an anti-German campaign. The Soviets had worked out arrangements on a theme that had made it difficult for us to participate along with them. The speeches that the Soviets had made on this day were not helpful from our point of view.

Dobrynin interjected that at least the Soviet speeches showed that they and the United States had been together in the conflict. The Secretary went on to say that the Soviet speeches and propaganda had engaged in bitter attacks upon the West German Government and the people and that this had not been helpful.

Dobrynin countered by stating that the Soviets had particularly resented the references in the speech to the liberation of East Germany because of the day on which it was made.

Dobrynin said he had raised the question of drafting of the speech from a professional point of view. Ambassador Thompson said that from a professional point of view, he thought the Soviets had made a mistake by sending out invitations referring to the celebration of the victory of the Soviet Union over Fascist Germany. Dobrynin replied that his own invitations had not been so worded, and that he had nevertheless had few representatives of the State Department present.

In reply to the Secretary’s question as to what significance should be attached to the personal attacks upon the President, Dobrynin hesitated for some time but then said that he supposed it was because the Soviets realized that the President was the center of power and was responsible for the policies that raised issues between us. He reverted to Viet-Nam and said he knew nothing about the 325th DRV Division, but pointed out that we had over fifty thousand men in South Viet-Nam and that even if there had been a Division from the North, the rebellion could not have been carried on unless it had been an indigenous one.

The Secretary stated that this argument could be used the other way because our people were interlaced with the South Viet-Namese, working with them in the countryside on agricultural and other projects and that they would not be sustained in this work if the people of South Viet-Nam did not want them there. He stated it was the intervention from the North that brought in American troops.

Dobrynin asked the Secretary how he saw the end of the story.

The Secretary said he could not predict the end because this depended upon two sides, but that there could be peace very quickly if Hanoi would stop doing what it was doing in the South. He said that there could be elections in both parts of Viet-Nam and that these people could live in peace. He then expressed his great disappointment over developments in Laos. We had thought that we had agreed to let the Laotians alone. They were not a warlike people and we were convinced that if they were left alone they would stop killing each other. The numbers of the North Viet-Namese in Laos never fell below six thousand and the International Control Commission was never allowed to come into Pathet Lao-held territory. He said this problem would have created a greater issue between our two countries if we had thought that the Soviets had had greater influence on the ground.

Dobrynin replied that we could not say that the Soviets had violated any agreement, but the Soviets could produce a whole list of actions on our part. When the Secretary suggested that we should talk about that list, Dobrynin said that the Soviets’ conscience was very clear. He went on to say that this was true even of bilateral relations. There had been no movement in this field but all of the matters were held up on the American side. When the Secretary referred to the Blagonravov/Dryden talks,⁴ Dobrynin replied that there never had been much cooperation in space, but that there had been no retreat on the Soviet side. He then mentioned that he had been awakened at three o’clock in the morning to assist us in stopping signal interference with our satellite communications. The Secretary said that their cooperation in this matter had been very much appreciated.

The Secretary concluded the conversation by suggesting that they meet in about a week’s time, which would give the Ambassador an opportunity of finding out whether Moscow had any points to raise.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on June 16. The conversation was held in Rusk’s office.
2. In a memorandum to the President for his evening reading on June 15, Rusk summarized this paragraph of the conversation. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164)
3. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506–509.
4. On June 8, 1962, Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, and A.A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences reached an agreement on cooperation in outer space. Talks on various projects had continued between Soviet and U.S. officials since that time.