76. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson1

When we last spoke on the telephone, I said that I would let you know how I got on during my visit to Berlin and Bonn which has just taken place.2

As it turned out, it was a very good thing that my trip should have started with the visit to Berlin. This enabled me to make an act of presence in the city and to make a speech re-affirming British determination, together with our allies, to safeguard the freedom of the city. The demonstration and the speech acted as a useful curtain raiser and set the tone for my subsequent talks in Bonn with the Federal Chancellor.

My talks with Erhard covered four main points:

(1)
The nuclear organization of the Alliance
(2)
Reunification
(3)
European problems including measures to improve the cohesion of the continent and bring EFTA and EEC closer together and
(4)
The offset agreement

In addition I had a private session with him, as between two retired or reformed economists, on the British economic situation. This gave a chance for me to say what I thought about Rueff and all his works and for Erhard to say that he totally disagreed with De Gaulle about the gold standard. Erhard indicated clearly, without actually committing himself, that we could expect German support when we apply for our fund drawing later in the year.

As to nuclear matters, it soon became very clear that whatever Shroeder’s views might be, Erhard was not going to have anything to do with nuclear matters this side of the German elections. It is clear that the only way that Erhard can preserve his relationship with De Gaulle and the unity of his party is by putting nuclear matters on ice for the time being. When I told Erhard that I assumed he wanted the MLF and ANF to be a sort of sleeping beauty he did not disagree. The wording in the communique3 represents the compromise between the British desire not to lose momentum and the German wish to forget about it for the time being. I would judge that there is no progress to be made on this until after the German elections.

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The one thing that the Germans were really interested in, again for electoral reasons, was some demonstration of public activity to which they could point on the re-unification front. I made it quite clear that, in practical terms, re-unification can only come as a result of a period of detente with the Soviet Union and could not be made a condition for detente: and in agreeing to remit the matter to the Ambassadorial Group, I was careful not to commit myself to any specific project. Although the Germans would like progress in time for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in May, they may be able to live with a minimum of demonstrable activity on the subject with their Western allies.

On the economic organization of Europe, I found Erhard equally concerned as I was myself to prevent the further division of Europe by allowing the gulf between the Common Market and EFTA to widen. He is a strong proponent of liberal outward-looking policies, and, privately, indicated that as an economist, he did not think much of the present agricultural arrangements of the Common Market. It was however a price that had to be paid. I am myself instituting a study here of ways and means of mitigating the effect of present divisions and hope to come up with some useful ideas.

We had some very tough sessions on the offset agreement but since you have yourselves virtually equipped the German armed forces, there does not seem to be much for us in that line. However Erhard undertook to issue a directive to his people to try harder and the fact of the directive was written into the communique. We shall give them a couple of months and then if necessary send the chief secretary, who is a very tough character, back to Bonn to re-negotiate the whole process. We left the Germans in no doubt that if we did not get satisfaction on this point, we should be forced to agonizing re-appraisals.

All in all the talks were tough but constructive. The visit was well worthwhile and has, I hope, generated the right sort of atmosphere for the Queen’s state visit in May.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9. Secret.
  2. Wilson visited Germany March 6–9.
  3. For text of Erhard-Wilson communique, March 9, see Europa Arkiv, Zeitschrift fur Internationale Politik, 1965, Dokumente, D 167–168.