54. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Department of State1
Secun 3. For Secretaries of State and Defense and Bundy from Ball. I met for an hour on the afternoon of November 30 with Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street. He was accompanied by the Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker (who left mid-way in the meeting), and his Private Secretary Oliver Wright. I was accompanied by Ambassador Bruce and my Special Assistant, George S. Springsteen.
Gordon Walker started the meeting by summarizing the conversations in which he and I had just engaged.2 He reported my statement, in reply to his query, that the British could not expect the United States to [Page 127] match the Polaris submarines to be contributed by the UK to an Atlantic missile force.
The Prime Minister countered in a jocular vein by saying, “This is a nice beginning. Maybe we had just better wait and start next week.”
The Foreign Secretary then reported that I had indicated to him that we were not doctrinaire in our approach to the multilateral nuclear force but we were determined that any ideas for accommodation must not compromise what we considered the basic objectives of the MLF. Moreover, any changes must be acceptable to other participants. He said he had been about to ask me about the US veto when we had broken up our meeting in order to come to the Prime Minister’s office.
I responded to his comment about the veto by recalling my recent conversations with the Germans at the fourth German-American conference in Berlin on November 14. I had been asked by the German participants to state the US position with regard to a possible European deterrent.
I had replied to this query by asking what was meant by a “European deterrent.” If it meant an offer by France to use the force de frappe in the defense of Europe the effect would be merely to transfer European reliance from Paris to Washington [sic]. In that event the USG would, of course, have to re-examine its military relations with Europe. The Germans had been unanimous in saying that they would never be in favor of a European deterrent on these terms. The Prime Minister interjected, “nor would we.”
I had then said that if we were talking about a European deterrent that might emerge as a result of the political unification of Europe that which brought about the creation of a competent executive authority to which the European nations had been willing to delegate the authority to make the life or death decision involved in the use of atomic power then this would have created a new situation which we would have to examine. But that time was obviously far in the future.
Wilson interjected at this point to inquire whether we meant an executive which was established prior to actual political unification. Gordon Walker said that this was a hard point to define.
I said that what we should tell the Europeans was, “You build a united Europe with a competent executive and we will look at the situation after you are finished”. But we were certainly not ready to agree now to relinquish our veto even if they succeeded.
The Foreign Minister interjected to say that any language on this point in any agreement regarding a multilateral force would require very careful drafting. I agreed but added that we were prepared to develop language on this subject under which the United Kingdom would, in [Page 128] effect, have the right to veto any action by the US in relinquishing its own veto.
The Prime Minister asked if we would say this publicly, and asked if I were familiar with his recent speech in Parliament on the multilateral force.3
I answered that I was very familiar with his speech. We had been frankly disturbed by the speech and particularly by his reference to the MLF as a “divisive force in Europe”.
This was the kind of language that De Gaulle was using—not the kind of language we expected from the United Kingdom.
The Prime Minister looked momentarily embarrassed but sought to explain his statement. He was assisted by Gordon Walker who observed that the MLF had been frequently referred to as a “divisive force” during the election campaign. The Prime Minister added that if I wanted to see a real Gaullist speech I should read the one delivered in Parliament by Peter Thorneycroft.4
It was, he said, unforgivable for the Tories to insist on a debate on the MLF on the eve of an important negotiating session with the United States. It made it all the more difficult for the Labor Party because the Conservatives threatened to force the issue to a vote.
The Tories, he insisted, had introduced the Nassau issue into the election campaign by posing as the great defenders of the “supreme national emergency” clause. He himself felt this was counter to President Kennedy’s view of Nassau, which stressed the multilateral aspect of that agreement.
He said he cited this as an important factor in political terms because it formed the background for his handling of the debate in Parliament on the MLF. The actual details of Gordon Walker’s discussions in Washington in October had not been reported to anyone but the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. Therefore, he could not bring the MLF question into the Cabinet until after the Chequers meeting. In actual fact he did not go to the Cabinet until last Thursday on this matter. He had succeeded in forcing the issue through—and, he said with considerable emphasis, he had taken his political life in his hands when he had talked about the possible disposition of Polaris submarines in the debate in Commons.
He had done all this, he said, because he fully realized that considerable momentum had built up since Nassau. He, therefore, had gone far in [Page 129] committing himself on putting the Polaris submarines into a multilateral force in spite of his earlier election statement.
The Prime Minister then suddenly shifted the basis for his defense of his Parliamentary statement by saying that he probably had more accurately expressed the idea of “divisive” in his Guildhall speech. What he meant by “divisive” was a “dispersion” or “dissipation” of effort within the Alliance as a result of the undertaking to construct a wholly new weapons system.
At this point I said that he might be interested in the considerations that were influencing the present attitude of the USG. Discussion of the MLF had proceeded for a long time. We had worked with other nations in Paris for many months. We had examined with great care various alternative schemes. The MLF seemed to offer the best solution.
It was admittedly somewhat complicated but that resulted from the fact that we had to deal with the political structure of the world as it was, and that structure consisted of a number of nation states.
In view of this fact there were only two ways to approach the problem of nuclear management. We could approach it on a collective basis or by creating a number of individual national deterrents. The latter course held great dangers.
We were prepared to work with HMG on trying to find accommodations for its problems. However, we were not prepared to do so at the expense of compromising our objectives. Our principal objectives were to tie Germany closer to the West, to strengthen Atlantic unity and to discourage nuclear proliferation by providing nonnuclear nations an opportunity to participate in the ownership, management, and control of nuclear weapons. Moreover, any adjustments of the basic plan must, of course, be acceptable to the other interested nations.
The Prime Minister then asked how we proposed to move the discussion toward some agreed basis. I said that we hoped to be able to find a range of solutions for our mutual problems when we meet next week in Washington. We should not, however, continue too long with bilateral discussion. Early in January, perhaps beginning sometime the week of the 3rd, we might find it useful to have a multilateral meeting at the ministerial level. I though that at least five nations should be asked to attend such a meeting—the US, the UK, the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch.
The Prime Minister asked if such a multilateral meeting would be held under an “umbrella” such as NATO. I replied that in my view this would not be very practicable. Gordon Walker then chimed in to say that a NATO umbrella would involve too many people and create too many other difficulties.
There was a brief discussion as to a possible site for a meeting. I suggested Switzerland or perhaps The Hague, but said this was something [Page 130] we could discuss in Washington. Gordon Walker pointed out to the Prime Minister that during the first part of January he would be in the midst of his electoral campaign. The Prime Minister instantly responded that this was no problem since Healey could be the representative for the British Government.
The Prime Minister then stated that he was in thorough accord with the idea of a ministerial meeting in early January, and stated quite emphatically that we could not continue to discuss the matter very much longer on a bilateral basis. He then noted that he might be in the United States again late in January at the UN General Assembly. He would be prepared to go to Washington for a formal or informal visit, depending on which appeared more useful at the time. I remarked that this might be quite helpful but that we could not delay progress until the latter part of January.
Gordon Walker then said that he would be seeing the German Foreign Minister on December 11 and that he would see Spaak before next week. He also mentioned that he planned to see Saragat again. He added that he doubted that there could be useful discussion of the MLF at the NATO Ministerial meeting.
[Here follows discussion of the Congo.]
At this point Gordon Walker left. Immediately the Prime Minister became noticeably more relaxed and candid. He gave the impression of a man who knew what he wanted but was on guard in the presence of his own Cabinet colleagues.
I said that I thought it might be helpful to describe to him the prevailing atmosphere in Washington. President Johnson was approaching his pending visit as a meeting between friends who had problems to be worked out together. I said that I mentioned this because I was aware of a school of thought in London which held that the only way to succeed with the Johnson Administration was through hard bargaining.
The Prime Minister interjected to say that he wished to get ahead with the problem but he did not feel that this was a situation in which there could be no “trade”—in the sense of an “exchange” of one point for another.
I said that we were not thinking in terms of haggling or selling carpets. Everyone was well disposed toward the Wilson government and anxious to get off to a good beginning. But, I said, we must view these talks as a situation in which each side says “My problem is such and such, your problem is such and such and we must try to find a solution together.” With this attitude we stood a good chance of succeeding.
The Prime Minister said that he faced political problems—both domestic, and in the field of foreign affairs. President Johnson had the great advantage of having “smashed” the opposition. Wilson was faced with the possibility of another election—perhaps in the spring—in [Page 131] which the defense issue would be a key element. At the moment it was popular to take the Gaullist line in Britain. Therefore, he said, “I must come back from Washington in a very strong position, not perhaps next week but at least at the end of January.”
The Prime Minister then picked up a clipping from the London Times of Saturday, November 28, regarding my trip to London. He read various portions of it. He noted that it said: “Mr. Ball is well acquainted with the latest Presidential approach to the nuclear proposals.” Looking across the table he said, “I agree with that statement.” He said that the article also indicated that President Johnson was firmly committed to the MLF, and he believed that too.
He said furthermore that the United Kingdom was not against a multilateral force. “We are,” he said, “committed to that part of the Nassau agreement which deals with the inclusion of national forces in a multilateral force but we are against the other part.”
Continuing further he said that he was greatly interested by one statement in the article which said that “Any proposal designed to perpetuate national control …will be unacceptable.” He asked me if that was an accurate statement of the United States point of view.
I said that it was not a very accurate statement of our present thinking.
The Prime Minister replied, “That is too bad. I had hoped that it was.” I then explained to him that the decision to give up the British national deterrent was a national decision which only the British could make. We were hardly in position to insist that the British give up their deterrent since we had originally worked with them in developing it. And at Nassau had ratified its extension into the next generation of weapons.
The Prime Minister then said “Suppose we came to Washington with a fall-back proposal which involved our keeping our own Polaris but giving in to the mixed manned surface fleet?”
I replied that would be fine with us.
The Prime Minister, grinning like a fox, then said, “Ah, you agree with Tory policy but not with Labor policy. You would prefer that we would all go back to Nassau.”
I said that at Nassau the UKG had indicated that it did not plan to participate in the mixed manned force but it had committed itself to giving that force “a fair wind”. I recognized that if the United Kingdom now decided to turn over its Polaris submarines irrevocably to an Atlantic nuclear force, we would see benefits in that course. By divesting itself of nuclear weapons the HMG might help to arrest the present disturbing trend toward proliferation—a trend that had been given a new impetus by the recent Chinese explosion.
[Page 132]I said that we could explore further in Washington whether it was at all feasible for us to go on record as encouraging the British relinquishment of its national nuclear system, if that would be useful to the Prime Minister in facilitating British participation in the mixed manned force. However, this would require further thought and I did not wish to express a definite view at this time. It should be clear however, I added, that if we were going to succeed in developing an arrangement in Washington it would have to provide for some British participation in the mixed manned surface fleet.
The Prime Minister said that during the election campaign the Tories had made a great point of saying that the Labor government would turn over the defense of the United Kingdom to the Americans. We would recognize that there were anti-American elements both in the Tory Party and the Labor Party. These elements did not control either party—particularly the Labor Party. However, he had to face the fact that merely to hand over the British Polaris submarines on a non-returnable basis could well be political suicide.
[Here follows discussion of British Guiana.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House and OSD. Ball visited London and Paris November 30–December 3, primarily for talks about the MLF. Documentation relating to the trip, including memoranda of conversations and reporting cables, are ibid. and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2443.↩
- Ball had met for about an hour at noon with Gordon Walker and Defense Minister Denis Healey and members of his staff to discuss the military aspects of the MLF. The talks focused on mixed manning and the British desire for a clear U.S. statement about its control of nuclear weapons. Ball summarized the conversation in Secun 2 from Paris, December 2. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF))↩
- For text of Wilson’s speech to Parliament, November 23, see House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol. 702, cols. 930 ff.↩
- For text of former Defense Minister Thorneycroft’s speech on November 23, see ibid., cols. 1015 ff.↩