Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, November 4, 1964, 6 p.m.

1742. I called on Chancellor Erhard late yesterday at my request. He expressed appreciation for the letter from President Johnson of November 2 (Bonn 1268),² delivered to him the previous day, which dealt principally with the recent discussions with British FonSec Gordon Walker in Washington on the MLF. The Chancellor said that he would reply to the President shortly.

Without elaborating, the Chancellor volunteered that we would see a new political situation in Bonn tomorrow. He was obviously referring to the results he anticipated from a series of intensive meetings he had been holding during the day with CDU/CSU Party leaders in an attempt to achieve party harmony. This is being reported separately in Embtel 1741.³ Now that the American elections are about over, direct relations between us must continue. It would, perhaps, be helpful for FonMin Schroeder to meet soon with Secretary Rusk. Later, perhaps after his inauguration, he hoped to receive President Johnson.

Returning to the question of the MLF, the Chancellor observed that General De Gaulle says that German participation in the MLF will violate Germany’s duty to Europe. The Chancellor believes that he may want to downgrade the MLF so as to “push Germany down”. He wanted to make it clear to us that the attitude of De Gaulle will in no way influence Germany in its decision to participate in the MLF. If Germany were to accede to De Gaulle’s current attack on the MLF she would become a “laughing stock”. Germany cannot accept a “law laid down” by De Gaulle. Germany cannot “yield to pressure.” Germany will remain firm on the MLF and hopes that the U.S. will.

Continuing, the Chancellor said that in the light of recent developments he did not feel that it was possible to sign the MLF this year. The effort should not, however, be postponed too long in 1965 otherwise the public will get used to indecision concerning the MLF and will lose interest in it and fail to support it. In view of the time-table forced on him by the forthcoming German elections, the Chancellor thought we should not delay beyond February 1 at latest.

The Chancellor felt, moreover, that it is now all the more important that President Johnson come to Europe as soon as convenient after the elections, to talk with De Gaulle about “nuclear systems.” Perhaps he will be able to persuade De Gaulle to integrate the force de frappe with other European nuclear efforts. If, however, the President should fail—if De Gaulle says no—we must all feel free to proceed in taking the necessary action in the nuclear field. The Chancellor said that he wished to make it clear that what he had in mind was something within NATO, not among a few disintegrated states. He asked me what further details I could give him of the results of the Gordon Walker visit.

I assured the Chancellor, in the first place, of our continued firm determination to proceed with the MLF as indicated in President Johnson’s letter. During the discussions in Washington Gordon Walker had presented no specific alternative to the MLF as we have planned it. He had indicated a preference for the inclusion of other British nuclear forces on a non-mixed-manned basis, and a desire to minimize both the size and the degree of British participation in the multilateral seaborne force. He had also asked for more time for a decision.

We had, however, made no commitments as to any changes in the existing concept of the MLF, or in any extended delay. We had indicated clearly that any changes would have to be in agreement with Germany and our other partners. It is heartening, however, that the new Labour government appears to have such a positive attitude toward the MLF, and we believed that we should make every effort to see if the matter cannot be negotiated out with them on a basis acceptable to all.

In this connection we were particularly interested in Gordon Walker’s forthcoming visit to Germany scheduled for November 14. We felt that by this time the British should be in a position to present more specific suggestions to the Germans as to their concept of the nature and composition of the force. We assume that the Germans will listen carefully to what the British have to say, however, we want to make it clear that we do by no means feel the Germans need necessarily accede to all of the British proposals. We have been involved in the MLF together for a long time and are prepared to play our role alongside the Germans and other participants in whatever negotiations are required with the British.

I advised the Chancellor that, in view of the importance of getting on with the MLF, Under Secretary of State Ball was prepared to come to Bonn to meet with him on November 16 following participation in the fourth German-American conference to be held in Berlin November 12–15 where he would have opportunities for prior discussion with FonMin Schroeder. Ball would, in addition, wish to discuss with the Chancellor a wide range of other matters, including UGP, centering around the present impasse in the general Common Market-Kennedy Round area. The Chancellor said that he would welcome Secretary Ball’s visit and asked me to extend him an invitation in his behalf.⁴

Comment: The Chancellor’s comments on the MLF as [garble] believed to raise several interesting points of emphasis. He does, in the first place, indicate a sharp reaction against De Gaulle’s current attempts to block the MLF—and a determination to proceed with its development at all costs, seeing in failure to do so a disastrous defeat. He seemed somewhat apprehensive about the results of the Gordon Walker talks, perhaps as a result of not being fully advised up to this point on what took place. His suggestion that the signing of the MLF might be postponed as late as February 1 is the first time, to my knowledge, that we have heard the Germans mention such a late date, and should provide a reasonable compromise between our present January 1 date and the British suggestion of a March date. In any event I feel that Germany could be set off her time schedule if the signing were delayed beyond February 1. I consider it important that we continue to emphasize to the Germans that we will be with them in further negotiations and not leave them alone to negotiate a compromise with the British. Of particular interest is the Chancellor’s suggestion that President Johnson make an effort to reach agreement with General de Gaulle on the inclusion of the force de frappe within a European “nuclear system.” Despite his firmness on MLF, the Chancellor obviously does not relish the prospect of a head-on collision with De Gaulle on the MLF and would be much happier, particularly from the standpoint of his internal political opposition, if De Gaulle and his force de frappe could be integrated into the planning for a European nuclear force.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limdis. The source text also beans an Exdis stamp. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels and passed to the White House.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.) The letter stressed that the U.S.-U.K. talks had covered a wide range of topics and that the British had outlined some preliminary ideas about the MLF.
3. Dated November 4. (Ibid., POL US–GER W)
4. In telegram 1746 from Bonn, November 4, McGhee reported that he had mentioned to the Chancellor how several issues, including French participation in the EEC, the success of the Kennedy Round, further European unity efforts, and perhaps even the MLF, had been linked by France to the question of a common grain price. Erhard admitted that some of these issues had been linked, but he felt that the threat to leave the EEC was a bluff. (Ibid., Central Files, INCO–GRAINS EEC)