328. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
21254. Summary. General De Gaulle carefully restricted conversation at today’s 50-minute meeting to one issue, namely, Germany. Apparently De Gaulle is planning his own position for his meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger and he is reverting with singleminded concentration to his thesis that U.S. commitments to territorial integrity of Western European countries, especially Germany, are inadequate. It is this inadequacy which explains, in his mind, why the Germans are so disturbed and edgy. Despite his repeated suggestions that the U.S. was not sufficiently committed to European defense to allay West German worries, he repeatedly refused to give any indication that France would undertake any new commitments or make any new statements, public or private, bilateral or multilateral, for the security of the Western world.
End of Summary.
[Page 762]- I.
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De Gaulle opened the conversation immediately with a question asking for our evaluation of the Czech invasion. I responded in detail utilizing the Department’s 242962.2 I emphasized that invasion had created new military situation which in turn required collective action as well as bilateral action by Western European countries to strengthen military deterrent as best antidote to possible Soviet recklessness. I referred specifically to need for larger conventional forces.
De Gaulle responded by stating that in his opinion the Soviets could be expected to continue and heighten their propaganda war against West Germany, that they would maintain pressure all along the line, psychological, military, diplomatic, that it was to their advantage to keep a fear of Germany alive in Europe and to utilize revanchism as an excuse for strengthening their position throughout the satellite nations. I noted that although the Russians were using alleged activities by West Germans in Czechoslovakia as an excuse for their own invasion, there was no evidence of any Western nation threatening Czechoslovakia. De Gaulle said that in his judgment the Russians were worried by the threat of a revitalized Germany joining with Czech and perhaps even East Germany, plus the Chinese, in joint actions against Russia itself. The Russians, he said, were not worried about the current situation in which there was nothing to justify such a massive action as the Russians had undertaken against Czech. Rather it was the spectre of China and Germany working together against Russia in the next five or ten years that was the real cause of their alarm and actions. He repeated that he anticipated further diplomatic, economic, psychological warfare by the Russians against the East Germans looking toward the day when having built a sufficient foundation, the Russians would invade Hanover or Hamburg. Whereupon he asked: if the Russians did invade West Germany if they did breach the western frontiers of Germany, what would the U.S. do?
- II.
- Responding to De Gaulle’s questions I drew heavily on the Department’s 2412843 affirming that the U.S. has always fulfilled its treaty responsibilities; that the President himself had reaffirmed our commitments to the Alliance in recent meetings with FRG; that we have informed the Soviets that we intend to keep our obligations to the Germans; but that our government would be greatly assisted by a show of determination and commitment from the countries of Europe.
De Gaulle responded by saying that no country in Europe had sufficient power to stand up to the Russians and that, in fact, even collectively the European countries do not have sufficient power. Thus, he said, the first question remained: what would the U.S. do? I repeated that the U.S. [Page 763] had a record of living up to its treaty obligations and that our country would do so in this case even if it meant war. De Gaulle asked whether or not the U.S. would be prepared to respond immediately with our nuclear power if the borders of Germany were violated, to which I responded that our country would probably not respond initially with nuclear weapons to an invasion by conventional forces. Rather, we would first want to utilize our own conventional forces together with those of our European allies, that we wished to avoid a nuclear holocaust. I pointed out that these were my own opinions, that I had no instructions from my government on this issue, but that since he had raised the question I would like to know from him what France’s response would be if the Soviets invaded Hanover or Hamburg as he had suggested.
De Gaulle responded that it was not a question of France’s response because France didn’t have the power to respond adequately to such an attack that France’s response would be controlled by the U.S. response; but that if the U.S. responded with all of its power, France would respond with all of its power.
I asked him if he would advise me in greater detail with his own opinion of France’s response to an invasion of West Germany. He responded by saying an invasion of West Germany was not an invasion of France; that France had no common border with Russia; and that France must look to its own life and death and to its own future. He said explicitly that the U.S. would do the same and he made it clear that in his judgment the U.S. would not risk nuclear war for the defense of Western Europe. Apparently he believes that since France would not respond to a military invasion of West Germany by deploying all of its resources, neither would the U.S., and because the U.S. would not really make an absolute commitment of its military power both conventional and nuclear to Germany, the Germans are worried and will continue to be worried no matter what the French, English or Italians say or do.
At three different points in our conversation I specifically asked De Gaulle to suggest what the U.S. could do, above and beyond what we have already done, to allay his doubts and the doubts which he says the Germans have. What could be done, I said, to convince you that the U.S. will live up to its obligations?
De Gaulle was unwilling or unable to suggest any action, public or private. Moreover when I suggested that France might well consider enlarging its own commitments, intensifying its military cooperation with Germany, and reestablishing contacts with the military forces of the Alliance, he declined to respond either negatively or positively. Our conversation concluded with his observation that the subject we were discussing was immense and that we would have many additional opportunities to talk about it, that he welcomed this exchange of views and looked forward to seeing me again.
[Page 764]He made no allusion to Vietnam and gave me no occasion to do so before he indicated his time had run out.
Conclusion. De Gaulle appeared to be in good health and in a good frame of mind. He even smiled warmly and said “thank you very much” in English when, as I was leaving, I congratulated him for his courage and vision in supporting the new educational reforms proposed by Edgar Faure in which so much emphasis is placed on decentralization and reliance on youth.