Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

321. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, August 26, 1968, 2146Z.

4381. Subj: Brosio views on post-Czech reassessments.

1. SYG Brosio and I had a general tour d’horizon today on the implications for NATO of developments in Eastern Europe. We agreed that while any NATO decisions would have to await outcome of current discussions in Moscow, it was probably true that the implications for NATO will be drawn primarily from events to date, i.e., the raw fact of the invasion itself. That is, the Soviets have demonstrated both a willingness to use force for political purposes and a capacity for political misjudgments and mismanagement which contrasts with the military effectiveness of their operation; this creates impression that political constraints on Soviet behavior are less than had sometimes been assumed.

2. On Kiesinger idea for a high-level meeting, we compared impressions that Germans were not taking any follow-up initiative on the subject here. I did raise on a personal basis the question of whether there might be a place in the fall scenario for a DPC meeting at MOD level, i.e., taking advantage of the fact that most key Ministers, including ours, would already be in Bonn for the NPG meeting on 10 October. Having an immediately preceding or following meeting of the DPC in Bonn might be a politically useful step if relevant decisions could be made ready by then. Brosio thought the idea interesting but wished to reflect further.

3. We also noted that the Military Committee was today discussing the notion of a collective no-reduction pledge (the text of MCM 68–68, 26 Aug 1968, is reported and discussed in septel).² SYG Brosio felt this notion (that there should be no weakening of NATO pending a defense review of the new situation) was a good one and especially helpful vis-a-vis the Belgians. Comment: We are not clear enough here as to the state of play of various possible U.S. adjustments in the light of the Czech situation to assess what problems, if any, this would pose for us. But on the available evidence, it appears almost certain that such a “freeze” would be strongly favored by the British— or, at least, by Healey—and by both the Germans and Italians. The Dutch, Norwegians and all others would also be favorable, so that there would be, in effect, unanimity if the Belgians and the Canadians (and, of course, the U.S.) found it palatable. See septel for our recommendation. End comment.

4. In our discussion of a “defense review”, we identified three separate elements:

A. The package of problems dealing with warning, surprise, crisis management and consultation—which the Germans and Dutch will certainly want to review;

B. The question of force levels and particularly qualitative factors and remediable deficiencies—which might initially be approached by way of a freeze on reductions and then improvements in the 1969–73 force plans which will be up for review in December;

C. The continental mobilization—US-UK-Canadian reinforcement package, i.e., the “you mobilize—we’ll reinforce” bargain suggested by Secretary Clifford’s remarks at the last DPC meeting, Brosio felt that this might be the area in which the German proposal for a restatement of the NATO defense concept could find a productive application this fall.

5. Turning to the political side, our discussion also brought out the need for a parallel reappraisal (“Harmel revisited”). This, in contrast to the fourteen-nation defense review, in the DPC, would be handled in fifteen-nation NAC and POLADs. Brosio’s instinctive feeling at this point is quite similar to our own, namely, that while the importance of the “defense” pillar has been heightened, the “detente” pillar remains valid, even though the process will be longer and harder than we had thought. SYG Brosio was concerned that questions might be raised about the status of ongoing work for the longer-term on East-West relations and MFR. He thought while we could anticipate increased resistance to MFR, it was still relevant to continue our homework, even if in somewhat lower key and over longer period.

6. In the next day or two, USNATO will be sending its further analysis of the substance of these defense and political reviews and how they should be related to each other, along with our ideas for a fall scenario. This package will be raw material for my consultations in Washington next week.

7. One substantive comment seems in order now: it is important to distinguish the question of posture and actions in direct response to the Czech situation on which, despite occasional sniping, there has been no responsible suggestion that NATO should have taken other than a “low profile” posture, from a kind of “malaise” which may adversely affect some elements of NATO’s new strategic concept. Some Europeans are “discovering” that despite all the talk—especially from the U.S.—in recent years about crisis management, flexibility, mobility, mobilization, political waring, etc., the more likely kind of crisis is one like the present, i.e., internal to Eastern Europe, which makes it politically impossible for NATO to implement those concepts for fear of being provocative. Thus, the concepts themselves have tended to come under attack; and while we think there are some good rebuttals, e.g., on warning time (see USNATO 4364),³ the critics may have one valid point. Perhaps the most likely contingency directly threatening NATO would be a follow-on to tension within the bloc, i.e., where the Pact subsequently decided to whip up a crisis with NATO to obscure or bridge over an internal crisis. Here NATO might not be politically in a position to take full advantage of warning time and mobility, giving the Warsaw Pact—as things stand just now—a significant head start in operational readiness. This aspect can doubtless be explored in the defense review, with a possibility that future exercise (such as one involving the U.S. redeployed forces, and some selective mobilization or reserve activation) could be arranged against a scenario of the need for “non-provocative” readiness measures in an assumed high state of tension within the Warsaw Pact. But to avoid the malaise getting too much headway, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, it would seem worthwhile to us to try to work out some such international activity, even of a limited nature, in the near term.⁴

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the other NATO capitals.
2. Not further identified.
3. Telegram 4364, August 24, summarized the discussion at a North Atlantic Council meeting on August 23 during which the question of the time for a political warning was discussed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO)
4. After summarizing the discussion at a Council meeting on August 28, Cleveland reported that the Permanent Representatives and Brosio were still in the process of disengaging themselves intellectually from the Czech crisis, and because of this the process of focusing on the nature and scope of an assessment in its wake was just beginning. (Telegram 4427, August 28; ibid.)