Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

318. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, undated.

On July 15, Rusk sent Clifford a brief reply thanking him for the talking paper and stating that he found it “sound, balanced, and persuasive.”

1. The Value and Function of NATO.

The value of NATO to the United States rests on the basic fact that our vital security is indissolubly tied to the security of Western Europe. The resources, human and material, of Western Europe, if in hostile hands or under the domination of a hostile power, would be enough to tip the balance of world power against us. We would have to become a bristling defensive fortress, and live under drastically different conditions. Our society would have to be organized for survival against an enormous technological and manpower threat, with a manifold increase in the percentage of our resources spent for defense.

The vital importance to the US of keeping Western Europe free is therefore quite clear. Almost as important to our national security is the preservation of the political stability and security of Western Europe. In view of the history of two world wars, and of today’s balance of power in Europe, it is very clear that the United States is needed in Europe to preserve the political balance between East and West, and even to permit a secure and easy relationship among our friends in Western Europe. NATO has enabled us to accomplish both the purpose of preserving our vital security interest in Europe, and the purpose of letting Germany contribute to European defense without arousing fear among its neighbors.

The record of US commitment to NATO—a commitment that would be brought into grave doubt by an abrupt withdrawal of 5/6 of our forces from Europe—has been repeatedly made clear by the Presidents of the US over the past two decades.

Most recently, on 19 February 1968, when President Johnson met with NATO’s Secretary General Brosio, they jointly announced that:

“They considered the maintenance of NATO’s strength, including the U.S. commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.”

II. US and European Contributions to NATO.

In early 1950s, the United States had to provide the muscle, the forces, the organizing talent, and the resources to get NATO started, and to create a respectable power base. But since then, our European friends have, in fact, steadily built up their forces, the equipment of these forces, and the share of the common load of defense they are carrying. United States forces now constitute only 12% of the ground manpower in NATO Europe, even if French troops are excluded, and about 1/4 of the air force.

III. The Need For Strong Conventional Forces in Europe.

In the most critical region, Central Europe, the Soviets and their allies facing NATO have in excess of 600,000 men. NATO forces in that area presently approximate the same total. It is here that US forces are concentrated. A drastic cut in US forces thus would upset the conventional force balance of the two alliances.

For aggression to be deterred, it is essential that NATO not become inferior to the Warsaw Pact in any element of its military establishment. Nuclear weapons, for example, are no substitute for soldiers. Where one side possesses stronger conventional forces, it may be tempted to exploit that conventional strength recognizing that a nuclear response would be so imprudent as to make its threat incredible. NATO’s political weakness resulting from a disparity in conventional forces would thus increase the chances of pressures by the Warsaw Pact, such as, for example, intensification of the incidents involving access to West Berlin. The multiplication of such incidents would create a grave danger that miscalculation might lead to general conflict.

NATO’s security, and hence our own, requires balanced forces— conventional as well as nuclear. Such balanced forces now exist. We must not abandon them. Although we should continue to seek mutual force reductions with the nations of the Warsaw Pact and should continue to encourage replacement of US forces by those of our European allies, we must follow both courses in a fashion that avoids disturbing the present balance in Europe.

IV. US Withdrawals From Europe.

Past and Current Withdrawals. While our military contributions are still substantial, they have steadily become a smaller share of the total European defense burden. Our troop strength in Europe has steadily diminished as our European allies have taken over more of this burden. In 1961 we had 417,000 military personnel in and afloat in the EUCOM area. In 1966 we had 366,000. In 1967, in removing our forces from France, we eliminated spaces accounting for about 18,000 military personnel and 21,000 dependents, and also eliminated 11,000 jobs held by foreign nationals, saving $110 million in BOP costs. We are now engaged in redeploying to the United States, as part of the 24th Division and four air squadron redeployment from Germany (Reforger/Crested Cap), 33,000 military personnel, about 15,000 dependents, and 96 fighter aircraft at a prospective saving of about $70 million annually in our balance of payments. Thus by September, 1968, we will have reduced our authorized strength in Europe by a total of 51,000 military personnel and 36,000 dependents.

These large reductions of US forces in Europe have been kept in phase with the increasing capability of European forces, and with the capacity of the US to return our combat forces in a hurry in a real emergency. They have therefore been within the capacity of NATO Europe to absorb, both militarily and politically.

Further US Withdrawals. The Department of Defense is at this moment considering, together with the Department of State, how we can make further sizeable yet orderly reductions in our European troop levels and costs over the next several years. On the 10th of May in Brussels, Secretary Clifford told the NATO Defense Ministers:

“While I cannot speak for future Administrations, I do not believe that it is realistic to assume that the United States will maintain the same level of ready forces deployed in Europe indefinitely into the future. I think it is inevitable that the European members of the Alliance should plan increasingly over the coming years to assume greater responsibility for the direct and immediate defense of Europe.”

We have lost no time in starting this process, but we believe it is essential to conduct the process in a way which will preserve the cohesiveness and strength of NATO and which will protect to the maximum US interests in Europe.

We are considering actively a series of proposals which could result in reductions of over 40,000 additional military personnel in Europe, to start in this fiscal year and to be completed during the next, and an annual saving of over $200 million in BOP costs. Our emphasis will be on maintaining combat capability to the maximum extent, cutting drastically into expensive support activities and headquarters rather than into combat troops wherever practicable. These additional military personnel reductions, when added to our reductions since 1 January 1966, would yield almost 100,000 military personnel cuts in Europe (18,000 from relocations from France, 33,000 from Germany, and over 40,000 additional). Taking into account US and foreign employees as well as US dependents, these cumulative reductions are anticipated to yield a total cut in DOD supported population in Europe of about 215,000 and BOP savings of over $350 million a year.

Our proposals regarding this further reduction should be ready in the near future, hopefully within the next month. We must then consult with our NATO allies and consider how we can fit together our planned reductions and their defense planning, making adjustments or tradeoffs to provide for an orderly transition and the maximum possible maintenance of NATO strength in Europe. What we are doing is, therefore, fully in accord with the views often expressed in Congress. We are reducing our level of forces in Europe and encouraging our European allies to provide a greater proportion of NATO forces, while at the same time adhering steadfastly to our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Nor is the reduction now under consideration to be the final word. We will continue to diminish US force levels in Europe as rapidly as the political, military, and technological situation allows. If the Soviets respond to current NATO suggestions of mutual force reductions, such response would permit us to accelerate these reductions. But it is vital to our own security, to the political stability of Europe, and to the political and military power balance in the world that the reductions of US forces in Europe are kept in step with the political and military power realities.

V. The Balance of Payments Effects of European Deployments.

We are keenly aware of the importance of reducing our balance of payments deficit. But the amount of deficit that can be ascribed to our European deployments is frequently exaggerated. The fact is that of the 1.6 billion dollars in current military costs in Europe, something like 1.1 to 1.3 billion is currently offset through cash receipts from arms purchases by our allies and through financial measures, such as bond purchases, which they undertake for the purpose of relieving the US balance of payments deficit on the military account. A drastic reduction in US expenditures in Europe on military account could also result in a substantial reduction of purchases of US military equipment and US securities by our European allies. Thus the small net gap in our balance of payments on military account in Europe could well remain relatively unchanged.

Our overall balance of payments deficit, in the area of $3–1/2 billion last year, is a problem of the most serious concern to all of us. But the three to five hundred million dollars current net deficit which results from our European deployments, is a small price to pay for the security it buys for us.

With respect to Germany, where by far the greatest number of our forces are stationed, the “gap” is expected to average only approximately $200 million annually during FY 1968 and FY 1969. That gap cannot endanger our gold reserves, moreover, since Germany follows a policy of not converting dollars into gold. Recently we concluded an agreement with the Germans whereby in addition to payments of approximately $100 million for commercial purchases of military equipment, they agreed to purchase $625 million in bonds to reduce the military balance of payments deficit for fiscal year 1969.

As to the future, we are exploring exhaustively possible means of further ameliorating the BOP situation, over and above the various force reductions currently being studied. We are examining the possibility that joint basing arrangements can be made; that certain military functions now performed by US forces can be transferred to other NATO countries; and that host countries can assume certain maintenance and operations costs now financed by the US. We have also completed a comprehensive study of US community support for our troops in Europe and have identified other measures which may enable us to realize further BOP economies.

The United States and German Governments agreed on 10 June of this year to begin talks in the early fall to explore together possible long-term solutions for the particular BOP problem on military account in that country.

VI. The Adverse Effects of Drastic Congressional Action.

It is our strong conviction that any Congressional action at this time drastically reducing US force levels in Europe would have the gravest consequences for the security and stability of the NATO Alliance, and would wreak havoc with US policies and goals in related areas. In particular:

The Europeans could not possibly make the requisite military adjustments in time to compensate for the withdrawn US forces. The remaining US forces would not be able to put up any substantial fight for Berlin, to safeguard our nuclear arsenal, or even to receive and deploy reinforcements from the US rapidly in case of trouble in Europe. A large portion of our nuclear weapons, many of which are pledged to the support of European forces which man the delivery systems, might have to be withdrawn.

The psychological and political effect would be even more destructive than the military effect. Europeans would feel profoundly uneasy about the stability of any American commitment at all, and might well seek safety in neutralism and accommodation with their overwhelming neighbor on the Continent, the Soviet Union.

The Germans, above all, would feel that the US had in large part decided to abandon them and that the remaining US forces were largely token. The effect on internal German political stability would be strongly adverse. Nationalist influence would grow very rapidly, and a German foreign policy seeking a relationship with the Soviets, offering heavy economic concessions and a possible neutralist stance, would gain wide acceptance. This in turn would revive a host of European antagonisms and anxieties which are now effectively held in check by the assurance of stability that the US presence provides. The other Europeans would view with great unease not only the new military balance in Europe favoring the East, but the disproportionately large German forces involved on the Western side.

A massive redeployment of US troops from Europe would require very great one-time budgetary expenditures, and pose personnel, construction, procurement and training problems. Based on a preliminary analysis, withdrawal of 200,000 US military and civilian personnel and their dependents could mean one-time budget costs of over three billion dollars if equipment were procured and prepositioned overseas to permit rapid return of these forces to Europe in case of need. The cost could be about $1–1/2 billion if the redeployed units did not have prepositioned equipment in Europe. It is also very important to understand that redeployment of forces from Europe to CONUS does not save major recurring budgetary costs, since most of the costs of supporting forces—equipment, personnel, and most operating costs—are the same whether the forces are located here or in Europe.

Such action would also affect the prospects for ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We would be undermining our Allies’ confidence in US mutual defense assurances at the very time that many NATO countries, and especially the FRG, are seeking reaffirmation of US commitments to facilitate their undertaking a 25-year NPT obligation, in the face of the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty could be terminated at a year’s notice.

In Eastern Europe, the Czechs have recently made some determined steps toward greater independence from the Soviets. The USSR and other Eastern European countries are applying diplomatic and even some military pressures on the moderate Communist government in Prague. Massive withdrawal of US troops, leaving the field largely to the Soviet Union and its adherents, would discourage this and other efforts toward liberalization and would strengthen the advocates of hard-line Communist hostility and repression.

It is barely a year since the US and NATO completed their relocation of troops and headquarters from France. While the Fourteen (the NATO nations other than France) have adjusted well to the new situation, and while NATO maintains peacetime cooperation with the French and would hope to have French support in wartime, the partial disengagement of France from NATO military affairs has not been without an undesirable adverse political effect. A drastic US redeployment would aggravate this effect substantially and suggest a weakening in the political cohesion of Western Europe as a whole.

In the Mediterranean, Soviet fleet activities have markedly increased. Although we now consider the Soviet threat in the Med to be essentially political rather than military, the shadow of the increased Soviet presence would grow substantially longer if the US withdrew the bulk of its forces from Europe. The impact on Turkey would be immediate and damaging.

NATO cannot continue as a viable organization unless we consult with our Allies well in advance about any proposed change in our force contribution to NATO which will have profound effects on their security and political posture. Drastic Congressional action to take the bulk of our forces out of Europe would confront our Allies with a fait accompli. It would make a mockery of our efforts at genuine consultation in the Alliance.

A legislative directive to cut our current European forces from about 340,000 to 50,000 would be an action destructive of our own security posture, and of the military balance of Europe, and surely of the political stability of the continent. It would be regarded by friend, ally, neutral, and foe as the substantial abandonment of Europe by the US, as a loss of our interest in the continent in view of our Asian engagement, as a return to isolation, and as an act that would cast doubt on the validity of our international commitments.

1. Source: Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 164, Luncheon Meetings with the President. Secret. Attached to a July 11 memorandum from Clifford to Rusk, which stated that the Department of Defense was continuing to examine the military threat to Europe, the NATO Alliance, U.S. troop levels in Europe, and alternative ways to meet the threat with a reduced troop presence. This talking paper was intended to help in the continuing discussions of these problems.