Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

281. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Brussels, December 14, 1967, 1749Z.

1056. Secto 044. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting: Assessment. Ref: A. Secto 26 (sent as USNATO 1022); B. Secto 31 (sent as USNATO 1127).²

1. Although partly overshadowed by Greek crisis, NATO Ministerial results satisfactory in terms of (A) resolution of specific issues; and (B) general atmosphere.³ Despite some tough negotiating on both the military and political issues, agreement was reached on all major subjects where Ministerial action had been indicated. Possibilities of impasse or open disagreements inherent in the situation (between the Fourteen and France on the Harmel study and between the US and FRG on strategic concepts) were avoided without any significant loss to US objectives.

2. On defense issues, results already summed up in reftel A. An important additional point to be stressed is that new force planning and nuclear consultation machinery established by NATO members last Dec has successfully completed its first full cycle. Whatever problems remain—and there are some difficult ones—the Fourteen now have in being a set of institutional arrangements enabling them realistically to tie together nuclear and conventional strategy, force planning and available resources.

3. In addition to action on firm force commitments for 1968, on five-year force plan, and on “flexible response” strategy, DPC session included several other points of interest to us. Various Ministers highlighted Mediterranean security problem in their statements, and NAC review of the international situation provided additional underpinning for future work on this subject. US is also gratified at widespread support that made possible agreement on establishment of standing naval force under SACLANT (multinational destroyer force).

4. While Secretary made his major statement in the NAC (see septel),⁴ we wish to call attention to two significant US statements in DPC which merit careful reading. First is Secretary McNamara’s “valedictory” presented by Deputy Secretary Nitze. Second is Secretary Rusk’s brief statement on burden-sharing and NATO claims against France. (Texts of both statements transmitted to addressee posts.)

5. Main item of business for the NAC—and most highly publicized subject for Ministerial sessions as a whole—was Harmel study, outcome is reported in reftel B. The full agreement reached on text of the report, embracing both a set of agreed principles and work program for political consultations, is highly satisfactory to us. We, like number of other countries, would have preferred greater detail on a number of points in line with Rapporteurs’ studies. Fact is, however, that despite hard negotiations between Fourteen and France at Special Group and in Brussels this week, our essential needs are met substantively and presentationally. France undoubtedly went along in part because of solidarity among key members of Fourteen, but existence of UK/EEC problem may also have played important role, French not wanting to add new NATO dispute to UK/Common Market dispute.

6. As the Secretary indicated in the meeting, US considers that the value of the Harmel Exercise goes beyond the report itself. We believe the analytical process carried out this year has had great utility in clarifying Alliance thinking; in bringing the members closer together on some fundamental propositions, and in laying out agreed framework for future political consultations. We also attach considerable importance to the agreement to publish the report.

7. In a sense, analogy can be made between Harmel report this December and decisions taken on defense matters last December which established tasks for future implementation. The big problem now is to begin carrying out the Alliance’s political work program.

8. Methods, timing and order of priorities for followup work, as between East-West relations, arms control and disarmament, Mediterranean security, and world-wide issues all remain to be sorted out. There is also question of any additional subjects Italy may raise in the Permanent Council under compromise worked out in order to overcome Italian reservation on concluding Harmel study now. (Part of earlier Italian reserve based in part on expressed desire NATO consultation on security implications for Western Europe of such issues as NPT and ABM’s.)

9. Brosio pointed out in meetings that it would be up to each member country to interpret Harmel study results for its own public opinion. We recommend addressees bear in mind hope expressed by Secretary Rusk that, in public presentation of Harmel study findings, member governments portray them as indication of future confidence in the Alliance.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Madrid.
2. Dated December 12 and 13, respectively. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 248)
3. U.S. Delegation records of the 40th North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, held at Brussels December 12–14, including telegrams to and from the delegation, memoranda of conversation, briefing papers, verbatim records of the sessions, and miscellaneous administrative records, are ibid., CF 242–251. For text of the communique issued at the end of the meeting with the Harmel Report attached, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 320–323.
4. Telegram 1038, Secto 40, December 14. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR))
5. Intelligence Note No. 1006, December 19, seconded this appreciation of the Ministerial Meeting. (Ibid.) On December 18, Secretary of State Rusk informed the British Ambassador that, in his opinion, the meeting went well with no surprises and that even the handling of the Harmel report had proven less difficult than anticipated. (Memorandum of conversation, December 18; ibid.)