Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

278. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 6, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Ferri’s Views on British EEC Membership and Italian Domestic Matters

PARTICIPANTS

• Italy
  • Honorable Mauro Ferri, PSU Deputy
  • Minister Giulio Terruzzi, Embassy of Italy
  • Mr. Platone Romani, Ministry of Foreign Trade
• United States
  • Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • Wells Stabler, Country Director, EUR/AIS
  • Rush W. Taylor, Jr., EUR/AIS
  • Jose De Seabra, Interpreter

Mr. Ferri said that he was grateful to have the opportunity to meet with a senior Department official responsible for the conduct of U.S. relations with Europe. He was interested in hearing Mr. Stoessel’s views on the problem of British entry into the EEC. The French position on the British application for membership was a problem of deepest concern both to Italy and to his party.

Mr. Stoessel said that we very much regret the situation which has arisen with regard to the British application. He said that we favor British entry and feel that Britain has a natural role to play in Europe. Her entry into the Common Market would strengthen the Community politically and her technology would be a considerable asset. Although we have long supported British entry, we have decided that it would not be useful to proclaim this policy from the roof tops. It is felt that such action on our part would be counterproductive as it could be used to support the Gaullist contention that British entry into the EEC would serve as the Trojan horse for the United States. It is our impression that General De Gaulle has taken an extremely harsh position. Although he has not yet used the word veto, he has as much as said that he will not permit British entry.² We feel that Prime Minister Wilson’s attitude of waiting to hear from the Six rather than accepting De Gaulle’s response is correct and sensible.

Mr. Stoessel asked Mr. Ferri if he would elaborate on his views of the subject. Mr. Ferri said that the Five were presented with an impossible dilemma. No one knew just how far De Gaulle would go in blocking the British bid, but it would certainly be as far as the Five would allow him. The dilemma which the Five face is whether to push for UK entry, thus risking the destruction of the Community or to capitulate to the General. Neither alternative was palatable.

Mr. Stoessel said that hopefully UK membership could be achieved after De Gaulle’s departure from the scene. He would hope that Prime Minister Wilson and the UK would keep up the momentum for entry during the interim. Wilson had already demonstrated that there was no alternative to full membership and that neither NAFTA nor EFTA offered valid alternatives. Fortunately, Wilson appeared to have the support of both parties in the UK.

Mr. Ferri said that the ultimate solution to the impasse was De Gaulle’s “departure for another world.”

Minister Terruzzi said that he was not completely convinced that the situation in France after De Gaulle would necessarily favor major changes in French policy.

Mr. Ferri said it was important to note the subtle shades of opinion in France. He pointed out that Giscard d’Estaing was opposed to De Gaulle on certain issues and that De Gaulle generally received support from the Communists on foreign policy issues.

Mr. Stoessel said that it is hard to foresee exactly what would happen after De Gaulle and that much depended upon how he goes. It was, of course, a mistake to assume that everything would change upon his departure. For example, French refusal to participate in the NATO unified military command structure would most probably not be altered. On the question of European integration and British entry, however, there might well be some changes.

[Here follow 2 pages of discussion of Italian politics.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Taylor on December 8.
2. At his press conference on November 27, De Gaulle stated that the United Kingdom might one day be eligible for membership if it underwent “vast and very deep” changes, which might come about through some kind of associate membership.