Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

267. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/10

New York, September 27, 1967, 6:15 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September–October 1967

SUBJECT

• NATO (Part II of III Parts)

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Edward Lampson (notetaker)
  • Edmund Glenn (interpreter)
• Belgian
  • Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel
  • Vicomte Davignon, Chef de Cabinet
  • Baron van der Straeten-Waillet, Director General, Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Ambassador Scheyven

Foreign Minister Harmel told the Secretary the drafting of the Harmel study on the future tasks of the Alliance was generally going along in a positive and satisfactory way. He spoke warmly of the contributions made by Mr. Rostow and his collaborators and especially of the work of Mr. Kohler as rapporteur of the Third Sub-Group on defense policy which was doing an outstanding job.

He then turned to the problem of French obstruction. Spaak had completed a draft of the report of the Second Sub-Group on Inter-Allied Relations, which the French refused to accept. They even rejected a formulation that the Alliance was an element for peace. This was a complete reversal of what Couve had said at the last ministerial meeting in Paris. Harmel said he was planning to talk to Couve in New York in the hope of persuading him to be less obstructionist. In the past it had been possible to make some headway by talking to him personally. It was much preferable to continue with French acquiescence but it might be necessary to proceed without them if they remained completely negative. With the exception of the French the work had gone well with a lot of interest and dynamism and the quality of the analysis and drafting had been high.

Harmel said, however, that the drafting on Atlantic solidarity had been disappointing because a number of Europeans and the Canadians had been holding back and had shown timidity in discussing this topic.

The Secretary said there was a very serious question in regard to France. There was one report that Couve might refuse to come to the December meeting in Brussels where the report will be discussed. French conduct presented us with a dilemma. If the Fourteen adjust to French sensibilities the report may have nothing in it. But if we say what we think, this may give deGaulle a pretext for withdrawal. This basic question of political strategy deserves attention at the highest level. The Secretary said that in his personal view we should not let ourselves be blackmailed but this has some danger in it.

The NATO Foreign Ministers should exchange views on this vital question. But it is much better for the other Foreign Ministers to try to discuss the matter with the French.

Secondly, regarding Atlantic solidarity, the Secretary said that we are willing to go as far as the Europeans wish us to go but that we cannot tell the Europeans what they should do. Harmel replied that, in his view, the concept of Atlantic solidarity was essential. The Secretary said it might conceivably be useful if the question were discussed at some time, strictly among Europeans. Harmel replied that, in his opinion, this question should never be discussed in a European caucus but in all frankness with the U.S. and Canada.

The Secretary then spoke of the work of the Fourth Sub-Group dealing with NATO consultation or problems outside of the treaty area. European suspicion that the U.S. was trying to entice Europeans into Vietnam or Cuba was wrong. This was not what we had in mind at all. In our view, NATO cannot think soundly about its security if it limits itself to considering problems within the geographic framework of the NATO area. Things outside the NATO area vitally affect NATO itself. The Middle East crisis has shown that. It is impossible for NATO to ignore the vast continent of Africa which is only twenty minutes by air from Europe. It is only in the past year that Saclant has begun to think in terms of naval operations in the Atlantic south of the NATO line. But it is ridiculous to think in terms of two disconnected naval battles—one north and one south of the NATO line.

Harmel agreed that NATO could not ignore such interrelationships and advocated an exchange of information and assessments regarding developments outside the NATO area. It had been a great mistake for the Europeans not to have listened more attentively to the American analysis of developments in the Middle East eight months ago. But he said that the drafting of the fourth section had been the most difficult. Vicomte Davignon, who had been working on the Report, said that the Third Group was reaching positive conclusions but the work of the Fourth Committee had been proceeding poorly. The members of the group were unwilling to engage in serious and thorough discussions and the rapporteur had to do most of the work himself.

In conclusion the Secretary assured Harmel that we would do everything we could to support and assist the work of the Harmel Group and that we must keep in touch on the problem of French obstruction.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Approved in S on September 29. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers.