Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, September 6, 1967, 1648Z.

32570. NATUS. Ref: (A) State 8514 Circular; (B) Paris 2756.² Subject: Future of the Alliance Study.

1. Department has been reviewing status of Future of Alliance Study in preparation for four sub-group meetings scheduled for September and early October, and meeting of rapporteurs scheduled for October 12–13 in England. With this timetable, we would envisage meeting of Special Group principals at end of October. Purpose this message is to summarize our views at present stage for background of addressee posts. Action with representatives of other countries should be taken only by the US participants in the Study.

2. We continue to attach major importance to speediest possible completion of sub-group reports; to encouraging rapporteurs to submit substantive, well-written analyses and conclusions; and to avoid at sub-group level negotiated language representing lowest common denominator of fifteen national positions. Thus, we continue to adhere generally to views outlined in reftel A.

3. Beyond foregoing points, however, we consider aims should be (a) that Ministers receive for action in December a brief, substantive paper covering the four sub-group reports; and (b) that there also be a brief public document emanating from the Ministerial Meeting designed for maximum public impact.

4. While development of tactics in connection with these aims will depend importantly on developments between now and mid-October, it may be that, in connection with their October 12–13 meeting, rapporteurs themselves can do much of drafting of proposed covering report for Ministers. They should make it possible for Special Group principals subsequently to concentrate on resolving any outstanding substantive differences. Alternatively, covering document for sub-group reports might have to be drafted in Special Group or by PermReps and International Staff acting under its guidance. Our preference, however, would be for first approach indicated above. Similarly, there is question whether US would favor public release of this document or whether published report should be written separately. We incline to latter view but will take final decision later. Our decisions re tactics and procedures will depend importantly on our reading of likely problems with France and certain other countries.

5. Major point on which we are now clear is that public document, at least should be a short summary of major findings and conclusions with minimum of analysis and factual material. These might be included in December Ministerial communique or issued separately. In order for our approach to have best chance of success, all basic ideas should be built in at sub-group level. This means that, in addition to clear statement and rationale for indefinite continuation of the Alliance (including such things as integrated military system, substantial forces, careful balance between detente and deterrence, and general need to strengthen political consultation and policy coordination), we need at least one major clearly-defined substantive or institutional proposal relating to future tasks of the Alliance from each of the sub-group reports.

6. It is these latter, in our judgment, that will have greatest impact on official and public opinion in NATO countries; serve to demonstrate that Alliance is looking to the next decade; and provide indispensable counterpart to fundamental points about Western strength and cohesion that are relatively undramatic but must be clearly reiterated and endorsed in final report.

7. We have tentatively identified following points, additional to those cited re maintenance of strong Alliance, that US participants should endeavor to assure stand out as specific proposals or conclusions in sub-group report.

A. Sub-Group One (East-West Relations). In addition to providing defense and deterrence for the indefinite future, a principal Alliance task for the late 1960s and 1970s will be to come to grips with the problem of East-West security arrangements in Europe. This includes problem of division of Germany and Berlin. Closest understanding and coordination among Western countries desiring to contribute to resolution these basic issues will be required prior to initiation of discussions between East and West. While solid understanding is desirable among governments having special responsibilities for German question (US, UK, FRG and France), there must also be broader agreement within the Alliance. This means investigation on continuing basis of all substantive issues of European security, in all their ramifications, as well as consideration of procedural approaches to East-West negotiations. This should be undertaken by a special group responsible to the Council, and might well take form of a major continuation exercise deriving from the Harmel Study.

B. Sub-Group Two (Inter-Allied Relations). We think most useful idea to come out of this group would be one aiming at better balance in the Alliance as between Western Europe and North America. While US would not want to take the initiative in pushing the idea in formal meetings, US participants should endeavor to stimulate Belgium or some other country to put in appropriate proposal for increased European cohesion in the Alliance framework (i.e., a development of the Belgian idea for a “European caucus”). Such a proposal could relate to the principle of advance discussions among all or some European members of the Alliance on subjects for political consultation in NAC. For various reasons it may not be possible to refine a proposal in the Harmel Study context by December. It would nevertheless be very useful for the idea to be advanced as clearly as possible with appropriate language to make clear that objective is to improve Western European cohesion and cooperation on broad framework of Atlantic cooperation.

C. Sub-Group Three (Defense Policy). Report for this Sub-Group, for which US has drafting responsibility, will include, in addition to emphasis on Alliance strength and cohesion, proposal for emphasis on disarmament and arms control matters. Specifically, it will suggest creation of improved machinery for the Alliance including a new Council-level, reinforced committee, strengthened international staff capability in this field, and increased utilization of defense planning procedures to advise on military implications of disarmament measures.

D. Sub-Group Four (Problems Outside the Treaty Area). Most important specific idea we would like to see emerge from this Sub-Group’s work is need for intensification and greater flexibility of NATO consultations on problems beyond the Treaty area. Thus, in addition to stressing need and right of Alliance members to harmonize policies on world-wide issues, the report should clearly establish the principle that groups consisting of less than full Alliance membership can meet under NATO auspices to consult on selected international questions. Rather than a permanent new committee or committees, we might seek to establish general criteria to govern creation of ad hoc groups to consult on specific issues as they arise. Most important criterion in our opinion should be that consultations take place among countries (a) that express a definite interest in problem under discussion and (b) are prepared at least to contemplate possibility of harmonized national policies and shared responsibilities.

E. General. Beyond the above specific ideas, we would also like to see another basic thought expressed in final report. This would be strong statement that, much more than in past, NATO bodies should serve as meeting place for senior officials from capitals. Purpose would be to supplement work of Permanent Delegations with frequent exchanges among officials in main stream of policy formulation at home. Analogy can be made with OECD practice in this regard. This point is applicable particularly to sub-groups one and four but may also apply to other fields. There is notably example of NPG/NDAC which already represents substantial step in this direction.

8. In addition to foregoing major points, there are perhaps limited number of other specific initiatives that should be reflected in final summary and published version. One that occurs to us would be endorsement of the proposal to establish a new and official relationship between North Atlantic Assembly (formerly NATO Parliamentarians Conference) and the NAC. Proposal has thus far evoked apathetic reaction from many Alliance members. It may stand a better chance if Harmel Study report gives it a boost and if problem is treated in context of broader efforts to strengthen the Alliance.

9. Request USNATO comments on this telegram. Would also appreciate any thoughts info addressees may have.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Bowie, Kohler, Springsteen, McAuliffe, and Thompson; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, CINCEUR, SHAPE for POLAD, and EUCOM for POLAD.
2. Circular telegram 8514, July 18, transmitted guidance for a rapporteurs’ meeting on July 21. Telegram 2756, September 2, offered an appreciation of the progress made to date in the Harmel exercise. (Both ibid.)