Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

256. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations¹

Washington, June 8, 1967, 9:16 p.m.

209519. NATUS. For Ambassador Cleveland from the Secretary. USRO deliver Cleveland by 8:30 a.m., Friday, June 9. Ref: A. Paris 19972, B. State 208534 Circular.² Subj: NATO Ministerial Meeting and the Middle East. This message provides guidance requested for June 9 NAC meeting:

1. We are in general agreement with your views as reported reftel A, paras five and eight. We continue to believe there will be need for continuing NATO consultation on Middle East situation and that the proc-ess should begin with next week’s Ministerial meeting. Thus, at the meeting our aims will be (a) to establish clearly the major interests of NATO countries in the immediate Middle East situation and in relation to long-range stability and development of the area; (b) to obtain Ministerial agreement, or at least informal understanding, re need for quiet continuing NATO consultation on these problems; (c) to seek consensus on goals and methods of such consultations. Aside from obvious, intrinsic importance of Middle East problems, NATO consultations would represent major practical supplement to efforts underway in Future of Alliance Study.

2. Re NATO interests in the Middle East: Although many of these are obvious, believe it useful for Ministerial discussion to establish a clear record on this point. Consequently, recalling the Secretary’s emphasis on dangers of Middle East situation last December, we would expect to bring out such points as the following. These take on added urgency in light of current crisis:

A. Geographical proximity to NATO area.

B. Consequent vital European and North American interest in peace, stability and regional development in the Middle East.

C. Strategic elements in relation to NATO area such as sea communications, overflight privileges, and petroleum resources.

D. Importance of the Mediterranean to the Alliance.

E. Arms supply problems and the need to find means of avoiding future competitive arms buildups.

F. The link between foregoing points and Western relations with the Soviet Union. We recognize that East-West relations may be a good starting point to lead into questions of NATO’s interest in the Middle East. Point we wish to get across, however, is that there are also other important reasons for Western concern with the area.

3. Re need, goals and methods for consultations: NATO as an institution should have no action role vis-a-vis the Middle East. Such a role would be undesirable in East-West context; in terms of responsibilities of other bodies (notably UN); and in terms of Arab and “third world” attitude toward NATO and its members. This circumstance in no way detracts from need we see for close Western coordination on positions NATO countries will be taking in the UN and bilaterally with third parties. At same time, all of above factors highlight need for maximum secrecy re fact and substance of NATO consultations on Middle East.

4. An analogy can be made with NATO consultations on disarmament problems where the negotiating forum is the ENDC. Arrangements for continuing discussions on Middle East in NAC can create basis of support for Western positions at the UN. They can help assure full understanding of the interests of individual Alliance members and reduce risks that any of them might be working at cross purposes. Also, should a future crisis occur, NATO machinery would already be tuned up and could be used quickly if desired. Events of past few weeks have shown that, once crisis is upon us, it is too late to try and crank up special machinery for Alliance consultations.

5. As to the arrangements themselves, we have concluded that we should probably not seek agreement on creation of special group with formal terms of reference now. Desirability and possibility of such a step can be examined later. Rather, we lean toward your idea (reftel A, para eight) of urgent ad hoc consultations in framework of Permanent Council. This would presumably take care of chairmanship problem automatically; i.e., Brosio would preside. We do however attach importance to two elements: (a) understanding that participation is open-ended in sense that others can go ahead even if some countries should not wish to attend; and (b) policy-level officials from capitals can attend as necessary.

6. As we see it, foregoing approach would have several advantages. It reduces negotiating difficulties and time that would be required in attempting to get agreement on formal group, whether embracing full NATO membership or not. Keeping matter in framework of Permanent Council should help in reducing publicity as we have succeeded in doing with periodic NPT discussions.

7. Re tactics: We would prefer that Brosio or some other national delegation sponsor proposal along foregoing lines. If this cannot be arranged in time available, however, you should indicate our intention to make the proposal. In any case, you may expose our views on basis this telegram. Appreciate your urgent recommendations for US tactics at the Ministerial in light of June 9 NAC discussion.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by NEA, RA, Eugene Rostow, Leddy (in draft), and Springsteen (in draft); and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USUN, USCINCEUR, SHAPE for POLAD, and EUCOM for POLAD.
2. Telegram 19972, June 7, reported the NATO Permanent Representatives’ concern about the Middle East crisis. In paragraph 5, Cleveland added that he had not suggested any particular consultation process, but had emphasized the need for “open-endedness” and the possibility of including special policy officers; paragraph 8 noted that policy toward the Middle East should be framed with particular reference to East-West relations. Telegram 208534, June 6, provided a preliminary assessment of the questions that the Middle East crisis raised for NATO. (Both ibid.)