Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, December 13, 1966, 8:25 p.m.

102104. Ref A—Paris 8954;² Ref B—Paris Nodis 9004 and State 100646.³ For Secretary and Amb. Bohlen from Leddy. I have had only the briefest opportunity to discuss these matters with Defense but thought you might like to have my personal views in the event the question is raised during Secretary’s stay in Paris.

1. As suggested in paragraph 1 of reftel A, I believe it would be highly desirable to sell the French the equipment and installations on various air bases in France wherever such sales would be to the economic advantage of the US. This would give us a dollar return and might also speed up our time of departure from France thus helping us to meet the April 1 date. As Secretary McNamara will no doubt inform Secretary Rusk there is an intense interest here in getting out as soon as possible and avoiding any disagreement with the French over US delays.

2. Frankly, I see no advantage and some clear disadvantages in attempting at this moment to re-engage the French in a discussion of US use of military facilities in France. We may be certain that if they have to foot the bill they will in fact maintain only such facilities as they intend to use in any case. Presumably if France is at our side in an emergency or hostilities we would at that time be permitted to use these facilities. If we now suggest that we have an interest in their maintaining specific facilities they might very well demand some payment from us, such as, for example, free or cut-rate sales to them of existing equipment and installations on the theory that these facilities are of potential use to us even though in fact they had decided to keep these facilities for their own purposes. Finally, protracted discussion of this subject with the French could lead to additional delays in our departure and possibly a further exacerbation of our relations on this entire question.

3. The disadvantages cited in paragraph 2 would not necessarily apply at a later stage after we have left France and have sold them whatever equipment and installations we jointly decide upon. At that point we could simply present them with a list of the facilities which they had already decided to maintain and to which we might want access, with their approval in time of emergency or hostilities in which they concur, simply in order to facilitate planning. An approach at this later stage would avoid presenting them with an excuse for demanding payment and would not engage us in a request for some “commitment” on their part.

It would also avoid political disadvantages mentioned at end State 100646.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Leddy. Rusk was in Paris for the NAC Ministerial Meeting.
2. Dated December 12. (Ibid., DEF 12–6 FR)
3. Telegram 9004, December 12, has not been found. In telegram 100646, December 10, the Department of State agreed with Bohlen’s analysis, which stated that De Gaulle was being unrealistic in hoping France could remain aloof from any hostilities that might take place in Europe. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO)