Office of the Historian

212. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State1

Paris, October 22, 1966, 1444Z.

6007. NATUS. Subject: French forces in Germany.

1.
Position on French forces in Germany is briefly this:
A.
French have clearly run out on the arrangement worked out between the Secretary and Couve de Murville, and confirmed by all fifteen Ministers, at Brussels in June. French now insist that talks on French forces in Germany be conducted only by military commanders; there is no indication they would ever (even after report from the commanders) be willing to negotiate in the Council the “mission” of those forces, which they regard as solely a decision for French Government to make.
B.
FRG has abandoned (without due notice to us, by the way) the joint strategy we worked out with them for a preliminary agreement with French in NAC. Germans are quite prepared for talks between SACEUR and General Ailleret, without any political preliminaries at all.
C.
The only conceivable way to budge French from their position would be for FRG to be clearly willing to invite French troops to leave Germany unless they are satisfactorily related to NATO. Erhard is clearly in no position to do any such thing, and said as much to De Gaulle at their last meeting—or so the French believe.
D.
There is no prospect that SACEUR can settle this matter with the French unless the Fourteen instruct General Lemnitzer to accept whatever General Ailleret has been authorized to offer, and that is not a position in which the Alliance should place its Supreme Commander.
E.
In these circumstances an agreement with France that gives these forces a NATO character, even tentatively and tenuously, is not achievable.
2.
Our options are therefore in a very narrow range indeed. We can either
a.
Pretend that these troops might somehow be related to NATO even though the French won’t say just how, in order to help the Germans pretend that they are not there as purely French national troops under French national control; or
b.
Do nothing in NATO, and thus invite a bilateral side agreement between FRG and France to keep the French troops in Germany anyway.
3.
A bilateral agreement outside of NATO is so damaging to so many of our objectives in Europe, and regarded as so dangerous by all our allies, that let’s pretend alternative a is the least worse.
4.
I see no use at all in prolonging the agony at the political level. If we delegate the problem to the military commanders with instructions to report back to the Council, we will just have to recognize in a month or so (or perhaps at the December Ministerial Meeting) the facts of life as set forth above. Therefore, let’s end these “negotiations” now.
5.
There is a simple and effective way to do this. The Fourteen can draft a short instruction to SACEUR, saying in effect:
a.
We have listened carefully to what French representatives have told us, on several occasions, in NAC.
b.
We derive from these French statements the conclusion that the French troops in Germany might in some future circumstances be associated with NATO in the defense of Western Europe.
c.
In view of this possibility, SACEUR should maintain continuous liaison with the French military authorities for discussion of any plans and preparations which may be appropriate to the circumstances.
6.
This would not require SACEUR to try to reach agreement with General Ailleret on any particular subject at any particular time. They would not be required to make joint recommendations to NAC. If General Lemnitzer felt the need for further political guidance on particular problems that might arise in his liaison relationship with the French Chief of Staff, he would repair to the Fourteen for such guidance.
7.
The desire to get rid of the problem for this month, even if it has to come up again later, is now so great among the Fourteen that the procedure in paragraphs 5 and 6 may not be saleable at this stage. (It could also be used later on, if the military commanders first try and fail to arrive at an “agreement”.) But in my judgment it is so much better than dragging on through a predictably humiliating non-negotiation, that I recommend I be authorized to try it on for size the next time the Fourteen take up French forces in Germany. If it cannot be sold at this stage, then there is no alternative to going ahead with SACEUR-Ailleret talks ad referendum to NAC, and I should be in a position as fallback to go along with the majority that already wants to take that next step.
8.
Since Secretary was personally involved in the Brussels arrangement from which his French colleague has now “withdrawn”, I am repeating this message to Manila for his attention.2
Cleveland
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Manila for Secretary Rusk.↩
  2. On October 25, in a telegram approved by the Acting Secretary of State, the Department of State agreed that there was no longer any use in prolonging the matter of French troops in Germany and authorized direct talks between Lemnitzer and Ailleret. (Circular telegram 72261 to Paris and Bonn; ibid.)↩