Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, September 8, 1966, 3:10 p.m.

42890. Subj: Your 2879 and 2883—telecon with Leddy.² For the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. Schroeder discloses appalling lack of understanding of problems raised by proposed British action. Germans must be made to understand in unequivocal terms that unless we act immediately in concert with the FRG the British will be irrevocably set on a course of conduct that will result in substantial withdrawals from the BAOR. The result would put enormous pressure on the United States to make corresponding withdrawals and a process of unravelling can be started, with critical consequences.

It is totally unrealistic to postpone starting these discussions until after the Chancellor’s visit since the pressure for action in Britain due to instability of sterling cannot be dealt with in a leisurely fashion. The British have now agreed to participate in trilateral talks on the condition that they be held immediately (i.e. next week) so as not to postpone the target date of October 13 for completion of the work of the Anglo-German Commission, by which date they are determined to have “results.”

The US has proposed trilateral talks not for the purpose of “ganging up” on Germans but because offset and force level (including logistic backup) questions can no longer be considered separately or bilaterally. Re “ganging up” argument you should note we have already suggested to British they should take account of some $20 million annually of balance of payments savings they will obtain through transfer of US air squadrons from France to UK and reduce their German offset demands by that amount. Conceivably similar savings could be found. It would be our strong hope that out of trilateral discussions practical arrangements can be worked out on both questions of finance and force levels which will be acceptable to all three countries and preserve essential NATO security requirements which we are convinced will otherwise be endangered. The US is prepared to come to trilateral talks with suggestions for consideration to accomplish this end result. NATO would of course be consulted on any force level questions but it is of utmost importance that three countries be in agreement on them.

Accordingly, you should in your forthcoming talk with Erhard do your best to persuade him to agree to commencement of trilateral talks next week in view of serious dangers which would result from delay.³

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 GER W. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to London.
2. Telegrams 2879 and 2883, September 8 (received in the Department of State early in the morning of September 8) reported that Schroeder showed no sense of urgency with regard to trilateral talks and still preferred to postpone them until after Erhard visited Washington at the end of the month. (Ibid.) The telephone conversation has not been further identified.
3. On September 9, McGhee reported that after 1–1/2 hours of “hard discussion,” Chancellor Erhard, on the basis of the U.S. evaluation of the threat of a British troop withdrawal from Germany, agreed to reconsider his opposition to trilateral talks. (Telegram 2951 from Bonn; ibid.)