138. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Your Further Response to deGaulle
A further response to deGaulle will raise one central question on which your advisers may disagree. The key to deGaulle’s letter is the distinction he draws between (1) his obligation under the treaty to go to war in case of an unprovoked attack on an ally and (2) the organizational and command arrangements which are not strictly a part of the treaty but have grown up since 1949. He says he will support (1): the treaty obligations, but is against (2): the peacetime organizational arrangements.
[Page 327]Everyone is agreed that we must tell deGaulle that we and our other allies are determined to preserve an integrated NATO structure with or without France. The question is whether we should go further and tell him that if he won’t play his part in the organization, France will no longer enjoy the protection of the treaty. This would flatly deny his basic distinction between the organization and the treaty.
On its face, this is an appealing line:
- —it satisfies one’s sense of elementary justice: why should any nation profit from the treaty without sharing in the work?
- —it might convince sensible Frenchmen that the General has gone too far, and is risking French security;
- —it would provide a strong defense against critics at home who think it is high time we stood up to deGaulle.
But there is another side to the coin. It is a fact of geography that a U.S. threat to deprive France of our protection is at best barely credible and at worst, just plain silly. It is like threatening to abandon Kentucky in the face of a land attack by Canada. It is hard to do unless one is prepared to throw in Ohio. If we are going to defend the Germans against the Russians, we cannot help but defend France too.
The alternative is not to appease deGaulle. He is clearly not appeasable. And there is no question that we must reaffirm our continuing commitment to an integrated NATO, and to do what is necessary to make good on that commitment—with an empty chair always waiting. But we could by-pass, for the time being, the question of the security guarantee under the treaty, neither reaffirming it nor threatening to withdraw it.
My guess would be that this second approach is more likely to gain us the solid allied support we need. To the other Europeans, relations with France are a sensitive political issue. In a confrontation, we will be in trouble unless it is clear, not only that the provocation comes from Paris, but that the U.S. is not over-reacting.
There is no question that a cool approach will draw some fire at home. We will be accused of letting the French get away with murder, and still promising to protect them. But even in terms of domestic politics, I think it as likely as not that we will be safer than if we try to drum France out of the treaty on terms that are legally questionable and militarily meaningless. This would make us vulnerable to the more serious charge that our inflexibility helped to destroy NATO.
Perhaps, in the end, deGaulle will behave so outrageously as to force us to take a hard line even on the treaty. But for the time being, there is a strong case for limiting our response to a positive reaffirmation of our commitment to the organization, and not escalating the argument to the question of treaty commitment. (Even under this option, we will be able to take some very tough steps. For instance, I am inclined to think that we should withdraw our nuclear support from the two French divisions in [Page 328] Germany as soon as deGaulle actually withdraws these divisions from NATO command.)
Before making up your mind, you should hear both sides of the argument in much greater detail. I am afraid that State’s entirely natural irritation with deGaulle predisposes them to take a very hard line. If you wish to have the full range of choices spelled out, it will take an instruction from here. You might wish to speak to the Secretary of State yourself. Alternatively, Komer and I can let State know that you want to be given a wide range of choices, especially on the question of the security guarantee under the treaty.
I have called Rusk; you follow up with Ball and Leddy2
Komer/Bator should instruct State.
Take no action
Speak to me