Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

136. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 7, 1966.

5561. Couve opened our conversation by saying President De Gaulle had asked him to deliver letter to President Johnson² to me and was sending information copy to Lucet (original was handwritten by De Gaulle). He added this was to make approach more formal (“plus solonnel”). He said purpose of letter was to make clear De Gaulle’s intentions and position. He added similar letter would be written to certain others (British, Germans and Italians) during this week.

After reading note, I asked if this represented denunciation of agreements. At this juncture Couve simply replied letter is to inform us of French intentions. Couve went on to say that French have told us before that they would inform us of their plans in March 1966 but this did not mean intention to effect plans then but to give sufficient time before 1969, so plans could be made tranquilly (“tranquillement”). He said French position had been agreed on for long time. He said some thought French had changed position because of forthcoming elections and he said Lucet now reported from Washington we thought it was to act before Moscow trip. He concluded this was childish (“enfantillage”).

Couve then repeated other leaders would receive similar letter later in week but U.S. as leader of Alliance approached first. He stated next week all fourteen governments would receive diplomatic note which would spell out in more detail French plans. He pointed out U.S. most concerned with NATO while three countries—U.S., Canada and Germany—concerned with bilateral arrangements but he quickly added Canada was minor problem and German agreements were satisfactory as no German commander was involved. U.S. bilateral agreements, and he listed five principal ones, were, however, important.

I asked again if this were denunciation or proposal for negotiation. Couve said both and neither but admitted he failed see a priori how we could agree. I pressed again asking if it were French position that all U.S. troops should leave. I noted we had many installations here and this letter really offered nothing, and sounded like a denunciation. Couve said yes if we wished (“oui, si vous voulez”) i.e. it was denunciation. Couve reiterated letter was to inform us of French plans and French had been saying this for years. I pointed out General had always spoken of reforms to NATO and had indicated on February 11³ he would discuss this problem with me before action. This action I said represented decision without any consultation with us or the allies. I said it would be problem in Franco-American relations and in the whole Western security concept. Under Secretary had made it clear to General De Gaulle in August 1965⁴ that we considered North Atlantic Treaty and organization as a whole and on this basis U.S. had made Article V commitment. I added that in order to make clear that our commitment under Article V was serious and in effect 100 percent we had supported the set up of the organization, had stationed a considerable quantity of troops on European soil in order to reassure our allies. I added I wondered if it were possible to accept thesis of an alliance emptied of content and I wondered if this were not even a violation of treaty. This was also a juridical question I noted which was under study in Washington. I thought the consequences of the French action would be immediate and clear, for example, it would be impossible to leave nuclear warheads with French forces in Germany if they were not earmarked for NATO.

Couve stated Under Secretary had already made similar points to Lucet.⁵ He said France had always said she would not denounce the treaty in 1969 but for her part felt it should continue. He interpreted U.S. position as meaning we must keep not only treaty but all its accretions since 1949. Treaty when ratified by U.S. and French Parliaments in 1949 not at all now what it was then. Alliance was not automatic in principle, Couve noted. French, however, say treaty should continue even though world situation not what it was in 1949. France wanted an agreement on these issues but it seemed impossible to obtain. He said we seemed to think Article V was unilateral commitment but said only case when it arose since 1949 was in Cuban case of 1962, when France had stated her intention to carry out obligations. I pointed out to Couve that Article V had never entered into the Cuban crisis nor had it been mentioned by General De Gaulle when he assured us of his support. He did not pursue this subject.

Couve then added this seemed odd procedure where U.S. was already discussing Article V commitments with France’s other partners behind her back. If an attack came, he said, it would not be against France but probably against FRG and here we were pushing France towards neutrality in such a case. He wondered if all of our military paraphernalia here was not useless anyway. I repeated we did not want an empty alliance. Couve referred again to formal French undertaking in Article V. Couve said we could interpret French step as we wished. I said French move looked very much like a step in direction of neutrality.

I spoke at some length about integration problem in NATO and pointed out absence of integration in peacetime and consequently of any danger France could be dragged into war against her will. I told Couve that I didn’t think there was anybody in the U.S. Government and probably in other allied governments who seriously believed basis on which French action was presented, publicly, pointing out that there was no integration in peacetime and consequently no danger of France being dragged into a war through an integrated mechanism that did not exist. Couve asserted that France wanted to work out wartime accords and SHAPE and AFCENT integrated headquarters are located on French soil.

I concluded the conversation by telling him that this was a very serious action the French were undertaking and would have a very bad effect in the U.S. I said we did not consider that the hard elements of the Soviet situation had really changed in the last five years, that the Soviets continued their military preparations, were still a dictatorship where policy was made by a small group of men, were keeping Germany and Berlin divided, and reminded him that less than five years ago we had been forced to send troops to Europe to reinforce the Berlin position.

Couve interrupted to say that we had not found the French had backed down on Berlin.

On leaving I told Couve that I was very saddened by this news, I had been one of the individuals involved in the creation of NATO and I was particularly aware of the amount of effort and devotion which had gone into the creation of the Atlantic defense community which France was now leaving.

It was agreed to say to the press only that we had met and Couve had given me a letter from De Gaulle to President Johnson. There is to be no discussion of contents.

Incidentally, Couve started the meeting by denying vigorously that the Foreign Office had leaked it to Le Monde, which leaves only the Elysee as a possible source.⁶

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. The source text has no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:11 p.m. and passed to the White House.
2. Document 137.
3. On February 11 at the State dinner for the diplomatic corps, Bohlen had spoken briefly to De Gaulle who stated that France desired to maintain the Alliance but change its organizational structure. (Telegram 4853 from Paris, February 11; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. See Document 101.
5. See footnote 4, Document 134.
6. In telegram 5562, March 7, Bohlen commented that De Gaulle’s letter was a clear denunciation of all agreements with France concerning French participation in collective military defense arrangements and represented the “harder line” under discussion within the French Government. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO)