Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

124. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, January 17, 1966.

1. I should report a conversation between the President and David Bruce last week,² because of the light it throws on the President’s current thinking about Atlantic nuclear policy.

2. David asked the President for guidance in the light of the exchange with Harold Wilson in which the President said that Bruce would be prepared to pursue the subject on his return to London.

3. The President expressed his own support for a solution in which the British would put in some submarines, and we would put in some submarines, and the Germans would put in some money. He forcefully stated his belief that it is necessary to keep the Germans with us so that they will not get cut loose and become dangerous again.

4. At the same time the President explicitly rejected David’s suggestion that he make a firm decision now to do all that might be necessary to bring about British agreement to this course of action. The President is not ready at this time to make a hard issue of this question with the British. He believes that discussion should continue in an effort to see whether agreement can be reached between the British and the Germans without strong U.S. pressure on either one.

5. My own impression is that the President is sympathetic to the German desire for a “share,” but strongly aware of the opposition which such an arrangement might produce among important groups here and abroad. He wants to go ahead with it if agreement can be reached by the normal process of negotiation and discussion, but he is not willing to apply pressure at this stage.

6. The President and David agreed that Bruce should report orally to the Prime Minister that these matters are still under discussion here and would be discussed further after your return from Asia. Bruce will also indicate that he should have more to say after his next visit to Washington, which comes at the end of this month, in connection with the Cabinet-level discussions on the British Defense review.³

7. I report this to you because there continue to be members of this Government on both sides of this question who instinctively and insistently press their own preferred tactics without making sure they are in line with the President’s thinking. We have paid a price for this kind of pulling and hauling before, and we ought to try to avoid it this time.

McGeorge Mr. Bundy ⁴

1. Source: Department of State, President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217, WH/Mr. Bundy 1965. Secret. A copy was sent to Ball. The source text is attached to a January 17 memorandum from Mr. Bundy to Ball, which stated that since he and the Under Secretary had a longstanding difference on the MLF question, he wanted Ball to have as precise a statement of the President’s position as he could manage.
2. Bruce talked with the President at 11:15 a.m. on January 14. His summary of the meeting accords with the one presented here although he adds that Johnson instructed him “to hold the ‘PM’s feet to the fire’ on previous statements of his willingness to negotiate on ANF.” (Ibid., Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)
3. On January 20, Bruce explained to Wilson why no message had come from the President on nuclear sharing. As instructed he reminded the Prime Minister of his offer to negotiate on ANF, and Wilson replied that he was ready to do so if the United States wanted to. (Ibid.)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.