Attachment
(Copy of London Secun Five, Sept. 9, 1965)
Exdis. During the last two days
Under Secretary Ball and
Ambassador Bruce have had
extensive discussion regarding Singapore and Malaysia and the
quadripartite meeting convened by Her Majesty’s Government. This
telegram will report the essence of these conversations with Foreign
Secretary Stewart on September
8, with the Prime Minister later in the day on September 8 and with
the Prime Minister again on September 9, including the relation of
this problem to UK current financial
difficulties.
In the course of these conversations, the Under Secretary strongly
challenged the British assumption that the secession of Singapore
called for urgent contingency planning regarding the maintenance of
the British position and the continuance of British defense
commitments in the area. He stated that the quadripartite meeting
was regarded by Washington as both premature and hazardous. If it
became known in any of the relevant capitals that the British were
seriously considering alternatives to Singapore, the Western
position would be greatly weakened. The Under Secretary made clear
that the U. S. did not share the British sense that their position
was in imminent danger because of recent political events. He
emphasized the increasing American commitment in Southeast Asia and
made clear that the American people would not understand that at the
same time the British were considering a diminution of their
commitment in the same area. He pointed out in detail the disastrous
consequences if the word should be spread that Western power might
be withdrawn or diminished. He made clear that any efforts to
explore with Sukarno a possible end to the confrontation would be
regarded as evidence of weakness by Indonesia and thus lead Sukarno
(and the Communists) to feel that their bloody-mindedness was
justified by events. He indicated strongly that the use of Japan in
an intermediary role might well contribute to Japanese neutrals.
[Page 508]
The response of the British—both the Foreign Secretary and later the
Prime Minister—was directed at the contingency nature of British
planning. The underlying British concern was that the future
behavior of Lee could not be
precisely predicted. They did not know whether or not he might seek
to align himself with the Afro-Asian powers. They felt therefore
that some kind of contingency planning was necessary.
At the same time both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister
categorically rejected the idea that they were seeking an easy way
out of British commitments.
They therefore felt that Four-Power talks might be useful, not for
the purpose of preparing a British withdrawal, but rather with the
intention of developing alternative courses of action in the event
that the Singapore base proved untenable.
The end result of the Under Secretary’s conversations with both the
Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister was a categorical assurance
that the United Kingdom had no present intention of reducing its
commitments in Southeast Asia, but that it was merely seeking to
develop alternative arrangements in the event that the use of the
Singapore base was progressively circumscribed. Both the Foreign
Secretary and the Prime Minister also indicated clearly that they
had dropped the idea of any negotiations to end the
confrontation.
The Under Secretary felt that as a result of his conversations the
British had clearly gotten the word that the quadripartite talks had
been misconceived and that neither the U.S. nor Australia had any
intention of letting the British off the hook in Southeast Asia.
In the Under Secretary’s discussion with the Prime Minister on
Wednesday, September 8, the Under Secretary vigorously pressed the
argument that the U.S. regarded the maintenance of British
commitments around the world as an essential element in the total
Anglo-American relationship. In response, the Prime Minister
insisted that no clear link could be made between the U.S. efforts
to assist Sterling and a common approach to foreign policy.
To clear up the American position on the point, the Under Secretary
arranged for Ambassador Bruce and himself to have a private talk with the
Prime Minister following the Prime Minister’s meeting with Secretary
Fowler later on the
evening of Thursday, September 9. During this private conversation
which lasted for almost an hour, the Under Secretary and the
Ambassador made emphatically clear that the U.S. Government
considered that the Anglo-American relationship must be regarded as
a totality, in which each element of the relationship should be
given weight and each related to the other.
Thus it would be a great mistake if the United Kingdom failed to
understand that the American effort to relieve Sterling was
inextricably related to the commitment of the United Kingdom to
maintain its
[Page 509]
commitments
around the world. All of the U.S. Government activities in relation
to Sterling or the economic problems of the United Kingdom were
necessarily related to the commitment of the two Governments to
engage together in a 5-year review of the United Kingdom’s defense
program.
The Prime Minister agreed to all of this, noting that he had
expressed his earlier qualifications merely to make the record clear
that the United Kingdom would not accept an additional demand for a
United Kingdom contribution to Vietnam as a quid pro quo for U.S.
Government short-term assistance for Sterling. He readily admitted
that all aspects of the relationship of the two Governments must be
considered as a totality in any long-range review of the United
Kingdom defense effort.
The other subjects discussed by the Under Secretary with the Foreign
Secretary were Kashmir, Vietnam, and NATO. These subjects will be reported by the Under
Secretary upon his return to Washington.
