77. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to Secretary of Defense McNamara1
JCSM–129–65
Washington, February 26, 1965.
SUBJECT
- Conceptual Approach to the National Military Command System (NMCS) (U)
- 1.
- Reference is made to:
- a.
- A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ADM),
dated 28 January 1965, subject as above.2
- b.
-
JCSM–4–64, dated 10 January
1964, subject: “Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S).”3
- c.
-
JCSM–446–64, dated 25 May 1964,
subject “Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S).”4
- d.
-
JCSM–914–63, dated 2 December
1963, subject “Alternate Facilities and Supporting
Communications Required for the National Military Command System
(U).”5
- 2.
- Reference 1 a requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their
views on a report, subject: “Department of Defense Command and Control
Support to the President.”
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in broad general agreement with the
principles and concepts developed in the study (see Appendix A hereto)
and believe that the study provides an excellent basis for furthering
rapport and understanding among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and other governmental agencies concerned with
planning for command and control at the national level. The first
assumption in the terms of reference states that it is extremely
unlikely that the President would leave the Washington area during a
crisis situation. It is noted that the study nevertheless advocates the
principle of multiplicity of centers for Presidential protection and
infers that the likelihood of Presidential relocation would
significantly increase as a crisis intensifies, even if the crisis is
short of general war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider these points to
be valid both prior to and after construction of a Deep Underground
Command Center (DUCC); however,
continued improvement of national command and control capabilities
depends on a better understanding between all principals of the
conditions under which the President might seek protection.
- 4.
- With regard to the alternate command centers of the National Military
Command System (NMCS), the Joint Chiefs
of Staff consider that:
- a.
- The study’s recommendation prejudges the conclusions of a
separate study currently being undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff regarding the optimum number of National Emergency Command
Post Afloat (NECPA) ships
required for the NMCS.
- b.
- The National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) program, in which one or
more of three EC 135 aircraft are maintained on continuous
ground alert status, represents the minimum acceptable airborne
command post posture.
- c.
- There is firm need to assure, to the extent feasible, the
survival of the Presidency during any future conflicts; and the
circumstances of a future crisis or conflict may be such as to
preclude the relocation of the President to one of the existing
alternate facilities. In this light, the proposed DUCC represents a potentially
effective means for assuring survival of the Presidency to an
extent not now provided by the NMCS.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
- a.
- Concur in the study’s comments on the NEACP.
- b.
- Agree in principle on the NECPA as an important element of the NMCS. In this connection, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently addressing the optimum
posture for the NECPA and upon
completion will forward their recommendations.
- c.
- Consider that, if a DUCC is
approved and constructed, the study’s detailed concepts and
principles regarding the DUCC
generally provide a basis for determination of detailed
functional requirements, concept of operation, and detailed
design.
- d.
- Are in general agreement with much of the detailed discussion
in the body of the report regarding the role of the Alternate
National Military Command Center (ANMCC). However, as indicated in Appendix B hereto,
they do not feel that the study recognizes that the ANMCC is fully as valuable as the
other alternates of the NMCS
when its unique capabilities for supporting all levels of crisis
and war are considered. Moreover, they have previously noted
that it is essential to continue the ANMCC in its current role for the foreseeable
future.
- 6.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
- a.
- The study be forwarded to the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, the Office of Emergency
Planning, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence
Agency for comment regarding the principles and concepts
underlying those parts of the study particularly applicable to
their operations (see Appendix A).
- b.
- They participate in any evaluation of the comments received by
the Secretary of Defense from other agencies and in the
identification of
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subsequent steps to clarify the conceptual approach to command
and control.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
6
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Appendix A
Based on their analysis, it is the interpretation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that the following constitute the underlying principles and
concepts developed in the Study:
- a.
- For all levels of crisis and war, the President needs utmost
flexibility in many aspects of crisis management including
centers to be used, immediate advisors, other staff elements to
be informed, and options for military action.
- b.
- In crises short of general war, the constitution of the
Presidential advisory staff support (support which is estimative
analytical, and advisory) is highly dependent upon the nature of
the crisis. In contrast, capabilities for information support
(defined by the study to include watch, monitoring,
communications, decision implementation functions, and emergency
action procedures) of the President and his advisors must be
developed insofar as possible in advance of a crisis and can be
developed more independently of a particular type of crisis.
Advisory staff support and information support, although they
must work closely together, can be somewhat separated both
functionally and organizationally.
- c.
- During intense crises and general war, protection of the
President as an individual is as important or even more
important than protection of the Presidency through use of legal
successors. Although Alternate Decision Groups might be
established and relocated, it is doubtful that the principals
forming the groups will be named before the crisis and it is
doubtful that more than one group will be formed.7
- d.
- For crises less than general war, the President and his
advisory group do not need an elaborate, national command center
permanently staffed by representatives of several agencies;
however, the
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direction
of the Armed Forces will be exercised through the National
Military Command System (NMCS).
- e.
- During an intense crisis, protection of the President depends
on his seeking protection prior to the onset of general war. He
will only occupy a protected center if he can manage the intense
crisis as well as he could from the White House Cabinet
Room.8 (For Washington level support during
the intense crisis, the Presidential advisors located with the
President will primarily depend on their soft centers and their
staffs in Washington.) For managing the general war, it would be
highly desirable for the President to be collocated with his
general war advisory staff support and the related information
support. In light of these needs for both intense crises and
general war, the Alternate Command Centers of the NMCS and other centers that the
President might occupy must be capable of operating as national
(versus departmental) command centers.
- f.
-
The basic missions of the alternate command centers of the
NMCS have the following
priority:
- (1)
- Support the President (located at the Center)
during the intense crisis and the strategic exchange
phase of a general war.
- (2)
- Support the President or an alternate decision
group (located at the Center) during the strategic
exchange phase of general war.
- (3)
- Locate the President after the onset of general
war.
- (4)
- After onset of general war, provide military
information and advisory staff support to the
President or a legal successor located
elsewhere.
- (5)
- Protect information and advisory staff capability
for the follow-on phase of general war.
In assigning the above missions and priorities, the study
concludes that direction of the strategic exchange phase of
a general war should be directly from the Presidential
location to the commanders of unified and specified
commands, their alternates, or successors.
- g.
- Under a “no warning attack” at a time of international calm,
only marginal protection can be provided to the President or his
designated successors.
- h.
- An alternate command center should be evaluated with respect
to the following criteria: survivability, accessibility,
endurance, staff support, communications support, flexibility,
and cost. The study heavily emphasizes survivability and
accessibility for individual centers and a multiplicity of
centers of comparable capability.
- i.
- For the strategic exchange phase of a general war, the
President and the Presidential Group will be directly and
primarily concerned with military operations, civil defense,
diplomacy and negotiations, and informing and leading the
public. The President can extensively
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delegate responsibility for nonmilitary
resource allocation, economic mobilization, and maintenance of
local law and order. Accordingly, during this phase, the
advisory and information support to the Presidential Group
should be preponderantly military.
- j.
- The National Military Command Center (NMCC) should provide information support to the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, non-Department
of Defense officials, and their attendant advisory staffs. Under
certain circumstances, the NMCC
will provide advisory support. The NMCC must have the capability to “get information”
from many sources (such as CINCs and Service Headquarters) and
should not attempt to store all possible information, but only
that essential for its primary mission, in its data base.
- k.
- The NMCC and the Organization
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising strategic direction
of the Armed Forces. They should also support the President and
his advisors in detailed monitoring and control of selected
military actions when such actions may have grave national
significance. A system built to satisfy only one of these roles
will not necessarily be adequate for the other.
Appendix B
With regard to the Fort Ritchie Complex and the Alternate National
Military Command Center (ANMCC), the
Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous position that these
facilities are essential to our command and control capabilities in the
foreseeable future. They concur with much of the analysis relating to
the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) and the ANMCC and
with many of the conclusions regarding their capabilities, functions,
and relationships within our over-all national command and control
capabilities. However, they are concerned that the study does not
support these facilities strongly enough. Specifically:
- a.
- The value of the ANMCC as
one possible relocation site for the President or an alternate
decision group is recognized (pages V–35, 36 and VI–36) but its
capabilities for the strategic exchange phase are equated to
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. This conclusion seems contrary to two
principles in the study. First, survivability is stressed and
the ANMCC is significantly
harder than [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified]. More important, the study stresses
collocation of the President and his principal advisors with
their supporting military staff. Such collocation could be
achieved much more effectively at the ANMCC than at [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] or
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Camp David. The study correctly proposes a
multiplicity of sites available for relocation. If the
individual sites for Presidential or alternate decision group
relocation are compared, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would rate
the effectiveness of the ANMCC
as somewhere between that of a National Emergency Command Post
Afloat ship and [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified].
- b.
- There is not sufficient stress within the study on the
potential value of the ANMCC
in supporting a decision group on board the National Emergency
Airborne Command Post during the strategic exchange phase after
Washington has been destroyed.
- c.
- The study correctly recognizes the unique value of the ANMCC for the follow-on phase of
a general war. However, since the dividing line between the
initial and follow-on phases would be blurred at best, the study
does not point out the great advantage of conducting both of
these phases from the same location.
- d.
- The study implies that a functional and technical analysis of
the ANMCC would indicate
potential savings. Such analyses are continuously taking place
and they may equally indicate that, if the principles and
concepts in the study are approved, additional investments in
the AJCC would be
warranted.
- e.
- The report does not explicitly recommend continuation of a
continuously manned ANMCC. The
summary paragraphs discussing the AJCC (pages VI–72 and VII–10) are not consistent
with the analyses and conclusions in the body of the report. For
example, they indicate that “the ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an
alternate decision group during an intense crisis or the initial
stages of a general war.” If the report is rewritten, the body
of the report should incorporate the above points and these
summary paragraphs should be made consistent.
