Thank you for sending me a copy of the memorandum you propose to send to the
President in regard to the FIAB proposal
for a new Net Evaluation Study.2 In general you have done
justice in presenting my views, although there are many more evaluations
going on than I mentioned in my letter to Walt
Rostow
3 or than you mention in
your memorandum to the President.
I would like to emphasize, however, that while I believe a new administration
might wish to have a hand in initiating as far-reaching a study as you
propose, my main point is that existing studies and existing coordinating
mechanisms for bringing information to bear on the problem are adequate to
do the job.
This is not to say that there are no intelligence gaps, or that we intend to
rest on the merits of studies we have already completed. I am convinced,
however, that our current efforts are able to identify—and take steps to
fill—any gaps in our intelligence, our research and development, and our
analysis.
I believe that our current efforts have the interdepartmental inputs that you
feel would be the main benefit of your proposed study. What is lacking most
in our current efforts is the relaxed, long-range view that could best be
supplied by studies at IDA, Rand, etc. I have been promoting such studies
and would appreciate your help in focusing such studies on the pertinent
issues.
I have enclosed brief descriptions of a few of the more important continuing
efforts that we are making to evaluate the relative strategic strength of
the United States and the USSR. I would be
glad to provide briefings on any of these efforts to you personally or to
the FIAB.
Enclosure
Major DoD Efforts to
Evaluate the Relative Strategic Strength of the United States and USSR
1. Political-Military War Games
Political-military war games are conducted and analyzed by the Joint War
Games Agency (JWGA). These
(non-computer) games explore major international issues, problems, and
questions bearing upon our national security. The White House, the
Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the USIA, the AID, the ACDA, and the
Military Services provide participants for these war games. These games
address broad political, economic, psychological, and technological
considerations as well as military strategy. The JWGA usually conducts at least four of
these games each year. They provide an excellent vehicle for obtaining
inter-departmental inputs for an examination for the relative strategic
strength of the U.S. and USSR. Two
games, played in 1967, studied the effect that anti-ballistic missile
defenses might have on a strategic exchange between the U.S. and the
USSR.
2. RISOP-SIOP War Games
The Red Integrated Strategic Operational Plan (RISOP) is developed by the JCS and the Services. It is our Soviet equivalent of the
U.S. Strategic Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). In developing this plan the Red Planning Board tries
to maximize the effectiveness of the Red forces and exploit known or
expected weaknesses of the U.S. strategic posture or forces. The RISOP is approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and then war gamed against the SIOP. The war gaming effort involves computer facilities in
Omaha, the National Military Command System Support Center in
Washington, and the Navy computer facility at NAVCOSSAC. Two independent war games
are conducted, one in Omaha by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
and the other in Washington by the JWGA. The results are briefed to the JCS and to appropriate CINCs. Applicable portions of the
plans are provided to the Office of Civil Defense.
3. Post-Nuclear Attack Study
The Post-Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST)
is being conducted in the JCS Special
Studies Group. It was initiated about two and one half years ago and is
now nearing completion. PONAST
considers two general war scenarios, which include strategic and theater
nuclear forces, in order to examine possible follow-on military and
non-military operations in the post-SIOP period of the war. The Office of Emergency Planning
(OEP) and the Office of Civil
Defense (OCD) have been active [Page 741] participants. Some
twenty-seven other agencies were called upon for various contributions,
through the auspices of OEP. The
Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency have played
major roles. The study will identify problems that probably will
confront national civilian and military leaders during the successive
stages of a general war, and will assess capabilities to cope with such
problems.
A feeling for the depth and scope of the study can be gained from the
fact that it took more than 4,000 hours of computing time on our most
modern computers. Except that it does not specifically focus attention
on gaps in intelligence data, it is exactly the kind of analysis that
appears to be envisioned by the FIAB in
that it evaluates the composition, reliability, effectiveness, and
vulnerability of the strategic offensive and defensive forces of both
sides, including their command and control systems. It also closely
studies the urban-industrial structures of both nations in order to
assess the probable effects of strategic attack on urban-industrial
targets, as well as the capability of the nations to recover from these
attacks. This study was based on the best available intelligence
information since the RISOP-SIOP war games, appropriately expanded,
were used as the basis for the study.
4. Strategic Forces Draft Presidential Memorandum
The Strategic Forces DPM presents the
recommendations of the Secretary of Defense on the strategic offensive
and defensive force structures for the next five years, as well as the
rationale behind these recommendations. An essential part of this
rationale is calculations of the ability of our strategic forces to
accomplish their major objective—deterrence of nuclear war.
To do this the DPM first calculates the
capability of our programmed forces against a combination of the
upper-range of the National Intelligence Projections for Planning
(NIPP) projections for each element
of the Soviet strategic forces. Excursions then are made to study cases
where we lose major components of our forces, to make sure that our
capability is not vulnerable to an unforeseen technological
breakthrough. If these calculations show that our capability is not
sufficient, the DPM recommends
developing and deploying enough forces to make it sufficient.
Next, the DPM tests our programmed forces
against a threat specifically designed to take away our deterrent
capability. It then examines force options which will restore our
capability to an acceptable level against this threat. It also examines
the lead-times necessary for development of these options and recommends
actions which will insure that we can maintain our capability even
against this greater-than-expected threat.
[Page 742]
Finally, the DPM next examines our
capability to limit damage to the United States in the event that a
nuclear war occurs. In this situation the DPM examines likely scenarios instead of the limiting ones
used to examine our deterrent capability. It also takes into account
possible Soviet reaction to the deployment of a U.S. damage limiting
force.
The DPM is sent out for comment to the
Services and the JCS. In addition,
comments on appropriate parts of the DPM
are usually solicited from the State Department and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense considers these comments
in writing the Record of Decision version of the DPM. The recommendations in the Record of Decision DPM then form the basis for the budget
submitted to Congress.
5. DoD Strategic Force
and Effectiveness Tables
The DoD Strategic Force and Effectiveness
Tables (SF&ET) contain
calculations, for each of the next ten years, of the capability of the
U.S. to sustain a first strike by the high NIPP threat and retaliate. Fourteen different scenarios are
considered, most of which test the effect of unforeseen vulnerability of
a major portion of our forces. The tables also contain calculations, for
each of the next ten years, of the retaliatory capability of 14
combinations of strategic force options against a greater-than-expected
threat. In addition, they contain calculations of our damage limiting
capability with different levels of U.S. ABM defenses in five different scenarios against six
different Soviet reactions to our deployment of ABM systems. [3 lines of source text not
declassified]
The SF&ET also contain a detailed
listing of the U.S. forces and options, the Soviet threat (from the
NIPP), and greater-than-expected
Soviet threats designed to take away our deterrent capability or our
damage limiting capability. The characteristics of these forces are
listed in detail.
These tables form a point of departure for all calculations within DoD of the capabilities of our strategic
forces. They are coordinated with the Services and the JCS and comments on the
greater-than-expected threat have been obtained from the Central
Intelligence Agency.
6. Study of Sub-SIOP
Options
The Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of the Air Force to
study sub-SIOP nuclear options (NU–OPTS) involving limited nuclear
exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR. A pilot study has been completed which indicates that the
U.S. and USSR can conduct coercive
warfare with strategic weapons, at relative high levels, with each side
retaining its capability throughout the exchange to deter an all-out
city attack. The Air Staff, SAC, ADC,
USAFE, and the Rand Corporation
are now investigating the strategic and operational considerations
associated [Page 743] with limited
nuclear operations, with emphasis on target selection criteria, required
damage expectancies, attack levels, types of delivery systems, and the
command and control, reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications
elements which will be necessary to conduct strategic operations at
lower levels of controlled response. These elements are being analyzed
both for the U.S. and the USSR. The
purpose of this study is to develop a logic for the conduct of strategic
war, at levels less than SIOP, in order
to provide the President with additional options for the limited use of
our strategic forces.
7. National Intelligence Estimates and
Projections
The composite views of the intelligence community on Soviet military
posture and capability are found in four major National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs): NIE 11–3, Soviet Strategic Air and Missile
Defense Forces; NIE 11–4, Main Issues of
Soviet Military Policy; NIE 11–8, Soviet
Strategic Attack Forces; and NIE 11–14,
Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces.4 These estimates are
produced yearly and, when necessary, updated during the year. Special
NIEs are produced when urgent
situations require them. Such a special estimate was issued recently to
assess our capability to unilaterally detect changes in Soviet strategic
offensive and defensive force structures.5 The U.S.
Intelligence Board (USIB) produces
these estimates. This Board consists of representatives from the
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the AEC, and the NSA. (Normally
the Department of Justice abstains from the above NIEs since the subject is outside their
jurisdiction.)
The National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP) is prepared annually by the USIB to serve as a supplement to the
NIEs on Soviet programs and
capabilities. It is much more detailed than the NIEs. The added detail is principally a quantification and
projection over a ten-year period of the broad trends and capabilities
indicated in the NIEs. Its purpose is
to: (a) include in a single document the quantitative data on all major
aspects of Soviet military forces, (b) to present the quantitative data
by mid-years for a ten-year period, (c) to organize the data into
mission-oriented categories, and (d) to indicate ranges of uncertainty
associated with each projection.
