Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume X, National Security Policy

172. Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 11–10–67¹

TCS 6232–67

Washington, March 2, 1967.

US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS

1. This Memorandum to Holders is prompted by a difference between the judgment made in SNIE 11–10–67, “US Intelligence Capabilities to Monitor Certain Limitations on Soviet Strategic Weapons Programs,” dated 14 February 1967, (Top Secret Ruff Trine Zarf Limited Distribution), and previous estimates on our capability to detect Soviet testing of multiple orbit bombardment system (MOBS). Paragraph 27 of SNIE 11–10–67 states, “the similarity between flight testing of a MOBS and the orbiting of certain types of satellites would make identification of such testing virtually impossible, [1 line of source text not declassified].”

2. A review of that judgment indicates that paragraph 27 of SNIE 11–10–67 should be changed to read as follows:

27. Fractional orbit and depressed trajectory delivery systems (FOBS and DICBMs) can be identified as such during testing. [4 lines of source text not declassified] we believe that multiple orbit testing of a MOBS would be identifiable. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Determining the extent of retrofit of MIRVs, FOBS, DICBMs, and MOBS into existing, deployed missile sites would be virtually impossible.

3. In addition, column II, item 7 of paragraph B.2. of the Annex to SNIE 11–10–67 should be changed to read as follows:

Probably during full system testing, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11–67—USSR, Box 4. Top Secret; Ruff; Trine; Zarf. SNIE 11–10–67 is Document 169.