Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI,
Vietnam, January–August 1968
7. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Leonhart) to the President’s
Special Assistant (Rostow)1
Washington,
January 6,
1968.
- 1.
- Herewith rough cuts at:
- Stabilizing GVN/RVNAF
- Political/Psychological Actions Against
the VC
- 2.
- My main search has been for measures which will (a) increase
GVN willingness to move in phase
with us and (b) minimize our dependence on their assumption of new
administrative burdens. Locke’s talk with Thieu yesterday abundantly illustrates the
point.2
- 3.
- On scenario reflections, the problem of the number of governments
with which we may wish to be in early touch will deserve very
careful treatment. “Effective international guarantors”, a revised
supervisory commission, or new international inspection force may
all be involved. And in addition to whatever claims the 1954 Geneva
Nine or the 1962 Geneva Fourteen may have—there are at least the
special situations of Japan and Indonesia.
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Attachment
1
STABILIZING THE GVN AND RVNAF FOR AND DURING
NEGOTIATIONS
- 1.
- Political. The prime question is
agreement on the nature and composition of the political system
we seek in Vietnam. This issue cuts across the negotiations
process, SVN cooperation, the
requirements of US public opinion. We must be clear about the
design we have in mind and get it right. From it, we can work
back to initial negotiating
positions—fallbacks—irreducibles—troop dispositions—interim
security arrangements—aid strategy—regional development plans.
- a.
- The non-negotiable negatives:
No coalition in advance of elections; no partition of
SVN; no
freeze-in-place during negotiations.
- b.
- The basics: constitutional
order; one-man/one-vote elections; GVN freedom of movement in
SVN; “open skies”
over NVN; undiminished
GVN control of the
armed forces and security establishment.
- c.
- Maneuver areas: (1) present
GVN Constitution
with representatives in an expanded Assembly elected
from where balloting has not yet taken place—(2) new
National Elections under the present Constitution and a
revised election law (primaries and a runoff)—(3)
revised Constitution by a new Constituent Assembly
followed by new national elections. Each has
advantages—the third would provide the longest stretch
out for strengthening the GVN and deferring US troop
withdrawals.
- 2.
- Bilateral Arrangements. Once agreement
is reached with the GVN “inner
group” on the political framework, we will need general
understandings on post-settlement bilateral arrangements. These
should include:
- —post-settlement MAP
and military support costs
- —US adviser forces (engineers, technical service
elements, instructors, etc.)
- —transfer and stand-by maintenance of military
installations
- —national and regional economic development
plans.
- 3.
- “Effective International Guarantees”—as
stipulated at Manila.3 We will need to
define at an early stage with the GVN who will be the guarantors and what the case of
intervention.
- 4.
- Negotiating Process. Invite and assure
GVN participation from the
beginning. Consider Military Advisers Group (in Saigon) from
Troop Contributor Countries.
- 5.
- Specific Actions
- a.
- Intensify
Pacification—deploying a substantial share of US
forces against provincial guerrillas; expanding combined
operations; moving at least one US division to the
Delta; increasing air reconnaissance and Market Time
operations.
- b.
- Accelerate Anti-Infrastructure
Campaign—expanding detention programs and
facilities, and emphasizing PRU operations (increased pressure against
the infrastructure is probably indispensable to greater
effectiveness of Chieu Hoi and National Reconciliation
appeals).
- c.
- Shift AID Program Emphasis to support of
elected village institutions—accelerating movement of
civilian supplies to the countryside, expediting
indemnity payments for war damage, energizing land
reform, improved rice cultivation, local education and
health programs.
- d.
- Grant Wage and Pay
Increases—for GVN
and RVNAF, justified
in any event (real wages having declined in the
government sector 50 percent since 1964).
- e.
- Organize Civil Constabulary—activate program for
combining elements of RF/PF/CIDG/PRU/PFF into a single rural
constabulary under civil auspices and not subject to
demobilization arrangements.
- f.
- Assist GVN Information Services—expanding
radio and TV operations
and rural programs.
- g.
- Increase Support to National
Political Building Blocks—labor unions,
veterans, farmers associations, sectarian groups.
- h.
- Accelerate and Publicize Post-war
Economic Plans—based on Lilienthal-Thuc
reports,4 and including regional
cooperation programs.
- 6.
- Contingency Plans
- a.
- (US/GVN) Reach general understanding on
military consequences of a failure of
negotiations.
- b.
- (US Only) Develop a series of
leverage actions and contingency measures for any GVN attempt to thwart or
sabotage negotiations—once they appear reasonably
productive. These measures should be scaled from reduced
US support through coup frustration to regime
succession.
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Attachment
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POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE NLF
- 1.
- High-level Defector Program could have
the greatest pay-off. It should be re-examined at highest levels
and pressed to the maximum.
- 2.
- Chieu Hoi—Seek further program
improvements in security of camps, living conditions, employment
opportunities, exploitation of individual returnees in VC areas, and information on good
treatment by GVN.
- 3.
- National Reconciliation—try to persuade
GVN to reactivate, offering
full amnesties, job opportunities, and political rights.
- 4.
- Designate “No Fire” Areas in each
district in SVN where
individuals can turn in—with bounties for arms—and supervised by
US civil affairs teams.
- 5.
- Establish Substantial Reward System for
province or district chiefs who arrange unit defections.
- 6.
- Expand Use of Hoi Chanh in Military
Operations—increase use of Kit Carson scouts;
experiment with Chieu Hoi Battalions; publicize in VC areas their successes against the
VC.
- 7.
- Psy Ops Appeals—Convene psyops working
groups in Washington and Saigon to review both procedures and
content. Possible new themes:
- “Join Winning Side—While You Can”
- “Hanoi is Sacrificing the South for Immunity in the
North”
- “Hanoi is Conspiring with the Chinese to Weaken the
VC for an NVN Takeover”
- “New GVN Constitution
Guarantees Free Elections—It’s Better to Vote than to
Die”
