309. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1
Mr. President:
You asked me yesterday: Do you think they are serious in Paris?
My short answer was: Yes. But it may be helpful if I set down where I would guess Hanoi now stands with respect to peacemaking—emphasizing that this is only one man’s guess and I could be wrong.
1. Military Situation
I do not believe Hanoi regards its military posture as stable for the long pull. If they mount major attacks they must count on taking very high casualties and increasingly North Vietnamese casualties. Although such attacks may have political and psychological effects in Saigon and in Washington they cannot count on even a maximum military effort being decisive. On the other hand, if they fall back to low levels of attritional warfare, as in 1967, they must count on a progressive extension of GVN control over the country. It was that fact which led them to abandon attritional warfare and go for broke starting at Tet 1968.
Therefore, I believe they are playing for the best end of the war they can bring about in the next 6–12 months. They regard their best hopes for a substantial achievement of their objectives to be in the politics of Saigon and Washington. They regard their military actions as a means of affecting the politics of Saigon and Washington.
2. Politics in Saigon
I do not believe they have abandoned hope that they can break the Thieu government, create a loose or chaotic political situation in Saigon and insert, somehow, men they control into key spots. But I believe they are somewhat discouraged by the relative success of Thieu in moving forward towards a stable government. The critical decision that they must make is whether they finally decide that the only way to end the war is to negotiate with Thieu’s government. They have not made that decision. If they make it, they must accept the likelihood that they will not get better terms than those offered in the Honolulu communique2 and in your TV statement of December [Page 892] 19 just before you went to Canberra.3 Arguing for an early decision are two possibilities:
- —if they delay, it is conceivable that the Thieu government will gather strength, legitimacy, and public support with the passage of time. It could be a substantially stronger government next spring than it is now.
- —equally important is the likelihood that the ARVN will be bigger, better equipped, and more confident next spring than it is now. Armed forces of a million men in South Vietnam, with the possibility of further re-equipment with tanks, helicopters, aircraft, etc., is not attractive from a straight North Vietnamese point of view.
Arguing against a decision to accept the Honolulu communique terms and the legitimacy of the GVN are:
- —the hope that the Thieu government will break either from the pressures of internal Vietnamese politics or because of strains in the US–GVN relationship.
- —but most important of all in postponing a decision is the hope that U.S. political life will either yield a Mendes-France4 (e.g., McCarthy), or that fears of this trend in the United States will produce a hardline coup in Saigon which would open the way to political turmoil, etc.
Therefore, of the three key elements in Hanoi’s equation (the military situation, the politics of Saigon, and the politics of Washington) I believe U.S. politics remains the ultimate focus of their thought and action.
3. U.S. Politics
With respect to U.S. politics, they are examining both trends in public opinion and the candidates. I am inclined to think that if McCarthy is not nominated by the Democrats, they will judge that time is running against them in terms of the military situation and developments in South Vietnam and that they had better negotiate seriously. That is why I am inclined to agree with Thieu and Ky that September could be the month in which negotiations get serious. If McCarthy is nominated, I would assume they would await the election in November. If they proceed with the mid-August third offensive it will be, on this view, primarily to try to shake American public opinion and influence the Democratic convention.
Therefore, preparing the American press and media for this mid-August offensive—and trying to assure that we do not get a reaction like that after Tet—could be critically important if (I repeat) if this chain of thought is correct.
[Page 893]4. I will do a memorandum during the day setting out my thoughts on how the press and the public might be prepared for the third offensive.5
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a) 7/68. Secret. The notation “ps” on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.↩
- See Document 303.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. V, Document 441, footnote 5.↩
- Pierre Mendes-France was elected French Premier in June 1954; he vowed to terminate the Franco-Viet Minh War within a month of coming to office and was successful in doing so.↩
- In a memorandum sent to the President at 5:45 p.m. that evening, Rostow noted that the biggest public relations problems faced by the administration were how to prepare the public for the coming third enemy offensive and how to suggest that “the U.S. public reaction to the Tet attacks was excessively pessimistic” and thus “it would be helpful for all of us to be prepared to play it cool this time.” He recommended a series of briefings by Abrams and other military men to carry out this task. (Johnson Library, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Vietnam 1968) In a memorandum to the President at 9:50 p.m. that evening, Rostow suggested that the President make a statement, backed up by statements by Abrams, Bunker, Rusk, and Clifford, informing the public of the coming offensive and urging that, “aside from this build up, the signs are favorable” that increasing strength and stability in South Vietnam and “a growing sense of realities” on the part of the North Vietnamese would lead to a successful outcome in the near future. (Ibid.) Asked to write a speech for the President along these lines, McPherson argued, in a July 29 memorandum to the President, that Johnson should not make the speech, since if the enemy did not launch the offensive until late August, “the McCarthy people would be given quite an argument: that the Administration had let six weeks of lull go by, and instead of using that as the basis for moving the talks forward, had continued (and even intensified) the bombing of North Vietnam.” (Ibid.)↩