Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968

302. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson ¹

Washington, July 18, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Trip to South Vietnam, July 13–18, 1968

My report will consist of three parts: My dominant impressions, a narrative which includes answers to the questions you have raised and a complete (but not verbatim) report of the meeting we had with President Thieu.

First, I will set forth the dominant impressions I have upon the completion of the trip.

1. Additional large-scale enemy attacks are anticipated in I Corps and in the Saigon area, perhaps in July but more probably in late August. The enemy is apparently now engaged in refitting and preparing for such attacks. It must be anticipated that his units will be up to strength, well-armed and that such attacks will be synchronized.

2. Our field commanders from General Abrams on down are confident that the enemy can be turned back and defeated.

3. Our commanders are satisfied with the resources at their command, both as to men and materiel. They are unanimous that they are in a stronger position today than they were at either Tet or the enemy May offensive.

4. I am most favorably impressed by General Abrams. He is intelligent, experienced and resourceful. He appears to have the quality of flexibility which will be so necessary in the days ahead. The other field commanders are outstanding, and in General Wheeler’s opinion, are the best we have.

5. The major problem we face here is that of putting the ARVN and the other South Vietnamese forces in a position to take over more of the war. Despite all the talk over the years, they still are badly in need of better leadership, better training, additional equipment and an improvement of living conditions for themselves and their families. Present plans for equipping the South Vietnamese forces are, in my opinion, inadequate to enable them to assume as rapidly as possible the amount of the total burden which they should be carrying.

6. There is apparent an obvious shift in the emphasis on and importance of the pacification program. I believe that this shift results from the reaction of all to the change in the enemy tactics and the enemy’s attempts to bring down the government of Vietnam by his attacks upon the cities. Both President Thieu and Ambassador Komer stressed the desirability of cutting down on the number of tasks required of the pacification people in order to place the major emphasis on territorial security.²

Throughout my discussions during the trip, I endeavored to develop the facts in response to the various subjects which you have raised with me. In your letter of July 10, 1968, you wrote:

“I am greatly concerned about the next Communist offensive in South Vietnam. General Abrams now appears to believe that there will be a maximum effort in I Corps and against Saigon in August.

“I count on you to go into this matter deeply with Abrams and make the best assessment possible of the probable strength and timing of that offensive.

“In particular, I would like you to develop the best answers you can and to the following specific questions:

“Could more of the ARVN be brought into I Corps so that the burden of conflict there could be more evenly shared?

“How can the ARVN effort be better dramatized and their contribution to the war kept in the headlines?

“Does Abrams have enough men and materiel to cope with the military tasks that lie ahead?

“What, if anything, does he need urgently?”³

In your White House message to me of July 15, you asked additionally for a careful review of any reductions in expenditures that we might make in South Vietnam which would contribute to the $3 billion defense cut we face. You asked also that we consider any additions we might have to make in next year’s defense appropriation bill. Other points raised in that message are for action and discussions on my return to Washington, rather than being directly related to the trip.⁴

We discussed in detail, both in Saigon and in the field, the matter of timing and probable strength of the attacks that should be expected and the targets that will be involved.

Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and the South Vietnamese and U.S. Field Commanders uniformly expect a renewal of the enemy attacks within the next few weeks. Because of the losses incurred by the enemy during both Tet and in the course of the May attacks, it is not anticipated generally that the enemy forces will be adequately reconstituted and resupplied for significant attacks until the latter part of August. President Thieu, in fact, suggests late August, September or even October as more likely dates. He and Vice President Ky also believe strongly that the enemy attacks cannot be sustained for more than 2 months once they are initiated.

All agreed that the objective of the attacks will be primarily psychological and political, rather than military.

Our Embassy and military officials in Saigon, our Field Commanders and South Vietnamese, all believe that the focal points of the anticipated attacks will be populated areas in I Corps and Saigon. President Thieu also lists the Pleiku/Kon Tum areas of II Corps as a likely target, but U.S. officials discount this latter threat.

I found unanimous agreement that we are in a position to meet anything that the enemy has to offer. General Abrams said in a written report to me:

“The present and programmed U.S./Free World Forces are adequate to cope with the enemy forces in South Vietnam and those known to be infiltrating.”

He added in conversation that the situation is “entirely one that can be handled”, and he believes that there is “at least a 50–50 chance that the attacks can be aborted by our own military operations.” Lt. Gen. Rosson, our Troop Commander in I Corps, states that he feels “very comfortable” and has no need for additional forces. Major General Stillwell, our Commander in the Northern section of I Corps, states that he is not only comfortable, but completely confident and ready for any eventuality.

Similarly, General Abrams, Lt. Gen. Weyand, and Major General Hay are confident that they will be able to cope with any enemy military efforts in III Corps, including Saigon. In response to my question whether we are in a better position to withstand them than at Tet and in May, Lt. General Weyand replied: “By far.”

In no quarter, at any level, did I find any suggestion that we would not be able to handle the anticipated attacks, that additional manpower should be rushed to Vietnam, or that there were equipment needs to be met in anticipation of the attacks.

General Abrams noted in his brief written report to me that he was expecting all units planned in the present deployment program of 549,500. He also assumes that the presently planned civilianization program will be implemented successfully.⁵ This program, as you know, would free 12,500 military personnel by replacing them with civilians in Vietnam. The only suggestion of any possible need for additional troops came in this regard, General Abrams said: “In the event the civilianization program is not successful, some adjustments in military space ceilings may be required.” General Abrams believes that we should maintain our B–52 and tactical air sorties at the currently planned levels in order to maintain our capacity to support friendly operations and preempt enemy thrusts.

Here is a brief rundown of the numerical strength of friendly and enemy forces, first in I Corps and later in III Corps around Saigon.

In I Corps, 305,000 friendly forces face an enemy strength of 135,000. The friendly forces consist of 190,600 U.S. troops, 108,000 in the various categories of South Vietnamese armed forces and 7,500 Republic of South Korea Marines. Of the U.S. forces, 151,000 are III Marine Amphibious Forces. The 108,000 South Vietnamese include about 42,000 regular ARVN, 27,000 Regional Forces, 25,000 Popular Forces and 13,000 consisting of other irregulars, police and provincial reconnaissance units.

The 135,000 enemy forces include about 38 percent regular North Vietnamese. The total of 52,000 NVA are in combat maneuver units and combat support units. They constitute over 70 percent of the enemy maneuver battalions in the area.

In III Corps, the area which embraces Saigon, enemy forces total about 60,000 men. This compares with a total U.S./SVN/Allied troop strength of 218,000. The enemy Main Force units amount to approximately 36,000, with the balance consisting of local forces, guerrillas and Viet Cong Infrastructure. General Weyand believes that this force ratio is well within his capacity to withstand and defeat any attack. He said “General Khang (his South Vietnamese counterpart) and I agree we have the forces to do the job.”

The friendly forces have recently been reorganized to provide a separate defense force for the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. The U.S. forces for this key region are under the direct command of Major General Hay, who reports to Lt. General Weyand. He has at his disposal a division equivalent, amounting to about 9,000 men. South Vietnamese forces assigned to the defense of the capital number around 30,000. The rest of the allied forces in III Corps are, of course, available to react quickly to any enemy attack on Saigon.

General Abrams cannot predict what the enemy will do if the anticipated attacks are aborted or defeated. He notes that the present level of infiltration would enable the enemy to sustain his existing force structure at a low rate of combat. He emphasizes that the enemy has lost many of his best assets, including a substantial number of guerrillas and many of his trained leaders. The depletion of guerrilla forces has come about through casualties and through their elevation into main force units. This has diminished the enemy’s capability to continue a protracted war at a low level of hostilities.

In the wake of the enemy’s defeat at Tet and in May, and in the light of the unanimous view of both United States and ARVN commanders that they are ready and able to meet whatever the enemy can present in the way of attacks, I inquired repeatedly why the Communists would go ahead with these attacks in the face of what should appear to be inevitable defeat. In his intelligence briefing at MACV, Brigadier General Davidson ⁶ suggested that the enemy might be under-estimating our capability and might be failing to recognize the growing strength of the Vietnamese government. He also said they are in a position where they must seek political ends by military means. President Thieu and Vice President Ky gave somewhat the same answer.⁷

In addition to satisfying myself that General Abrams has the manpower and material needed to meet and defeat any enemy attacks, I placed special emphasis on determining the present status and performance of the South Vietnamese forces. As for force strength, the authorized increase of 84,000 will bring the total of South Vietnamese under regular ARVN, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces. However, adequate arrangements have not been made to provide these forces with the equipment and leadership necessary to enable them to take on a greater share of the burden. Except for M–16 rifles, no equipment has been ordered for the 84,000 new men. As presently programmed, equipment for RVNAF modernization and improvement will not be fully supplied until fiscal year 1970. Communication facilities, particularly for RF and PF, do not permit their optimum performance. We are currently studying ways in which this equipment schedule can be expedited.

Even more serious is the deficiency in RVNAF officers. The shortages are greatest in the captain-to-colonel ranks. Our figures show almost 4,000 too few captains, almost 1,000 too few majors and substantial shortages in lieutenant colonels and colonels. General Vien disputed the shortages other than captain, but admitted that he was not prepared to discuss this question. RF and PF similarly are seriously short of officers. I have asked General Abrams to present to General Vien our figures on these deficiencies. We also stressed in our meeting with President Thieu and his colleagues the importance we place on revising their promotion criteria to insure that an adequate number of officers of appropriate rank are generated to meet the present and expanding demand.

The ARVN divisional units are now deployed to provide the widest area coverage for territorial security. One airborne division operates throughout South Vietnam in reaction to strong enemy pressures. It is in III Corps, committed to defend the Saigon Capital Military District.

You asked about bringing more ARVN into I Corps. There are presently 42,000 ARVN fighting in I Corps along with 27,000 RF and 25,000 PF. The first ARVN Division is highly regarded by our commanders, largely because of its commander, General Truong.

This again highlights the importance of leadership.

General Abrams and I believe that it is impracticable to replace any U.S. forces now in I Corps with further ARVN forces. The ARVN strength in that Corps will increase in September when a new three battalion regiment becomes operational. The present deployment of U.S. and ARVN forces represents the best utilization now feasible. Rather than trying to shift the roles of the two forces, we should equip, train and man the RVNAF as priority items so that U.S. forces may be gradually withdrawn from Vietnam.

While this long range development takes place, certain transitional steps may be taken. For example, General Abrams thinks that some special units, such as artillery battalions and armor battalions, may gradually be transformed from U.S. to RVN by substituting individual RVN for U.S. personnel. He believes that such a transition might be made within three months or so.

In spite of the progress made by the ARVN, it is going to be difficult to dramatize its participation in the war. I attempted to emphasize this point while in South Vietnam, both at a press conference at Da Nang after our day in I Corps and at another session with reporters as we left the country. We emphasized that of the four divisions in Northern I Corps, three were U.S. divisions and one an ARVN division. I quoted our commanders that these four operated as one entity and that General Truong, the Commander of the First ARVN Division, could “wear stars in any army in the world.”

Basically, however, the problem of dramatizing the ARVN will not be solved just by public affairs emphasis. In fact, General Abrams agrees with me that great care must be exercised in over-emphasizing ARVN improvements. He points out that claims of improvement have been made for several years, whereas actual discernible improvement did not begin until a year ago. Accordingly, the press will doubt statements of RVNAF improvements until actual results are visible.

The most dramatic evidence will come when ARVN units do, in fact, substitute for American troops. General Abrams is confident that this can be done. Until that time, the dramatization problem will be a difficult one.

In the interim, some public affairs steps can and should be taken. The MACV people are already working to influence the Vietnam Joint General Staff to increase and upgrade the RVNAF information personnel. MACV and the embassy are continuing to try to sell the ARVN story. U.S. advisers are encouraging senior RVNAF commanders to talk to news media following a successful action. U.S. commanders are attempting to defer interviews to RVNAF counterparts. All of these steps have, however, been taken in the past with little to show for them.

I have asked Phil Goulding to send one or two experts from his office to Vietnam to spend perhaps three weeks in Saigon and in the field, collecting information to prove that a portion of the RVNAF is, indeed, effective today. From that information, we should be able to assemble a series of speeches which point up the role of the ARVN and to write talking papers which can be used for backgrounders and press conferences in Washington.

Additionally, while in Saigon I discussed with Phil and with Brigadier General Sidle, the MACV Chief of Information, the absolute necessity of still greater efforts to tell the RVNAF story. But weighted down by fire fighting and day-to-day operational details as they are, I believe that our best hope for the short term lies in a pro-RVNAF sweep of Vietnam by one or two of Phil’s people.

We should not delude ourselves into thinking that this will do the job. It will be only a small step compared to the first actual substitution of an RVNAF unit for a U.S. unit.

We have discussed with both General Abrams and General Goodpaster the possibility of a contribution here to the three billion dollar cut.

We discussed also whether there were additional expenditures which the General could predict at this time for the FY 1970 program.

The generals here have no ready suggestions on how to contribute to the three billion dollar cut and I have been unable to find any specific items which could be deleted or deferred at this time. Needless to say, their attention here is focused heavily on the anticipated offensives by the enemy of late August or so. I believe that little help can be expected in the near future from here on the reduction of planned expenditures.

As for FY 1970, General Abrams and General Goodpaster believe it is too early to consider these programs seriously at this time. The single program which will inevitably add to our spending here will be increased emphasis on supplying and equipping the ARVN and the popular and regional forces of South Vietnam. As you know, we have been working on this program in the Pentagon. General Wheeler’s people have developed a plan which is now being worked over by Alain Enthoven and other civilian advisors.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 337 1968. Top Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Dep Sec. has seen.” For his personal assessment of the trip, see Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 550–553.
2. In a July 16 memorandum to Bunker and Abrams, Komer argued that all the pacification effort needed was additional time: “If we can only hold the negotiating line long enough to defeat the next enemy offensive effort and let the GVN/RVNAF grow in relative power, we can reasonably expect to be in a much greater position of strength than is visible at present.” He added: “In sum, if we can buy another 3–6 months, we will be in a position either to prove that our whole Vietnam enterprise has at long last borne fruit or, at the worst, to begin disengaging gracefully from behind a GVN/RVNAF which is at least strong enough to have a fighting chance of holding up its end.” (U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, Komer-Abrams File—1968)
3. The full text of the letter from Johnson to Clifford, July 10, is in the Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, South Vietnam Trip, July 13–19, 1968, Memorandum to the President from Secretary Clifford. In responding to the President’s letter in a July 11 memorandum, Clifford wrote: “I have received your memorandum outlining issues which you want me to pursue deeply with General Abrams. With General Wheeler’s assistance, I will make the best assessment possible of the military situation and outlook. Also, following our discussions in South Vietnam, I will provide for you the best answers which can be developed to your specific questions on the ARVN and resources for General Abrams.” (Ibid.)
4. The message transmitted to Clifford from Rostow, July 15, is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 88.
5. General Abrams’ report was not found.
6. Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, MACV G–2.
7. Most of Clifford’s conclusions in this report were derived from his and Wheeler’s discussion with Thieu, Ky, Huong, and members of the GVN Cabinet on June 16. A record of the meeting is in Clifford’s summary, “Meeting with President Thieu and His Colleagues,” undated. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 337 1968) Clifford also reported on the meeting in telegram 32822 from Saigon, July 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 VIET S) In a July 17 memorandum, Bunker reported on a conversation with Thieu, Ky, and Huong prior to the meeting with Clifford in which “Thieu told the others that once the South Vietnamese participate in the Paris negotiations an ultimatum should be presented to the North Vietnamese giving them the alternatives of ‘an all-out attack or of leaving the conference table.’” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 E (2), 1/68–8/68, Future Military Operations in Vietnam)