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  4. Document 294

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, July 10, 1968, 2327Z.

199837. Saigon deliver by hand to Ambassador from Secretary.

1.
Highest levels wish you to convey to Thieu following thoughts concerning Honolulu meeting:
a.
President hopes that entire focus of meeting will be on direct personal encounters between himself and Thieu. He would like to have Thieu explain frankly what he sees as key problems now and into the future. Then, if staff work is required to move toward best answers on these problems, matter would be referred to staffs. But entire emphasis would be on smallest possible groups at all times and on private and direct exchanges between President and Thieu.
b.
It would help if you could elicit from Thieu kind of key problems he would hope frankly to discuss with President in this manner.
c.
The President understands that Thieu has suggested Harriman or Vance come to Honolulu (this came to us today through Bui Diem). However, President’s feeling is that this might create undesirable impressions (a) of US/GVN crisis about Paris talks, and/or (b) of impending breakpoint in Paris talks, and would therefore strongly prefer that I be prepared to handle all matters relating to details of Paris talks. (For Paris: President would entertain possibility of quick trip to Washington by Harriman or Vance prior to departure if developments made this desirable.)
d.
In line with above concept, President expects to have absolute minimum staff accompanying—specifically, myself, Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler, Rostow, and Bundy. He would therefore suggest Thieu staff be on similar lines—i.e., unless economic problems are in fact among the key ones Thieu wishes to discuss, Economic Minister might be omitted, and the same for General Lac.2 We leave it to you to judge how to make this point, and perhaps it would best follow your discussion of what the key topics would be.
2.
From your own mission, President would appreciate your recommendations on the basis of the smallest number that can do the job. General Wheeler is cabling Abrams directly to express President’s concern about his being absent from Saigon, plus the feeling that the Clifford visit should bring back a fairly clear picture of the military situation and problems in any case. We assume you would wish some appropriate member of your political staff and would appreciate your recommendation whether Bob Komer should come—which may take you right back to what the central problems will be. But this is the kind of minimum size the President has in mind.
3.
On Thieu’s transportation, President hopes that you can move him in the direction of a PanAm charter such as he previously contemplated. If he should suggest our providing an aircraft, please let us know.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968–1969, Todel Chron. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Rostow and Jeanne Davis of S/S, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.↩
  2. Economic Minister Au Ngoc Ho and Brigadier General Hoang Van Lac, Deputy Minister of Revolutionary Development.↩