257. Memorandum for Record1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Prime Minister Tran Van Huong Friday, 31 May 1968
I made my first call on the new Prime Minister on Friday, 31 May 1968. Clay McManaway accompanied, as I want him to continue as my pacification and recovery liaison with the Prime Minister’s office. After a few remarks on the happy coincidence of our first meeting occurring on “Demi-Tet”—the fifth day of the fifth month of the lunar calendar and an auspicious day for beginning new relationships—I turned directly to substance.
Role and Importance of the RD Ministry. Covering briefly the origin of the RD Ministry in the inability of the regular ministries to carry out the kinds of programs needed in a wartime situation and its post-Diem evolution into the one civilian organization that has an impact at the hamlet level, I stressed the need to retain it as a Ministry until it is absolutely certain that the regular ministries are again capable of assuming responsibility for their different programs. I stated that it would be best to insist on proven performance before turning back any of the health, education, agriculture or public works programs to the respective ministries. I did not foresee this as likely for the next year or two.
The Prime Minister agreed; he stated that his appreciation of the importance of the RD Ministry was evidenced by his retaining the RD portfolio himself.
Pacification. With regard to pacification the Prime Minister stated his two guiding principles: First, protect the people and thereby gain their confidence; then involve the people in programs, in particular health and education. I agreed that security is paramount, but also pressed the importance of increasing the peasants’ income, primarily through increased agricultural production and price policies that benefit the farmer over the consumer.
The Prime Minister showed evident surprise at these statements and enthusiastically agreed, saying again that the people want first of all security and secondly enough money to live. He was born to a poor family and had worked as a “coolie.” So he understood what the people wanted. But security and confidence in the government’s [Page 741] will and ability to protect the people is overriding in importance. Until there is this confidence we cannot expect the people to cooperate with us or tell us what they know of the enemy; to cooperate with the government today too often means not only death, but an atrocious kind of death at the hands of the VC.
Leadership. I agreed in turn with the Prime Minister and emphasized that gaining the people’s confidence is above all a function of leadership. I stressed that one of the most important things he could do was to get the best leadership in the right places. In this connection I offered our assistance in providing information on the performance of Province and District Chiefs, reminding the Prime Minister of our extensive advisory organization throughout the country. The Prime Minister acknowledged the offer, but cautioned me on the differences between Vietnamese and Americans. He said he hoped I would understand that the Vietnamese think with their “hearts” (feelings) more so than with their “heads,” and that he must be certain of his facts and all related factors before moving against anyone. He underlined the importance of his first moves being right.
He then went on in this vein that because of internal politics and because of the feelings about the Paris talks, prominent officials may feel constrained from time to time to say things in public that offend or that contradict private working relationships. He hoped I would understand that this would not indicate any real problems or genuine anti-Americanism. He said he thinks we can work well together, we the Americans will supply the “head” (i.e., the logic and reason) and he, Huong, will provide the “heart,” (i.e., the feeling for and understanding of the people and Vietnam). I assured the Prime Minister that we Americans are sympathetic people also and that sentiment for the plight of Vietnam is an important reason for our being here. However, I agreed that only the Vietnamese can really understand Vietnam. I thought that the first stage of wisdom for Americans here is the realization that we do not really understand the Vietnamese peasant. But we can provide management and technical skills and, working with knowledgeable Vietnamese, we can make an effective team.
Prime Minister—A Man of the People. At this point the Prime Minister spoke eloquently and movingly of his peasant origins, the poverty of his parents and his early years, his days with the Viet Minh; in sum, the Prime Minister said, he is a man of the people and he knows and understands the people (Comment: He mentioned his participation in terrorist acts when he was with the Viet Minh and said he could not stand the atrocities and left them for this reason. Here and earlier the Prime Minister made the point quite forcefully [Page 742] that it is not so much death that the people fear as the thought of an atrocious death at the hands of the VC).
Mobilization. After first suggesting he consider expressing his feelings for the people at an appropriate time (because the American audience would be very impressed indeed could they hear Mr. Huong’s words), I stressed my understanding of the importance of mobilization. Then I urged that the program be carried out in such a way as to avoid crippling important elements of the civil administration, citing several examples of damage already done. Mr. Huong spoke for a few moments of the loss of a combative spirit among the people, in particular the youth who have run from the war and hidden themselves in the civil ministries; and the hope he has that mobilization will somehow work to revive the people’s spirit. He ended by acknowledging the dangers to the civil administration and agreed that the method of implementation must avoid paralyzing the government.
American Aid. I referred to a remark that the Prime Minister had made to Ambassador Bunker about American assistance not reaching the Vietnamese people and said I wanted to assure him that the great bulk does reach the people. I referred to PL 480 rice as a good example of a major segment of the AID program that goes directly to the people. Mr. Huong said the thought he had meant to convey was that a great many people are benefitting from American aid before it ever reaches the people and in some cases the amount of aid finally arriving at its destination is less than intended. Taking rice as the example, he implied rather strongly that there is corruption involved in the import of US rice. I assured the Prime Minister that we had no indication of any double-dealing in this program but he persisted, saying he knows how it works, and it does not work the way we think it does.
Dr. Dan. The last subject we discussed was the assumption of the Chieu Hoi portfolio by Dr. Dan. I said I understood that Dr. Dan was reluctant to accept the Prime Minister’s request to become Chieu Hoi Minister and expressed concern should this excellent idea not become a reality. The Prime Minister agreed on the political importance of the Chieu Hoi Ministry and said he hopes Dr. Dan will accept. I then offered two points to use in discussion with Dr. Dan: (1) While the Chieu Hoi Ministry is very important politically, it is not a complicated program and it would not take all of Dr. Dan’s time to run it; and (2) Furthermore, Col. Anh in the Chieu Hoi Ministry is like Col. Lac in the RD Ministry; he’s been there forever, knows everything, and can run the Ministry for Dr. Dan—leaving the latter free to do other things as well.
[Page 743]Mr. Huong restated his feeling about the importance of the Chieu Hoi Program and at one point said, in a rather dramatic way, that he (Huong) knows “many things;” so many that his life may be in danger. At this I assured him of our concern and constant readiness to assist in any way. The conversation continued as we walked to the door, with Mr. Huong expressing his long-held affection for and confidence in Col. Lac.
Comment: The meeting was cordial and at times animated. I was quite encouraged by Prime Minister Huong’s obvious grasp of the situation. The new Prime Minister is an impressive man and projects an image of wisdom, strength and confidence. Most encouraging.2
- Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Dep CORDS/MACV Papers, 84c-Pacification Concepts: 1967–1968. Secret. Prepared by Komer on June 2.↩
- Bunker’s assessment of Huong and his leadership potential is in telegram 29472 from Saigon, June 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 VIET S) The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp 461–467.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original.↩