Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968

177. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, April 3, 1968.

Pres[ident]: Appr[eciate] your dedication to country, loyalty to me, and your unselfishness. Many of you came here and stayed on at my request, faithful, competent, and served country well. Doubt anybody has sacrificed more. Doubt there has ever been a more dedicated Cabinet. All of you have been interested in bettering humanity. I will understand if any of you have to stand aside. I would be happy for you to stay until the last day. I will talk to each of you.

We have some indication from Hanoi we are evaluating.

Sen. K[ennedy] came in this morning.² Spent an hour. Briefed him on international developments. He said he would try to meet dangers that face country—tax, monetary, city, int’l problem. Told him Rusk-Clifford-Fowler and all would be available to him and to all of candidates.

Told V.P. expect him to know anything. I want to stay as close to position I outlined as possible. I do not want to be a king-maker. I was a trustee of the K[ennedy]-Johnson partnership. I looked on my work as if JFK was watching everything I did. I think he would give us an A+. I explained that to Sen. K[ennedy]. I am free man—first American, public servant, [then] Democrat. Said same thing to V.P. Told Kennedy that V.P. has been A triple plus V.P. (12:37—V.P. w/moist eyes). I figured I was a B+ V.P. and HHH was an A+++ V.P.

I did what I did because thought I ought to do it. Country is in damn serious danger. Danger in Vietnam—danger in Middle East. We have problem in L.A. Negroes are marching in cities. Needs of civil disorders. Demands of Senate to cut $6 billion. We must have a tax bill. Didn’t see how I could do that running with my motives being questioned.

I am going to try to stay as close to statement as I can.³ Told Bobby I could announce tomorrow but I don’t intend to. I am doing this because I want country to be better. Told K[ennedy] country be made better. Told him anything in State would be told him by Katz[enbach] & Rusk to all.

[Udall]: Because I am senior,⁴ I speak sentiment[ally] that we regret what you said the other evening. But you put your country, & unity of your country, before everything else. It has been a great honor to serve you. It will be a great administration in history.

Katzenbach: Hanoi came out with statement this morning. In reality, we are not bombing above 20th. This is further than Hanoi has ever gone. Treat it as a willingness to get together.

Clifford: The offer of Sunday night⁵ was a first step. It seems clear this is their first step. This appears to be a departure from [their] previous position about unconditional cessation of bombing. I would recommend a reciprocal step from Hanoi.⁶

Briefing made three main points:

1) Calling up add’l reserves for support of 11,000 emergency increment.

2) Effort to turn fighting over to SVN more.

3) Unilateral cessation of bombing above 20th parallel where 90% of people live and 75% of territory.

Sorensen said language in text was better than using 20th—less combative.

Sen. Fulbright-Russell-Stennis were told about it. Looks as though Fulbright wanted to reject it before Hanoi.

Katzenbach: Purpose of speech was to explain why bombing would continue in DMZ and area north of it where supplies continued to flow. Foreign governments knew 20th parallel was line.

Pres[ident]: We would endanger our troops to cut out all bombing. It was a 90% stop in population and 75% stop in territory.⁷

[Omitted here is a discussion of the Stockholm conference on the international monetary system and an assessment of an upcoming march on Washington.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from Tom Johnson’s handwritten notes. Those attending the meeting, which lasted from 12:29 to 1:29 p.m., were the Vice President, Katzenbach, Goldberg, Fowler, Clifford, Clark, O’Brien, Smith, General Taylor, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, Commerce Secretary Cyrus Smith, Under Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare-designate Wilbur Cohen, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Robert Weaver, Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd, and Presidential aides John Macy, Leonard Marks, Barefoot Sanders, Mike Manatos, Ernest Goldstein, John Roche, Ervin Duggan, Charles Maguire, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) A full transcript of the recording of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
2. See Document 176.
3. Reference is to the President’s March 31 address; see Document 169.
4. According to the transcript of the recording of the meeting, Udall stated: “I am senior in age of those who originally served with President Kennedy and then yourself.” (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
5. March 31.
6. According to the transcript of the recording, at this point, Clifford stated: “I think one significant comment of heretofore, Hanoi has insisted that it will not have any talks with the U.S. unless the United States unconditionally stops the bombing. Now this appears to be a departure from that previous position they have taken. Because they say, if our translation has its merits, that ‘the parties will get together to decide with the U.S. side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war by the United States so the talks could be begun.’ Now it seems to me that we have the right, within the framework of the President’s offer of Sunday night, to construe this as a reciprocal gesture on the part of Hanoi, and I would certainly, along with Nick, be ready to recommend—certainly should (it) also appear feasible—that we construe this as a reciprocal step on the part of Hanoi and now proceed to the second part of the program that the President had in mind.”
7. In a memorandum to the President, April 3, 2:45 p.m., Rostow noted the “potential” of U.S. military strength on the ground in South Vietnam and advised that this position be improved as talks progressed. (Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #31 History File, Apr 68 [II])