Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State¹

Rangoon, January 21, 1966.

365. Eyes only for the Secretary.

1. Called upon DRV Consul General Vu at his residence at 8:00 p.m. tonight.² Participants on both sides the same as at our Dec 29 meeting³ and atmosphere of our talks was much the same as reported at that time.

2. Vu did not wait for any introductory remarks on my part but remarked as soon as we were seated that I had delivered an aide-memoire to him recently which I had said I would keep confidential. He said he had transmitted document to his government as he had promised. He wanted me to know however that in his own personal opinion the tone and contents of the aide-memoire were such that he considered it an ultimatum.

3. I said I was sorry to hear him say this as I could assure him that this was a misunderstanding on his part and that no such impression had been intended. Told him that for my part I had kept our meeting secret even though I had been pressed by several Ambassadors for information. I told Vu that exact understanding of his remarks most important to me and asked if his opening remark was also the view of his government. He repeated again that it was only his personal view. (This I wonder about.)

4. I reminded him that when I last saw him I had said I would stand by for a reply from him. So far none had been received and there was no indication of any response either related to military action or to obstacles to negotiation. I asked if he had any reply for me. He said he had had no instructions from his government to reply. He said that in the meantime his government had issued public statements which indicated its position.

5. I said my government wanted me to make sure, through direct contact with him, that there was no misunderstanding and no chance of mishap on this very important matter in any attempt they may have made to contact us. Vu shook his head and sat silent for a while. I told him for my part I would continue to stand by for any contact he wished. He nodded his understanding.

6. I said there was one other aspect I would like to mention. The worldʼs attention was focused on Vietnam. The press of most capitals of the world was alert to any new sign and in this atmosphere it was probably expecting too much to think our contacts could long remain secret. (I had learned of U Thantʼs Jan 20 press conference remark⁴ minutes before seeing Vu but did not mention it and he apparently had not heard of it.) I said if leaks occurred that we had met that this should not discourage us. We need not admit what we talked about. Rangoon would still be a quiet place and we could still meet secretly. I said that I would find a place where we could meet with complete secrecy and he might wish also to give this some thought.

7. Vu said he had read press reports from the White House which hinted at our direct contact. I said I was aware of this statement⁵ but Rangoon had not been singled out. He said “such news should not have been disclosed, if you sincerely wish to exchange views.” I said I understood and would do all I could to preserve secrecy our contacts.

8. I said I wished to revert to his opening remark. Told him I know President well personally as well as his important advisers. From this knowledge and based upon the most intimate knowledge US policy, I was absolutely certain that President was sincere in wanting peace to come to Vietnam. I said it would be a great tragedy in the end if there was any misunderstanding on this point.

9. I made remark that I hoped I received a telephone call some day from him and was preparing to depart when he said he was ready to listen if I had anything more to say. I said I had no instructions to say more but would make one more comment. I said from Washington viewpoint it was obvious that VC initiated military activity in South Vietnam had remained at a high level. We also had reliable evidence of major truck movements continuing to South Vietnam through Laos. It seemed we had no alternative but to assume that DRV was continuing to support large scale military effort in South and send regular units there.

10. Vu said that as we were now speaking informally he would comment. He said that immediately after the US made its 14 points public, 4000 US soldiers had landed in South Vietnam. He also mentioned the figure of 9000 more arrivals (but I never got period of time to which he referred). He said there are reports that 20,000 more South Koreans may come. This was ample proof that our President was not sincere.

11. I said we both had had military experience, and therefore we both knew the advance planning that had to go into major movements of military units. Certainly it was obvious that the actual decision to move these troops was made long before the time they arrived. This however was not the major point. Anyone who understood the Presidentʼs position clearly would not be surprised that more troops should be sent to help the South protect itself. We are constantly faced with military action against the South. There was evidence of unrelented build-up from the North. Our youth were being attacked and killed. The President had made himself quite clear as to what he considered his obligations to be as long as this situation continued.

12. I said I hoped he and his government would study most carefully our 14 points and the Presidentʼs more recent State of the Union message. Vu said our 14 points contained nothing really new. I said I hoped he would find it a useful summary of our views for study.

13. I said while it was obvious we could not agree on many things I thought that it was good nevertheless that we could talk together in this fashion and that I hoped we could meet again in the future. He was personally quite friendly in escorting me to my borrowed Volkswagen and in saying goodbye.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:46 p.m. and forwarded to President Johnson by McGeorge Bundy at 4:15 p.m. with the observation that “the man from Hanoi has nothing to say.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)
2. In telegram 227 to Rangoon, January 20, Rusk instructed Byroade to seek an appointment with the DRV Consul General “as part of our effort to close all circuits.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 135–136)
3. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 736–737.
4. For a summary of U Thantʼs comments at his January 20 press conference, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, pp. 146–147.
5. See footnote 8, Document 16.