32. Notes of Meeting1
PRESENT
- The President, Rusk, Harriman, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, Valenti2
President: Assuming we are going to stay there—and thatʼs a safe assumption. Want in order of priority all we should do—go after this railroad—that POL, this trail, would take so many planes—and here are estimated results.
Return of Rusk and Harriman
If our military can say if we do certain things we can interrupt their supplies and hurt them—or at the end of 8 months they will need reinforcements, etc. In other words, I want the coach to give me the seasonʼs schedule—what the other teams will do—and what we will do.
Bob, you need to get from Westmoreland his plan for using our resources and what results—what happens July—and next January. What is estimate of NVN response?
Rusk, give much thought to this—think weʼll be subjected to immense propaganda over next weeks from peace lovers. They told us bombing cease would help us—now theyʼll say “another month or so.”
Donʼt want to be impetuous. Must be careful and cautious. Honestly believe we all talk too much. Only useful purpose is it might confuse Ho so much heʼll go crazy. The newspaper articles only serve no useful purpose. Tom Wicker says he has it on high authority that President will wait 10 days and then let them have it.
(What President wants Rusk to tell press)
“Itʼs been 26 days since cease bombing. Harriman has been to 11 Capitals. Goldberg and I, too, plus 113 nations. We know weʼve done everything we can do and should do to talk rather than fight. Adequate time to reply—nothing encouraging—we donʼt want to mislead American public.”
Then stop there. Donʼt say any more. We have done everything that is within the bounds of self respect—we will not grow weary. Then you have given a signal—but without dramatics. Then I would hope they would break out—show their bottom before we showed ours.
[Page 99]When other nations come in asking more time, tell them to go talk to the other side. It takes two to tango. I read we have a commitment that we will not bomb until H. Wilson has departed Moscow.
Weʼre going to have to double our manpower. At the same time, we must surface all our peace moves. We canʼt hold much longer than 30 days. Iʼve told State to tell all other nations weʼve heard nothing.
Bundy: Since that order, U Thant and Vientiane had intruded. My own curbstone reaction is that a “no answer” ought to go on the record.
President: Rusk, now that you are back, you tell the press that whatever the hopes, there has been no response. We think 26 days is long enough. The aggressors donʼt want to talk.
Rusk: Can see some advantage in starting with Baltimore3—the 5-day pause—and go on through all the other moves—
But the whole question is the bombing pause. They want me to tell them about the pause. I have to say nothing has happened. What am I going to do? They ask. I have to say I canʼt say except our men will give a good account and will not run.
Bundy: Would strongly say that these 26 days have proved that we have done all we can do—and the other nations in the world know this.
President: These Russians are the same ones who told us there were no missiles in Cuba. They let us believe good would come from pause. But we canʼt endure this indefinitely. McGovern and his crowd always want you to go further than you do.
Bundy: Youʼll have two pieces of paper—Ball on the case against resumption—also an intelligence report on the pros and cons of bombing resumption.4 Hope you wonʼt start bombing the day after Tet.
President: Iʼm not going to start now. I just want McNamara to get the decks clear. We have to think about getting our story out quickly.
Rusk: Having a press conference tomorrow.5
President: It would be good if you can do in the Senate what you are doing in the House. Get the hawks and the doves together at the same [Page 100] time. Perhaps get Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations.
McNamara: Let Rusk ask Fulbright to bring in other committees.
President: Main thing is to drive the nail in. They have had sufficient time and have not responded. None of the nations we have talked to have anything to report.
Rusk: But U Thant will probably say that Souvanna Phouma talked to him—and will say we threw it out.
Ball: Iʼll make a prediction this will get a dirty answer from Hanoi.
Rusk: Even a dirty answer is better than nothing.
Moyers: Story Iʼd like to see on Monday is that though Rusk has spoken, the President hasnʼt decided.
President: Iʼd like to see “the peace jig is up.” We donʼt have to say everything we know to newspapers. I might be turned around tomorrow, so we have to be able to talk to each other.
- Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.)↩
- Moyers was also present. (Ibid.)↩
- Presumably a reference to the Presidentʼs Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394–399.↩
- McGeorge Bundy forwarded the two papers to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. on January 20. Ballʼs memorandum, dated January 20, argued that resumption of the bombing would “substantially increase the risks of escalation” but would not “substantially contribute to persuading Hanoi to stop the aggression.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 10) The intelligence memorandum, dated January 19 and prepared by CIAʼs Office of National Estimates, estimated probable reactions both to resumption of the bombing and continuation of the pause. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV)↩
- For text of Ruskʼs news conference on January 21, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1966, pp. 189–197.↩