Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

297. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, November 9, 1966.

SUBJECT

• JCS Proposal for RT 52

1. This proposal which has been forwarded to the President and to you by Secretary McNamara (see Tab A)² is very similar to his earlier informal proposal presented early in September³ which was subsequently withdrawn and considerably reduced in scope and re-presented somewhat later. Memoranda to you and the Acting Secretary of September 10, re-submitted on October 31, discussed this reduced proposal for RT–52; they are attached at Tab B.⁴

2. The renewed proposal for an expanded RT–52 includes strikes on SAM support facilities, POL storage areas, electric power, steel and cement plants, waterway locks and port areas. It also proposes moving naval gun fire farther north and permitting armed recce up to within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi and Phuc Yen and 4 nautical miles of Haiphong. There is attached at Tab C a tabular review of each of these target proposals, together with recommendations for approval or disapproval.⁵

Discussion

3. In general the RT–52 proposal would, if carried out in full, be interpreted as an escalation because of the inclusion in an RT program for the first time of steel and cement plants and waterway locks as targets. Whether or not RT–52 envisages a greater intensity of activity is not clear because there is no period mentioned within which the targets proposed would be struck. However, permission for armed recce to enter the present 30 and 10 nautical mile circles around Hanoi and Haiphong would undoubtedly appear to be an intensification in sensitive areas. The recommendations which are made in Tab C assume that we wish to continue the bombing pressure on North Viet-Nam as it has been applied over recent months but do not wish to make any sharp departures in the way of more intensive activity or new kinds of targets which begin to enter the civilian realm or which take less account of the danger of civilian casualties.

4. With regard to four SAM support facility targets which have not previously been proposed we are unable to comment intelligently since we have neither information on civilian casualties nor any photographs. With regard to the waterway locks, we have not had time to assess their full impact on the civilian population in terms of flooding and particularly crop destruction; the two targets where these dangers appear to be great have been negatively recommended.

5. Under Rolling Thunder 52, armed recce would be authorized up to 10 NM from the center of Hanoi and Phuc Yen airfield and up to 4 NM from the center of Haiphong vis-à-vis the present 30 NM for Hanoi and 10 NM for Haiphong. There would be a route and railroad segment which would approach within 10 NM of Phuc Yen airfield; however, this was authorized in Rolling Thunder 51. We believe the proposed new limits for armed recce to be too close for “free wheeling” without special justification and the designation of special route segments—(Rolling Thunder 51 included 4 railroad and 1 highway segments that were within the 30 NM limit of Hanoi). The attack of dispersed POL within the armed recce limits surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong would continue to be authorized provided positive identification is obtained, the targets are not in populated areas, and after notification to Washington of the plan to strike. (Attack against dispersed POL co-located with JCS numbered targets within the above limits that have not been authorized for attack is prohibited.) SAM sites would also be authorized for attack except in the Chinese buffer zone and in populated areas.

6. Naval gun fire operations against military and logistic water-borne traffic in coastal waters of NVN would be authorized south of 20 degrees north latitude vis-à-vis the present limitation of south of 17 degrees 30ʼ north latitude. The present authority has only been in effect since October 15 and we believe that it should remain in effect until greater experience factors have been developed. We are concerned with the possibility of engaging purely civilian or commercial traffic north of 17 degrees 30ʼ.

7. In light of the experience of the past eighteen months, we judge that the full program will have only marginal impact on Hanoiʼs general war effort and, in particular, its ability to sustain the conflict—at the present level or above—in South Viet-Nam. INR adds the following observations: The program proposed by JCS would have significant diplomatic repercussions in offsetting the positive impact of the Manila Conference and in reducing prospects for exploring modalities for negotiation. It is highly unlikely to have an adverse effect on the determination of the leadership in Hanoi to pursue the war, or significantly undermine the regimeʼs ability to maintain public control and a disciplined war effort.

Recommendations

8. That you approve the targets as recommended in the Tabular Review at Tab C with provisions outlined and with the understanding that the strikes will be spread out over a reasonable period of time to avoid the appearance of undue intensification and escalation.⁶

9. That armed recce be maintained with the present limits and subject to the present ground rules.

10. That naval gun fire operations against coastal military and logistic water-borne traffic be limited to the south of 17 degrees 30ʼ north as presently in effect.

1. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. Sent through Under Secretary Katzenbach. On November 1 the Department of State changed the title of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
2. Document 295.
3. See Document 226.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Attached but not printed.
6. Bundy recommended approval of the following targets: 2 of 8 SAM support facilities (he recommended disapproval of 2 and deferred a recommendation on 4 while awaiting civilian casualty estimates); 2 of 2 POL storage areas; neither of the 2 industrial targets (the steel and cement plants); 1 of 2 electric power plants; 2 of 4 waterway locks; and 1 of 2 ports (Cam Pha but not Haiphong).