Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

295. Memorandum From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara ¹

CM–1906–66

Washington, November 8, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Military Actions against North Vietnam

1. As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that we should increase military pressures on North Vietnam. They believe that military actions designed to reduce still further the capabilities of the North Vietnamese to receive help from out-of-country, to move men and material in-country and from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, and to reduce in-country war-supporting facilities and supplies are necessary and feasible—militarily, politically and psychologically. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Rolling Thunder 52 (RT–52) program, provided earlier,² is a desirable first step in undertaking such military measures against North Vietnam.

2. Another useful concurrent action would be the employment of our surface naval vessels against waterborne coastal traffic between 17 degrees 30ʼ N and 20 degrees N.

3. The salient features of the recommended program are set forth in the following subparagraphs:

a. Reduction of Restricted Areas. Reduce the restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong to a ten-nautical-mile radius racetrack pattern around Hanoi/Phuc Yen airfield; reduce the restricted area around Haiphong to four-nautical-mile radius.

Comment. Within the Hanoi restricted area are located at least thirty-six (36) major targets of military worth. The location of population argues against striking some of these targets; however, many are located in population-free areas. While the number of targets in the Haiphong restricted area is much smaller, there are worthwhile targets not now subject to attack. Additionally, reduction of both the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas will permit armed reconnaissance operations against an additional 284 nautical miles of the primary lines of communications around these two cities and the searching out and destruction of the increasing number of dispersed supply installations in these two restricted areas. Area reductions will also provide desirable flexibility, now lacking, in targeting and tactics, thereby degrading air defenses.

b. SAM Support Facilities. Three (3)SAM support areas are recommended for attack.

Comment. Since 1 July 1965 the North Vietnamese have launched at least 949 SA–2 missiles against our strike forces and have destroyed thirty-two (32) manned aircraft. At least twenty-eight (28) SA–2 missiles were launched in the Hanoi/Haiphong area on 4 November. Obviously, we should destroy concentrations of SAM equipment and SAM support facilities wherever discovered in order to reduce their limiting effect on our strike forces, which is greater than revealed by the number of U.S. aircraft destroyed by missiles.

c. POL Storage Systems. As of 4 November our intelligence indicates that some 24,800 metric tons of fixed POL storage capacity remains of a pre-strike fixed capacity of 132,000 metric tons. Dispersed storage capacity has grown to 42,500 metric tons. The program recommends strikes on fixed POL facilities at Ha Gia and Can Thon, formerly erroneously identified as being associated with Phuc Yen and Kep airfields respectively.

Comment. It is apparent that identified dispersed storage now represents the major portion of the POL storage system in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, it would be militarily desirable to destroy all fixed storage in order further to reduce flexibility in receiving, storing, and distributing POL throughout the country. In this connection, while the residual Haiphong POL storage area is not included in RT–52, railroad tank cars have been identified in the Haiphong POL storage area, leading to the belief that the remaining pumping station is still in use and should be destroyed.

d. War-Supporting Facilities. The program recommends attacks on selected elements of the Thai Nguyen steel plant and the Haiphong cement plant. These two facilities are producing materials to repair damaged lines of communications and, in the case of the steel plant, to build barges and tanks to move POL products.

Comment. There are other industrial areas which should be brought under attack because they produce or contribute to production of small arms, grenades, ammunition and the like.

e. Electric Power Systems. Two electric power plants, Haiphong TPP West and Haiphong TPP East, are recommended for attack in RT–52. These two plants represent fifteen per cent of remaining generator capacity in North Vietnam and destruction will reduce operating efficiency in the entire Haiphong area; specifically, six (6) shipyards and the naval base, the ship and railway shops and, to an undetermined degree, the off-loading of cargo in the Haiphong port will be affected.

Comment. There are eight (8) major electric-power generating plants remaining in North Vietnam. All should be struck, as should the Hanoi transformer station, in order to affect to a major degree both military and civilian support to the war effort. In this connection, the North Vietnamese have contracted from Czechoslovakia, and are in the process of installing, a number of small packaged generating plants which, apparently, they will employ to supplement or to replace electric power sources in North Vietnam.

f. Waterway Locks. Four (4) waterway locks are recommended for attack. These locks control water levels on water lines of communications. We have noted an increasing use of inland waterways by the North Vietnamese to supplement or to replace interdicted rail and road lines of communications.

Comment. These locks are not associated, except indirectly, with agriculture. Flooding resulting from their destruction will be minor and very few people will be at risk. Moreover, the North Vietnamese have expressed on many occasions their apprehension that we will destroy the Red River dikes as a part of our air campaign. The destruction of these four (4) locks should exert desirable psychological pressures on both leaders and population.

g. Ports. Selected areas of Cam Pha port and Haiphong port are recommended for attack. The particular areas, remote from berths and wharves to preclude damage or destruction of foreign shipping, were chosen not only to destroy important facilities but to exert psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese, shipowners and crews by showing that ports are not sacrosanct. It is anticipated that attack of these port facilities could cause shipping (as in the case of the Soviet tankers) to move out of the port areas into roadsteads and unload by time-consuming use of lighters and barges.

Comment. If the result hoped for is achieved, not only would the unloading process be impeded but barges and lighters would be open to attack once they had left the cargo vessel, thereby giving us the opportunity to destroy imported materials in bulk.

4. Mentioned earlier was the military desirability of using our naval surface craft to interdict coastal shipping in the area between 17 degrees 30ʼ N to 20 degrees N. Pertinent to this comment is the fact that, from 25 October through 2 November, 325 coastal craft were sighted in coastal waters between the DMZ and 17 degrees 30ʼ N with 132 craft destroyed and 140 damaged. Since 2 November very little movement of coastal water craft in this area has been noted.

Comment. It is pertinent that, during the month of October, in the coastal waters lying between 17 degrees 30ʼ N and 20 degrees N our aircraft observed over 800 coastal craft. Obviously, surface naval activities in this area would restrict further the flexibility and capacity of North Vietnamese lines of communications.

5. I informed you the other day that I have had prepared folios of blown-up photographs of the target system in North Vietnam which reveal very clearly the military worth, the location of population and other factors pertinent to air strikes.

6. I recommend the following: (a) that President Johnson be briefed in the immediate future on RT–52 so that his early approval of the program can be obtained; and (b) that I be present in order to explain the photographs and RT–52 and to respond to any questions the President may have.³

Earle G. Wheeler

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE Primarily McNamara Recommendations. Top Secret. On November 8 McNamara forwarded copies to the President (ibid.) and to Rusk (Department of State, EA/VN-Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966).
2. See Document 218, footnote 2 thereto, and Document 226.
3. See footnote 4, Document 299, regarding Wheelerʼs meeting with the President.