Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

272. Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, October 15, 1966, 2:40–3:30 p.m.

Vietnam—Manila Conference

The Council Meeting had originally been planned to give Secretary McNamara a chance to report on his visit to Vietnam. However, it was later decided to spend the meeting time discussing the Presidentʼs Asian trip.

Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler see the President alone prior to the NSC Meeting. The purpose of this private session was to have been a discussion of the differences between General Wheeler and the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara with respect to future military actions in Vietnam.

The meeting in the Presidentʼs office included, in addition to Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, the Vice President and possibly the Secretary of Treasury. There is no record of this discussion² but it apparently centered on the differences recorded in memoranda from Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, single copies of which are attached.³

The formal NSC Meeting was opened by the President, who requested Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler and Under Secretary Katzenbach to report briefly on their recent visit to Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara: The military situation in Vietnam is better than he expected it to be. Military preparations are progressing in an entirely satisfactory way. Progress in pacification is less than he had hoped. More emphasis needs to be placed on pacification programs. The pacification situation was worse than it had been when he was last in Vietnam.

We will be in Vietnam longer than we have thought. We should prepare now contingency plans looking toward the future so that if it turns out that we have to stay a long time, we would be prepared to do so.

General Wheeler: There has been substantial improvement in the military situation. The morale of our troops is the best ever.

General Wheeler then gave a short summary of fighting in and along the Demilitarized Zone, citing the activity of the North Vietnamese 324B Regiment. He described Operation Irving⁴ and said that there was still a belief in the field that the North Vietnamese were trying to separate the two most northern provinces from the rest of South Vietnam.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Efforts in the field of pacification are not as good as they should be. Lack of security in many areas prevented progress toward re-establishment of the authority of the South Vietnamese Government. For example, we constructed 65 school rooms in one area, only to have 55 of them destroyed within the year.

The Council then turned to a discussion of the Presidentʼs Asian trip, including the Manila Conference.⁵

Secretary Rusk: The purpose of the conference is to give the President an opportunity to meet with the Heads of State of those countries contributing to the war effort in Vietnam. Although there is basic unity among the seven countries involved, there is rivalry among Korea, Thailand and the Philippines for Asian leadership. The conference will come out satisfactorily for us.

Bill Moyers: The purpose of the Asian trip is to show our friendship for Asian countries rather than accomplish substantive policy gains. There are specific problems which will be encountered in each country, e.g., Malaysia—the rubber problem; Thailand—the internal security problem. In addition, there is the problem of rivalry between Korean President Pak and the Philippines President Marcos.

There followed a discussion of public information problems which was initiated by the President who referred to a leak to Drew Pearson of the substance of the Presidentʼs conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

The President: There should be no backgrounding on the Manila Conference unless it is cleared with Bill Moyers. Our public information must be coordinated. Our Ambassadors in these countries should talk to the heads of government about the dangers of public airing of differences among us as well as the critical need for unity.

Mr. Moyers: We should play down any expectation that a hard peace proposal will come out of the conference. Our emphasis should be on reconstruction in Vietnam after the fighting stops.

Secretary Rusk: Summarized the draft communique (copy attached).⁶

The President: The conference will probably accomplish little so we must consider now how to keep the initiative in the period ahead.

Bromley Smith

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith.
2. For Wheelerʼs record of the discussion, see Document 274 and footnote 3 thereto. The meeting with the President in his office began at 2:10 p. m. and was attended by McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, and Humphrey. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary)
3. Documents 268 and 269.
4. U.S. troops, assisted by South Vietnamese and South Korean soldiers, launched Operation Irving on October 2 against a combined Viet Cong-North Vietnamese force in the central coastal area about 305 miles northwest of Saigon.
5. Filed together with the source text is telegram 66747 to Saigon, October 14, 16 pages, transmitting a paper drafted by William Bundy that discusses the scope and issues of the conference.
6. Not attached.