Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

269. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–672–66

Washington, October 14, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Actions Recommended for Vietnam (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your memorandum to the President, subject as above.² Their views as to the situation in Vietnam and the proper courses of US actions coincide substantially with yours in many areas; however, in some important areas the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with you. For convenience of reference their comments are set forth in subsequent paragraphs in the same sequence and with the same headings as in your memorandum.

2. (TS) Evaluation of the Situation.

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military situation obtaining in Vietnam has improved substantially over the past year. Since the President authorized the deployment of US ground forces to South Vietnam (SVN), Free World military forces have enjoyed an almost unbroken series of successes in combat. The few enemy victories have been gained at the expense of South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force units. Our present posture achieves our often-expressed objective of ensuring that the enemy cannot win militarily in SVN at his current level of effort; our future programs should be geared, as a minimum, to retaining this favorable situation. Our restricted air campaign against North Vietnam (NVN) has destroyed substantial quantities of military supplies and war-supporting facilities, inflicted major damage on lines of communication, and forced the diversion of at least 300,000 men from agriculture and industry to repair and maintenance activities. The demands of communist leaders and leftist sympathizers for cessation of bombing give strong indication of the impact the bombing is having on the North Vietnamese. Widespread and uninhibited Viet Cong (VC) sabotage in SVN over a period of five years has been far less detrimental to a sustained war effort.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree there is no reason to expect that the war can be brought soon to a successful conclusion.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that the enemy strategy appears to be to wait it out; in other words, communist leaders in both North and South Vietnam expect to win this war in Washington, just as they won the war with France in Paris. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is reason for such expectations on the part of the communist leadership.

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that, manpower-wise, the enemy should be able to replace his heavy combat losses. This assessment, however, does not—indeed, cannot—take into account the adverse impact over time of continued bloody defeats on the morale of VC/NVA forces and the determination of their political and military leaders. Pertinent to the foregoing, there is evidence that the VC increasingly must resort to forced conscription to fill their ranks, and that men furnished from NVN to replace casualties suffered by the 324B Division are a mixture of hard-nosed regular soldiers (about 25%), fanatical communist volunteers (about 25%), and unmotivated conscripts (about 50%).

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that pacification (revolutionary development) programs have not been, and are not now, adequate to the situation.

f. Additional Comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that your memorandum addresses only SVN; it does not consider the prospect of the expanding threat in northeast Thailand or Laos, or the requirement for the Free World forces to cope with these threats.

3. (TS) Recommended Actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in your general recommendations that we should continue to press the enemy militarily, improve pacification programs, and attain a military posture we can maintain indefinitely. Their comments on your specific recommendations are:

a. Stabilize US Force Levels—The danger to Government of Vietnam (GVN) viability imposed by inflation is recognized. However, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that a stable, sustainable force level in SVN is desirable, the suggested level of 470,000 is substantially less than earlier recommendations of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve judgment upon the force level required until they have reviewed the revised programs now being prepared under the supervision of Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland at Headquarters, Pacific Command. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out the necessity of having in CONUS, Hawaii, and Okinawa, forces capable of immediate deployment to SVN to cope with contingencies.

b. Install Barriers—The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that barriers properly installed and defended by ground and air effort can impede infiltration into SVN from NVN. As you know, they have reservations concerning the effectiveness of the currently-proposed air-laid munitions barrier; moreover, they consider that this effort must not be permitted to impair current military programs.

c. Stabilize Rolling Thunder—The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in your recommendation that there should be no increase in level of bombing effort and no modification in areas and targets subject to air attack. They believe our air campaign against NVN to be an integral and indispensable part of our over-all war effort. To be effective, the air campaign should be conducted with only those minimum constraints necessary to avoid indiscriminate killing of population.

d. Improve Pacification Program—The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you earlier that, to achieve early optimum effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to COMUSMACV. They adhere to that conclusion. However, if for political reasons a civilian-type organization should be considered mandatory by the President, they would interpose no objection. Nevertheless, they are not sanguine that an effective civilian-type organization can be erected, if at all, except at the expense of costly delays. As to the use of a substantial fraction of the ARVN for pacification purposes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur. However, they desire to flag that adoption of this concept will undoubtedly elicit charges of a US takeover of combat operations at increased cost in American casualties.

e. Press for Negotiations—The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with your proposal that, as a carrot to induce negotiations, we should suspend or reduce our bombing campaign against NVN. Our experiences with pauses in bombing and resumption have not been happy ones. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the likelihood of the war being settled by negotiation is small; and that, far from inducing negotiations, another bombing pause will be regarded by North Vietnamese leaders, and our Allies, as renewed evidence of lack of US determination to press the war to a successful conclusion. The bombing campaign is one of the two trump cards in the hands of the President (the other being the presence of US troops in SVN). It should not be given up without an end to the NVN aggression in SVN. As to maintaining contacts with NVN and the USSR in order to find ways to end the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree; however, they advocate that US personnel involved should reflect a quiet determination to prosecute the war until communist aggression against SVN ceases.

4. (TS) Prognosis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree we cannot predict with confidence that the war can be brought to an end in two years. Accordingly, for political, military, and psychological reasons, we should prepare openly for a long-term, sustained military effort.

5. (TS) Additional Comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the war has reached a stage at which decisions taken over the next sixty days can determine the outcome of the war and, consequently, can affect the over-all security interests of the United States for years to come. Therefore, they wish to provide to you and to the President their unequivocal views on two salient aspects of the war situation: the search for peace; and military pressures on NVN.

a. The frequent, broadly-based public offers made by the President to settle the war by peaceful means on a generous basis, which would take from NVN nothing it now has, have been admirable. Certainly, no one—American or foreigner—except those who are determined not to be convinced, can doubt the sincerity, the generosity, the altruism of US actions and objectives. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time has come when further overt actions and offers on our part are not only nonproductive, they are counterproductive. A logical case can be made that the American people, our Allies, and our enemies alike are increasingly uncertain as to our resolution to pursue the war to a successful conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate the following:

(1) A statement by the President during the Manila Conference of his unswerving determination to carry on the war until NVN aggression against SVN shall cease;

(2) Continued covert exploration of all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement of war; and

(3) Continued alertness to detect and react appropriately to withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from SVN and cessation of support to the VC.

b. In JCSM–955–64, dated 14 November 1964, and in JCSM–982–64, dated 23 November 1964,³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views as to the military pressures which should be brought to bear on NVN. In summary, they recommended a “sharp knock” on NVN military assets and war-supporting facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressure which was adopted. Whatever the political merits of the latter course, we deprived ourselves of the military effects of early weight of effort and shock, and gave to the enemy time to adjust to our slow quantitative and qualitative increase of pressure. This is not to say that it is now too late to derive military benefits from more effective and extensive use of our air and naval superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

(1) Approval of their Rolling Thunder 52 program, which is a step toward meeting the requirement for improved target systems. This program would decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas, authorize attacks against the steel plant,⁴ the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal power plants, selected areas within Haiphong port and other ports, selected locks and dams controlling water LOCs, SAM support facilities within the residual Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries, and POL at Haiphong, Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) and Can Thon (Kep).

(2) Use of naval surface forces to interdict North Vietnamese coastal waterborne traffic and appropriate land LOCs and to attack other coastal military targets such as radar and AAA sites.

6. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views as set forth above be provided to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle J. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret. McNamara noted on his copy of the memorandum that it was received at 8:50 a.m. on October 15 and that a copy was sent to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)
2. Document 268.
3. For text of both memoranda, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 902–906 and 932–935.
4. Inserted in handwriting at this point, apparently by McNamara, is “the cement plant.”